

CAMEROON

**The Stakes and Challenges
of Governance and Development**

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**Edited by
Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong & John Bobuin Gemandze**



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Preface

In November 2005 the department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University Cameroon organized a seminar under the theme “The Challenges of Governance and Development in Cameroon.” The seminar was intended to contribute to contemporaneous issue of Good Governance by identifying the problems faced by Cameroon in this domain and to propose possible solutions. Given the importance currently attached to the concept of good governance, the timing of the seminar could not have been more appropriate. Presenters and participants engaged in very lively discussions throughout the two day period of the seminar.

This volume which is the upshot of that Seminar has contributions from ten prominent and emerging scholars who share their expertise on the various aspects of the subject. Divided into four thematic sections namely, Governance and Development; Governance and the Higher Education System; Governance and the Economy; and Governance and Societal Issues, the volume discusses issues that are intellectually enriching.

We acknowledge with gratitude the financial support provided by the University of Buea without which the seminar would not have been possible. Our gratitude goes to the contributors and participants who, despite the financial and Logistic constraints that obligated us to several postponements, maintained their zeal for and participated in the seminar. All the papers in this volume benefited immensely from the informed comments of participants at the seminar. Useful comments by peer reviewers induced a reworking of some of the chapters.

We highly appreciate their contributions. Our gratitude also goes to all other persons who have contributed in any way directly or indirectly to the success of this volume. The views expressed in the various chapters are, however, those of the individual authors.

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List of Abbreviations

AAU	Association of African Universities
ADB	African Development Bank
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BOP	Balance of Payments
CAMU	Central African Monetary Union (popularly known in its French acronym as CEMAC)
CC	Control of Corruption
CES	Cameroon Ethics Society
CKE	Cameroon Knowledge Economics
CL	Civil Liberties
CPSD	Cameroon Policies for Sustainable Development
DGD	Democracy, Governance and Development
DOs	Divisional Officers
ECAM	Cameroon Institute of Statistics (French acronym)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGU	Good Governance Unit
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HCI	Head Count Index
HIPC-I	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
ICOR	Incremental Output Ratio
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LED	Local Economic Development
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINEDUC	Ministry of National Education
NDP	National Domestic Product
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGP	National Governance programme
NPG	National Programme on Governance
PP	Political Parties
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity

PR	Political Rights
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RL	Rule of Law
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDOs	Senior Divisional Officers
SMP	Social Marginal Productivity
SUMAWs	Senior University management Workshops
UNCITAL	United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
VA	Voice of Accountability

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Introduction

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

Development, whatever it means (and it means different things to different people) is indispensable for the well being of people. Africa, the birth place of the humankind and the cradle of civilization is in dire need of development. Despite the fact that the continent is endowed with enormous human and natural resources that are estimated to be greater than those of almost any other continent in the world (Nkrumah 1963:216), development seems to abhor Africa. And in spite of or indeed, because of the fact that its dependence on foreign aid is the highest in the world (World Bank 2007: 350) Sub-Saharan Africa with a GNI per capita of only 746 \$USA is not only the least developed region in the world, it also has the slowest economic growth rate (World Bank 2006:16).

Thus, of the 50 least developed countries in the world, 34 are in Africa (De Vylder 2007: 20). The situation is so alarming that even in agriculture which is the continent's main stay that had played a dominant role in its local, national and regional economies throughout pre-colonial history, Africa's performance is very dismal. As such, it is pointed out that "African agriculture and rural areas constitute a vast holding ground of immense social and economic misery with potential dramatic impacts on global politics, migration, environment and climate." (Beyene 2007:4). More disturbing is the fact that development "prospects for Africa in the next century do not seem any better" (Ninsin 2000: 9). Given the preceding, the obvious question is, what hinders development in Africa? Is it the nature of the domestic policy environment (The World Bank 1994); policy failures (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 23); the inability of the national bourgeoisie (Amin, 1990: 152); authoritarianism (Joseph, 2003: 10); external factors (Ninsin, 2000: 45); colonial legacies (Fonchingong, 2005: 3); a combination of all of the above, or other yet to be identified factors that constitute obstacles to development in Africa? Without claiming to provide a panacea, this study examines the problems associated with the process of

development in an African country. Many development paradigms have been prescribed and/ or imposed on African countries. Good governance is the latest catchphrase in the kaleidoscopic development discourse. The current obsession with it is reminiscent of the vigour with which the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were pushed down the throats of African states in the 1980s by the international financial lending institutions. Presented as solutions to African financial problems, the SAPs turned out to be instead major problems that have had devastating effects on African economies.

Cameroon, the subject of this study is an African country, situated mid-way between the West and Central regions of the continent. It is often referred to as Africa in miniature mainly because it has all the geographical, cultural and historical characteristics of the continent. Not only is Cameroon like the rest of the continent endowed with acknowledged human and natural resources, but it also enjoys, more than most other African countries, relative peace and stability by virtue of the fact that it is one of the continent's very few countries that have not experienced the trauma of coup d'états and military rule. Yet, in spite of the availability of resources, peace and stability, factors that are conducive to development, Cameroon is as stagnating in its development process as other African countries. The fact that Cameroon's development performance could have been otherwise is evidenced by what a onetime senior German diplomat told a Cameroonian priest, Father Humphrey Tatah Mbuy, Youth Counsellor and Communication Apostolate of the Archdiocese of Bamenda. The diplomat told the clergyman:

Father, If it were possible to make an exchange, we could give you Cameroonians Germany as it is with all its development and Wealth, and take this country Cameroon as it is with all its Supposed poverty. And we would give you a maximum of 10 years And you will regret that you ever gave up this country (CATTU 2008:4)

If the Germans can transform Cameroon into a developed country in just ten years, why have Cameroonians not been able to do so over the decades? In other words, what are the obstacles to development in Cameroon? In November 2005 a two-day seminar was held in the University of Buea under the theme “The Challenges of Governance and Development in Cameroon.” Organized by that university’s Department of Political Science and Public Administration, the seminar was intended to identify the problems faced by Cameroon in its development process and to propose possible solutions. The seminar brought together prominent and emerging scholars from at least four disciplines which included besides political science, history, education and economics who shared their expertise on the various aspects of the subject. This volume resulted from that seminar and it is, *ipso facto*, interdisciplinary in its focus.

This ten-chapter volume is grouped under four thematic sections that relate mainly to the internal or domestic factors that impinge on the good governance and development in Cameroon.

Governance and Development

This section focuses on the extent to which the government implements the good governance programme and whether or not the programme is conducive for development. In chapter one “Governance and Development: A Review of the Debate in the Cameroonian Context,” Gemandze reviews the literature on good governance and then proceeds to examine the government’s good governance policy. His argument is that the World Bank’s conception of good governance which has been adopted by the government is instrumentalist, managerial and technocratic. This approach cannot contribute to development first, because it assumes that the culprit is the public sector whereas traditional public management interventions do not work out well since they focus on ‘fixes’ provided by technical assistance experts from rich countries; and secondly, because the governance policy does not specify any development projects to be implemented. Gemandze concludes that this conception of good governance which is promoted by The World Bank within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programmes does not constitute a viable development strategy for

Africa and that an appropriate development programme for Cameroon and Africa is one that is based on rural development.

In chapter two “Corruption, Governance and Development in Cameroon” Fonchingong examines the relationship between corruption on the one hand and governance and development on the other hand. He argues that although corruption is a world-wide phenomenon from which no society is free, its incidence in Cameroon is so high as to constitute a hindrance to both good governance and development. Corruption hinders development in Cameroon by reducing government revenue, increasing transaction costs, engendering misplaced priorities and impeding foreign investment. By breeding and nurturing inefficiency, injustice, the lack of accountability and of transparency in public management, corruption impedes good governance. Reducing the incidence of corruption to a tolerable level requires an improvement in the working conditions of public employees, the establishment and enforcement of a national code of ethics, the creation of an Independent National Commission for the fight against corruption, and above all, the will to fight corruption on the part of the government.

Forje in chapter three, “Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Cameroon: Challenges and Opportunities,” pinpoints over-centralisation as the main obstacle to development because it hinders popular participation, accountability and equitable distribution of the commonwealth. The result of this, he says, has been wide-spread disillusionment and a greater divide between the governors and the governed. He therefore contends that it is imperative for the government to relinquish some of its enormous powers to the local communities and the private sector in order to facilitate the development process. This requires not only a modernisation of governmental structures and roles, but also a change of approach from the current bureaucratic top-down strategy to a people-focused bottom-up approach so as to ensure responsibility in governance and popular participation in the development process.

Governance and the Higher Education System

The two chapters that make up this section focus on university administration in Cameroon. In chapter four, “Governance in the University System and Students’ Crises in Cameroon,” Abangma examines the causes of students’ strikes in state universities in Cameroon. Using the University of Buea as a case study, he identifies a number of factors that induce students to agitate. The factors which are issues of governance include, among others, a centralised state university system in which students’ rights are not respected; inadequate attention given to welfare concerns of students; poor teaching and learning conditions; the unwillingness of the state to introduce meaningful reforms in the university system and a consequent disenchantment of students with the university system. As solutions to the problem, Abangma proposes the introduction of a good governance policy which entails, among other things, decentralisation of the system to grant greater autonomy to state universities; an improvement in the teaching and learning conditions and the participation of students as well as all other stakeholders in ensuring the proper functioning of the university system.

Titanji’s focus in chapter five “Governance in the University System: The Appointment of Principal officers” is on assessing the criteria of appointing academic personnel to posts of responsibility in state universities in Cameroon. He points out that the appointment of principal officers in state universities in Cameroon is based on scholarly accomplishments and political or ethnic considerations rather than on the basis of administrative expertise. The result is that these officers lack administrative skills, a situation that constitutes a major obstacle in university governance. The operational logic namely, that expertise in teaching and research can successfully be transferred to positions in administration is flawed because there exists an organized body of knowledge meant for university administration. Thus, in order to ensure good governance, Titanji argues for the appropriate training of principal officers of state universities in a six-step approach namely, acknowledging the need for training; job analysis; establishing priority needs; assessing resources; training workshops and evaluation.

Governance and the Economy

This section examines the relationship between governance and economic performance in Cameroon. In chapter six “Governance and Doing Business in Cameroon,” Sikod and Teke assess the relationship between governance and business operations in Cameroon. Using cross-country studies they show that there is an unequivocal relationship between governance and economic performance and that most entrepreneurs interested in doing business in Cameroon are constrained by bad governance which is evidenced mainly by the existence of a high incidence of corruption. As a result, Cameroon is lagging behind in its economic performance indicators. Consequently, if the country’s governance indicators improve, its economic performance will also improve. Taking the queue in chapter seven “Governance and Economic Growth,” Ntangsi identifies in addition to corruption another indicator of the absence of good governance which impedes economic growth in Cameroon. This is the non-enforcement of property rights. He argues that there is a correlation between enforceability of property rights and the measure of economic performance. In other words, that a better enforcement of property rights causes economic growth. Thus, to improve on its economic performance Cameroon needs not only to fight corruption, but also to ensure the enforcement of property rights because lack of commitment to ensure the enforcement of property rights induces low investment and high rent-seeking.

Governance and Societal Issues

Three of the four chapters that make up the fourth and last section of the book are more or less case studies contributed by historians and are therefore historical in perspective. They focus on the media, crisis in land management and the political significance of a work of art. In chapter eight “Governance and the Media in Cameroon 1961-2005,” Mokake examines the extent to which the media contributes to good governance in Cameroon. He points out that the tendency of successive governments has been to use the media as a tool for monopolising ideas and information so as to suppress the voice of the governed. Thus, although the liberalisation measures of the 1990s led to a quantitative boom in media organs,

this has been, due to government manoeuvres, accompanied by a qualitative slump in media performance. The result is that the media in Cameroon has been unable to play the traditional media role of objectively informing and educating the public so as to promote good governance. Mokake maintains that to ensure governmental accountability and responsibility, the media should be allowed to freely perform the function of informing and educating the public because freedom of expression is prerequisite to ensuring good governance. Societal conflict of any type is a hindrance to governance and development. Kah in chapter nine “Governance and Conflict over Land: The case of Aghem-Wum 1966-2005,” shows how male dominance in land control on the one hand and self-interest on the other hand constitute a barrier in the objective resolution of conflict over land (the farmer/grazier conflict) between women and men. Decisions of traditional rulers and administrators on land matters tend to favour graziers because they are richer and therefore more influential than the peasant farmers who are mainly women. As a consequence, the conflict has remained perennial and has since 1966, been the cause of several protests by women (who are the underdogs in the situation) in the form of strikes and street demonstrations which often lasted for several months. Such constant strikes and demonstrations are a barrier to governance and development. To avoid the strikes and street demonstrations, Kah proposes a proper and objective management of land in Aghem which entails the incorporation of women in land management structures and a clear demarcation between farm land and grazing land.

In chapter ten “The *Afo-A-Kom* and Governance in Kom c.1865-1973,” Nkwi shows how, in order to facilitate his governance, the Fon of Kom used a work of art The *Afo-A-Kom* as a symbol of unity in the heterogeneous Kom Fondom. Drawing inspiration from this and the fact that Cameroonian elites both at home and in the USA saw *Afo-A-Kom* from a national rather than Kom perspective, Nkwi argues that instead of only decreeing national unity as was the case in 1972, the Cameroonian leadership, as well as political leaders elsewhere, could use art objects to foster unity. The last chapter is a summary of the main arguments and recommendations made in the book.

Conclusion

The low level of development in Cameroon as in other African countries implies, *inter alia*, high unemployment, low incomes for those fortunate to be employed and poor living conditions in general. This state of affairs constitutes the main push factor in the emigration of Africans- professionals and non professionals alike- to the developed countries especially the West in search of the metaphorical greener pasture. But the emigration of African professionals further compounds its development problems since it results in a shortage of trained personnel especially in the areas such as education and health that are crucial for a society's development and well being. In other words the emigration of African professionals to the developed countries is an obstacle to development in Africa. It is therefore, a vicious circle: low level of development causes emigration; emigration hinders development. The significance of this is that the problems of development in Cameroon and Africa in general are numerous and multifaceted in nature consisting of both internal and external factors.

Among the most significant internal factors that this volume has identified to be a hindrance to development in Cameroon is inappropriate governing style or lack of good governance, the over-centralised nature of the state, lack of accountability all of which result in the existence of an inhibiting high incidence of corruption. The historical slave trade, colonial rule and neo-colonialism are among the major external factors that have rendered and continue to render African countries dependent and underdeveloped. Moreover, some of what are said to be internal factors such as corruption and even the nature of the contemporary African state itself are colonial legacies and could therefore also be regarded as external. In fact, in his *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Rodney (1981) leaves no one in doubt about the role of external factors, not just from Europe but from other developed countries as well, in hindering development in the continent as a whole. Thus, although this volume focuses mainly on the internal factors that hinder development in Cameroon this does not, by any means, imply either that there are no external factors or that they are less important. On the contrary, we believe that because of their importance the external factors deserve a different volume.

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Section One

Governance and Development

Introduction

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

The three chapters that make up the first section of this book focus on the extent to which the government of Cameroon is implementing an appropriate ‘good governance’ programme/policy for development. In chapter one “Governance and Development: A Review of the Debate in the Cameroonian Context,” Gemandze identifies a wrong development approach by the government as an obstacle to good governance in Cameroon. Gemandze points out that the development approach adopted by the government is that of the World Bank. This approach is not conducive to development firstly, because it is, like other traditional public management interventions, based on ‘fixes’ provided by technical assistance experts from rich countries without considering variations in national circumstances. Secondly, and most importantly, because the approach does not specify the type development project or agenda to be implemented. Gemandze maintains that the approach promoted by the World Bank within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme is not a suitable/sustainable development programme/agenda for Cameroon and that an appropriate strategy for Cameroon and Africa should focus on rural development.

A second factor that hinders good governance and *ipso facto* development in Cameroon is what Fonchingong in chapter two refers to as ‘an unacceptably high incidence of corruption. Corruption obstructs good governance and development in a number of ways including engendering and nourishing inequity, inefficacy, the lack of accountability and transparency, reducing government revenue, increasing transaction costs, and impeding foreign investment. The ruinously high incidence of corruption in Cameroon which is evidenced by *inter alia* the classification of the country twice by Transparency International (TI) as the most corrupt in the World is attributed largely to the unwillingness of government to introduce appropriate measures to fight against corruption.

In chapter three, "Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Cameroon: Challenges and Opportunities" Forje focuses on excessive centralisation as one of the impediments to good governance and development in Cameroon. Forje opines that over-centralisation is an obstacle to development because it deters popular participation and erodes accountability. Also, excessive centralisation does not enhance equitable distribution of public resources and this contributes to the appropriation of the commonwealth by a tiny minority of citizens. According to Forje, decentralisation is imperative for the institutionalization of good governance and development in Cameroon. In summary, the three chapters in this section focus on three different obstacle to governance and development in Cameroon – an, inappropriate development policy approach, corruption and over-centralisation.

Chapter One

Governance and Development: A Review of the Debate in the Cameroonian Context

John Bobuin Gemandze

Introduction

Governance has become a catchword in the development discourse today. In fact Kaufmann (2005: 41) states that governance – which remains a sensitive and misunderstood topic – is now being given a higher priority in development circles. This is all the more so especially as it is argued that there is a positive correlation between governance and development. An authoritative statement to this effect is contained in the World Bank's 1989 publication on Africa titled: *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. The Bank asserts that: "Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (World Bank, 1989:60).

It is rather interesting that the Bank could establish this relationship between governance and development especially in the African context because hitherto, the World Bank/IMF as well as Western governments provided unconditional military, economic and financial assistance to authoritarian regimes in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Leftwich, 2000: 35). So why this policy change? Why the sudden concern for governance?

Section 1 of this chapter reviews some definitions of the concept of governance. Section 2 is a brief review of the literature on the 'emergence' and 'evolution' of the current concern for (good) governance. Section 3 focuses on the prospects for governance and development in the Cameroonian context.

The concept of governance

There seems to be as yet no generally accepted definition of the concept of governance. This point is neatly captured by Doornbos: "As is often true with new buzzwords, though, there has hardly been a consensus as to its core meaning and less and less of a

common idea as to how it should be applied more concretely,” (Doornbos, 2004:374). This has led to attempts in the literature at identifying ‘constitutive’ elements of the concept of governance rather than formulating a ‘watertight’ definition. Leftwich (2000:118-123) for instance has identified a variety of definitions of the concept of governance which could be grouped into three broad categories.

Firstly, systemic or regime-level governance. From a broad systemic point of view, the concept of governance is wider than that of government. The latter conventionally refers to the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision-making in the modern state (Leftwich, 2000:118). ‘Governance’, on the other hand, refers to a looser and wider distribution of both internal and external political and economic power. In this broad sense, governance denotes the structures of political and, crucially, economic principles and relationships and rules by which the total productive and distributive life of a society is governed (Leftwich, 2000:118). Leftwich (2000) also notes that a neutral reading would suggest that regimes may differ greatly and hence cultures of governance may also do. But there can be little doubt that standing behind much of the rhetoric and apparently neutral technical language surrounding the concept of good governance in current development usage has been this wider, normative and systemic understanding of the term. Quite simply, it means a democratic capitalist regime presided over by a minimalist state which is part of the wider governance of the new world order (Leftwich, 2000: 118-119).

Secondly, good governance as participatory politics and (sometimes) democratic government. This involves a more limited and political meaning of the concept of good governance. It also explicitly means a state enjoying legitimacy and authority, derived from a participatory (not always democratic) mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, (Leftwich, 2000: 119).

Thirdly, good governance as managerial/administrative efficiency and probity. Leftwich asserts that this level represents the lowest, narrowest and most universal common denominator of meaning and usage of the term ‘good governance’. It is presented (at least from the perspective of the World Bank) as being detached from

political considerations (Leftwich, 2000:120-121). The World Bank thus focuses on four main areas of public administration:

- i. Accountability;
- ii. A legal framework for development;
- iii. Information, that is, information about economic conditions, budgets, markets, and government intentions must be reliable and accessible to all.

Transparency

This involves a call for open government, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate consultative processes between government and the private interests over policy development (Leftwich, 2000:121).

From another perspective, Swilling (1997: 4) asserts that the term governance is defined in a number of different ways in the literature and in African political discourse. He identifies four basic positions.

- First, the crude prescriptive position of many international development agencies who equate 'good governance' with the classic liberal democratic model (Swilling, 1997:4).
- The second focuses on state-society relations.
- The third views governance as an ideological device chosen by post-Cold War Western Governments to mask the imposition of capitalist market policies.
- The fourth approach goes beyond the first three normative and critical approaches by attempting to theorize what Hyden calls the 'governance realm' (Swilling, 1997:5).

The emergence and evolution of concern for 'governance'

The contemporary origins as well as the evolution of the current concerns for governance are well documented in the literature from different perspectives (Leftwich, 2000; Demeke, 2000; Doornbos, 2004; Whitman, 2005). For instance in the British context, Whitman traces the 'development' of the 'governance' concept to the publication of a book by former Prime Minister Harold Wilson titled: *The Governance of Britain* (Whitman, 2005:16). According to Leftwich (2000:109-116), the origins and emergence of the concern with 'governance' can be attributed to the following four factors:

The experience of structural adjustment in the 1980s

Structural adjustment involved stabilization, for instance, devaluation and drastic public expenditure cuts; as well as adjustment which sought to transform economic structures and institutions through varying doses of deregulation, privatization, dismantling or diminishing allegedly over-sized and rambling public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies (Leftwich, 2000:10). However instead of being a purely technical/technocratic measure, structural adjustment turned out to be highly political because it resulted in 'winners' and 'losers'. The experience with adjustment in the 1980s confronted the international institutions and bilateral donors with the reality of incompetent and often corrupt government in many developing countries (Leftwich, 2000:111).

The political influence of the neo-classical counter-revolution

Leftwich state that even though the World Bank and the IMF have considerable operational autonomy and are often independent sources of important development ideas, initiatives and policy, it remains the case that, politically, they are ultimately the creatures of their members and hence influences and fashions feed through from the said members – and from dominant ones in particular – such as the USA, Japan, Germany, Britain and France. Although thinking on these matters was clearly developing within the Bank and the IMF, the new orthodoxy came to reflect the emerging neo-liberal ascendancy in economic theory and politics from the late 1970s in these countries, notably the USA and Britain (Leftwich, 2000:112).

However neo-liberalism is not only an economic doctrine but a political one as well, involving strong normative and functionalist theories of politics and the state (Leftwich, 2000: 112). In normative terms, neo-liberal theory celebrates individual economic and political freedom as representing the good life itself. Beyond the preservation of peace and order, it is hostile to state limitation on the rights of individuals (Leftwich, 2000:112-113). Furthermore, outside but parallel to, the normative claims of politicians about the virtues of individualism, enterprise and minimal sates, political scientists operating within the revived tradition of political economy, also contributed to the new interest in governance. Their attack on the

obesity of states in the developing world was based less on normative objections and more on theoretical claims that large and interventionist states, with too much control or regulation of economic life, would necessarily suffocate the evolution of thriving market economies and provide tempting opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption (Leftwich, 2000:113).

The collapse of communism

According to Leftwich (2000: 114), the collapse of communism was another important strategic factor helping to shape the emergence of western interest in promoting good governance. Furthermore, the demise of official twentieth century ‘communism’ served to confirm neo-liberal theory that bureaucratically sclerotic, non-democratic collectivist systems were both unable to produce sustained economic growth and unable to change. Corruption, economic mismanagement, inefficiency and stagnation all flowed directly from their grotesque bureaucracies and lack of popular democratic participation. Political liberalization, administrative decentralization, reducing bureaucratic controls and the promotion of good governance on the essentially Western model were seen as necessary conditions for economic liberalization and growth (Leftwich, 2000:114-115).

The importance of the pro-democracy movements

The pro-democracy movements in Latin America, the Philippines and latterly Eastern Europe in the 1980s stimulated similar movements throughout the world especially in Africa. The West drew legitimacy for its pro-democracy policies from these movements and could thus be considered as supporting popular and intellectual demands for good governance in the societies concerned (Leftwich, 2000:115).

Governance and prospects for development in Cameroon

Conceptualizing governance in the Cameroonian context

Before examining the prospects for governance and development in the Cameroonian context, it is important first of all to assert (and in unequivocal terms), that the concept of governance is

applicable and indeed relevant in the Cameroonian context. This is obvious especially if we adopt Kaufmann, Kraay and Yoido-Lobaton (2000: 10), who define governance as the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions (Kaufmann et al., 2000:10). A most appropriate complement to this definition is offered by Boeninger, (1991) who identifies three dimensions of governance: political, technical and institutional:

Establishing objectives and exercising leadership clearly come under the political dimension. The constraints imposed by natural resources, levels of education, manpower skills, and installed industrial capacity represent the technical dimension, and the ability to get things done involves the institutional and managerial dimensions (Boeninger, 1991:268).

Boeninger (1991) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Yoido-Lobaton (2000) offer a much more holistic conception of governance, in contrast to the instrumentalist, managerial and technocratic approach (Konings, 2000) adopted by the World Bank. This approach could be adopted and applied on the basis of the theoretical framework for governance proposed by Stoker (1998). The major advantage of this approach is that it is much more appropriate to the Cameroonian/African context, in contrast to the instrumentalist, managerial technocratic approach (Konings, 2000), adopted by the World Bank.

Governance policy

The Government of Cameroon formally adopted a governance policy in June 2000. This policy has been reviewed and amended twice – firstly in 2004 and secondly in 2006.

The 2000 National Programme on Governance (NPG)

The 2000 policy document titled: *National Programme on Governance* (NPG) identified the following three major strategic objectives of the governance programme:

- a) Effective and transparent management of the state.
- b) Effective participation of the population and consolidation of the partnership between the Public Sector, the Private Sector and Civil Society.
- c) A State where there is the rule of law and equal access to justice through an efficient judicial system.

The document was also presented as a *Comprehensive Strategy for the implementation of the National Programme on Governance and the Fight against Corruption*. Furthermore, the Government identified the following six priority areas of intervention within the framework of the National Governance Programme:

- Administrative Reform;
- Improvement of Economic and Financial Management;
- Fight against Corruption;
- Decentralization and improvement in the supply of essential services.
- The participation of citizens, the Private Sector and Civil Society in the management of Public affairs.
- Reform of the judiciary (Government of Cameroon, 2000:8-17).

The 2004 National Programme on Governance

In 2004, the Government amended the 2000 NPG. It adopted a new NPG document titled: 'Cameroon: The Way Forward for Good Governance'. This policy document is essentially an evaluation of the 2000 NPG. Again the question of health governance is not taken into consideration. However in chapter 8 titled: 'Strategy to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion', the Government acknowledges that: 'the human development indicators deteriorated considerably during the years of crisis, notably in the sectors of education, health and infrastructure', and more specifically, that:

...the people's health status has deteriorated in comparison with the early 90s. Infant mortality increased by 12 points between 1991 and 1998, chronic malnutrition for children aged 12 to 23 months rose from 23% to 29%; the rate of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel dropped by 5 points during the same period; HIV/AIDS incidence soared from 0.5% to 11.8 % among the 15 to 49 group between 1991 and 2002 (Government of Cameroon. 2004:79).

The 2006 National Programme on Governance

The Government adopted another revised version of the National Programme on Governance in 2006. According to the coordinator of the programme, this revision was 'necessitated by the need for Cameroon to resolutely integrate into that strong wind of change so that the NGP can become the "road map" for the public sector, the private sector and civil society alike for the period 2006 to 2010' (p. 15). The following six major priority areas were identified:

- a) Modernizing the justice system.
- b) Modernizing the management of the public sector.
- c) Improving the management of public finances.
- d) The anti-corruption policy.
- e) Improving the business climate.
- f) Modernizing the electoral system.

Prospects for development


Firstly it is important to note that our governance policy is not comprehensive. In fact the UN (2000) within the framework of the African Governance Inventory (AGI) has identified the following ten (10) main governance areas (see figure 1 below):

- Peace and stability.
- Socio-economic management.
- Parliamentary system.
- Communication, press and media.
- Civil society empowerment.
- Decentralization.
- Rule of law and human rights.

- Public Administration.
- Leadership building.
- Electoral system.

The governance policy as reviewed above only focuses on six major areas. Peace and stability as well as leadership building for instance do not form part of the core areas of the governance programme in Cameroon.

Figure 1.1: Major Governance Areas



Source: UN (2000) African Governance Inventory

It is clear from this brief review of governance policy that the prospects for our current governance policy contributing to sustainable development are rather bleak. Firstly, because the 2000 governance policy as amended in 2004 and 2006 does not contain or specify any development project or agenda that has to be implemented, even though (good) governance is said to be a prerequisite for development (World Bank, 1989).

Secondly, the government has adopted the conception of governance as managerial/administrative efficiency and probity (Leftwich, 2000; Konings, 2002). This conception of governance is inappropriate in the Cameroonian context. This approach to governance assumes that ‘the culprit is the public sector in developing countries’ (Kaufman, 2005). Yet traditional public sector management interventions have not worked because they have focused on technocratic “fixes,” often done through technical assistance importing hardware, organisational templates and experts from rich countries (Kaufman, 2005:42). It is a conception of governance promoted by the World Bank within the framework of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and as we all know today, (SAPs) at least from the perspective of development studies do not constitute a viable and sustainable development strategy (Cornia et al., 1992; Mkandawire & Olukoshi, 1995). In fact, the failure of SAPs in Cameroon is well documented in the literature. For instance Mbaku (2004: 410 – 421) has analyzed the impact of structural adjustment in Cameroon from four main perspectives: external indebtedness; macroeconomic; poverty alleviation and institutional reforms.

Firstly, from the perspective of the country’s international indebtedness. A major objective of the adjustment programmes was to help the adjusting African countries deal more effectively with their debts. Thus, successful adjustment was expected to significantly reduce debt levels and allow these countries to devote more of their export earnings to poverty alleviation programmes (Mbaku, 2004: 410 – 411).

However, as table 1 below shows, adjustment has not led to any significant reduction in Cameroon’s external debt. Table 1 shows the evolution of the country’s external debt for the same period. In 2002 the external debt stood at US \$ 8.555 million as against US \$ 2.588 in 1980, which is an increase of about 230 per cent.

Table 1.1: Evolution of Total External Debts of Cameroon (1980-2002)

Year	Total External Debt (US \$ million)
1980	2,588
1989	4,678
1988	4,778
1989	5,440
1990	6,679
1991	6,415
1992	6,898
1992	7,415
1993	7,456
1994	8,326
1995	9346
1996	9,515
1997	9,372
1998	9,966
1999	9,485
2000	9,299
2001	8,401
2002	8,555

Source: *Mbaku (2004:412) World Bank, Global Development Finance (2005)*

Secondly, from the macroeconomic perspective: effective adjustment was also expected to improve macroeconomic performance and reverse the downward trend in national output as measured by GDP (Mbaku, 2004: 413). Table 1.3 contains information on per capita growth rates for selected African countries. Comparing the periods 1981 – 1986 and 1978 – 1991, we realize that Cameroon registered a – 12.5 per cent per capita growth rate. Furthermore, table 1.2 presents the evolution of GDP in Cameroon for 22 years (i.e. 1980 - 2002). It is interesting to note that GDP in 2002 was lower than it was in 1996.

The situation is further compounded by the fact that gross public investment has been on a steady decline since 1980. Table 1.4 below contains data on gross public investment (GPI) for selected oil producing countries in the Central African Monetary Union. In 2002 for instance, gross public investment in Cameroon as per cent of GDP stood at 1.0 as against 5.4 for Gabon; 8.6 for Congo and 22.2 for Chad.

Table 1.2: Evolution of Gross Domestic Product in Cameroon (1980-2002)

Year	Gross Domestic Product real (million of US dollars)
1980	6,319†
1988	11,344*
1989	11,138*
1990	10,458*
1991	10,060*
1992	9,748*
1992	7,748†
1993	7,909†
1994	7,711†
1995	7,965†
1996	8,364†
1997	8,790†
1998	9,233†
1999	9,639†
2000	10,044†
2001	10,576†
2002	11,020†

Source: *Mbaku (2004:409); World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2004*

NB: *** Constant 1987 prices

††† Constant 1995 prices

Table 1. 3: Gross Domestic Product per Capita Growth Rates for Selected African Countries

Country	Average annual growth rate (%), 1981-1986	Average annual growth rate (%), 1987-1991	Difference between the two periods (% points)
Benin	1.1	-2.0	-3.1
Central African Republic	-0.1	-2.8	-2.6
Rwanda	0.4	-5.0	-5.5
Sierra Leone	-2.1	0.8	2.9
Togo	-2.8	-1.4	1.4
Zambia	-3.2	-2.3	0.9
Mozambique	-5.9	1.7	7.6
Congo (Brazzaville)	4.1	-0.7	-4.9
Côte d'Ivoire	-4.2	-6.8	-2.6
Cameroon	4.6	-7.9	-12.5
Gabon	-2.7	-1.9	0.9

Source: World Bank (1994), *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead*, Oxford University Press: New York, P. 138 in (Mbaku, 2004:414)

Table 1. 4: Gross Public Investment for Selected Francophone African Countries (1980-2002)

Country	Gross Public Investment as % of GDP										
	1980	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Cameroon	4.4	1.8	1.3	1.2	0.5	1.0	2.0	2.3	1.4	2.1	1.6
Senegal	5.5	3.8	5.0	4.4	6.4	6.4	7.2	8.3	6.7	6.4	9.1
Cote d'Ivoire	11.4	4.9	5.1	5.1	4.9	5.4	6.0	4.2	2.8	1.8	3.2
Mali	n.a	9.3	13.9	9.4	9.2	8.2	9.5	9.4	9.1	7.8	8.2
Guinea	n.a	6.2	5.9	6.3	3.9	8.2	5.6	9.2	7.1	7.1	1.8

Source: World Bank (2004) African Development Indicators, pp 23

Thirdly, from the perspective of poverty alleviation, Mbaku (2004) asserts that although the data on economic performance in Cameroon since the country began its adjustment programmes indicate continued deterioration, the story is not complete. It is difficult to see from that information how the poor and many historically, marginalized groups have suffered from the implementation of the SAPs. However, there is a lot of circumstantial evidence to indicate the extent to which poor Cameroonians are being subjected to additional hardships through the government's adjustment programmes (Mbaku, 2004: 415).

Table 1. 5 (a): Countries Suffering Setbacks in Human Development Index, 1999

HDI Lower than in 1975	HDI Lower than in 1980	HDI Lower than in 1985	HDI Lower than in 1990	HDI Lower than in 1995
Zambia	Romania	- Botswana	- Belarus	- Malawi
	Russian	- Bulgaria	- Cameroon	- Namibia
	Federation	- Burundi	- Kenya	
	Zimbabwe	- Congo	- Lithuania	
		- Latvia	- Moldova,	
		- Lesotho	Rep. of South	
			Africa	
			- Swaziland	
			- Ukraine	

Source: *Adapted from UNDP (2001) Human Development Report 2001, p. 10*

Table 1. 5 (b): Countries Suffering Setbacks in Human Development Index 1990-2000

- *Botswana*
- *Cameroon*
- *Central African Republic*
- *Congo*
- *Congo D. R.*
- *Côte d'Ivoire*
- *Kazakhstan*
- *Kenya*
- *Lesotho*
- *Moldova, Rep of*
- *Russian Federation*
- *South Africa*
- *Swaziland*
- *Tadjikistan*
- *U. R. Tanzania*
- *Ukraine*
- *Zambia*
- *Zimbabwe*

Source: Adapted from UNDP (2005) Human Development Report 2005, pp. 23

In fact, the data on tables 1. 5a and b above are indicative of the deteriorating social condition in the country as it has suffered setbacks in human development indicators. Also, the reduction or rolling-back of the public sector as part of SAP resulting in the retrenchment of thousands of state employees has contributed to the high level and intensity of poverty, in the country (Durang, 2000).

Fourthly, from the perspective of institutional reforms: the government's general approach to reforms especially with respect to public sector retrenchment has been to protect the jobs of top civil servants in an effort to retain the loyalty of an important support base for the regime (Mbaku, 2004: 419). In fact, the objectives of reducing the size of the public sector have not been

attained. In addition to the persistence of the phenomenon of 'Ghost Workers', recruitments into the civil service has resumed. Worse still, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of cabinet positions and ministerial Departments.

Finally, Cameroon's governance policy/programme may not lead to the institutionalization of an effective and viable local governance system in the country. An important feature of governance is decentralization. Yet, the political culture of the governing elite (Le Vine, 2004) is not conducive either for the formulation and implementation of an effective and viable decentralization policy or the establishment of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and networks. Yet (good) local governance is indispensable for effective and sustainable development as well as poverty alleviation and empowerment at grassroots level (Loada, 2002; Gemandze, 2003).

Governance and Development in Cameroon: Bringing in Rural Development

The importance of rural development

Ake (1996:142), states that if people are the agents, the means and the end of development, then development has to be construed initially as rural development generally and more specifically as agricultural development. According to Chowdhury and Islam (1993), the fundamental importance of agriculture to economic development was first expounded by Johnston and Mellor (1961). They argued that agriculture provided five vital contributions to the development process:

- (1) meeting the demand for food for a growing population, as long as this was consistent with comparative advantage; (2) providing a source of foreign savings or earnings; (3) providing a source of savings for investment in development of other sectors, mainly industry; (4) providing human resources and raw materials for other sectors; (5) providing an internal market for the goods and services of other sectors (industry and services) (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993:57).

A classic statement on the importance of rural development is offered by Guy (1970):

It is in the rural sector in many developing countries that indigenous resources of men and land are underused, there that nutrition can be tackled; there that success would do most to slow the immigration to major cities, to provide a market for existing and new industries and services and to give the chance for restructuring education to meet the practical needs of a prosperous and diversified rural economy. Finally, it is there that some redress of the gross inequality in income distribution can be started, (Guy, 197:1).

The importance of rural development has been reiterated by the World Bank (1997). According to the Bank, sustainable rural development can make a powerful contribution to four critical goals:

- (i) Poverty reduction;
- (ii) Widely shared growth;
- (iii) Household, national and global food security;
- (iv) Sustainable natural resource management.

The Bank further asserts that its objectives of poverty reduction, widely shared growth, food security and sustainable natural resource management cannot be met unless rural development in general and a thriving agricultural economy in particular, are nurtured and improved (World Bank, 1997:1).

The imperative of rural development

The adoption of SAPs has meant the adoption of a wrong development strategy/agenda. In the African context, the most appropriate development strategy is one aimed at the promotion of the rural sector (Ake, 1996). In fact, The World Bank (2003) has underscored the importance of the rural sector to the Cameroonian economy:

The rural sector remains an important contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP), accounting to about one-third. Over the last few years (1997-2000), the rural sector GDP has been growing faster than the rest of the economy, at close to 7 percent compared to 4.5 percent for the economy (World Bank, 2003:7).

The World Bank further states that rural areas account for the majority (80 per cent) of the poor. The agricultural sector which is the key income generating activity in the rural sector is therefore likely to have high growth elasticity to poverty reduction (World Bank, 2003:1).

It is therefore imperative to mainstream rural development in our governance policy. This is all the more imperative as the World Bank (2003) cautions that the pursuit of the recent pattern of economic growth is increasingly limited, because of the progressive exhaustion of the country's oil reserves. This places agricultural development as a key source of future economic growth as well as an instrument of poverty alleviation (World Bank, 2003:1).

Conclusion

The relationship between governance and development must not be assumed or taken for granted. We must begin by asking (at least) these two pertinent questions: *Which governance?*; *Which development?* As regards the first question, it is clear that the instrumentalist, managerial and technocratic approach to governance underpinned by neo-liberalism and a capitalist development agenda, is inappropriate in the Cameroonian context. Concerning the second question, it is also clear that from a governance perspective, there can be no sustainable development unless our governance policy/programme adopts or includes an appropriate development agenda or project. In the Cameroonian context, the most appropriate and sustainable development agenda/project would be that of rural development.

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Chapter Two

Corruption, Governance and Development in Cameroon

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

Introduction

Of all vices in modern society corruption is one of the most pervasive, and although it is currently held to be one of the main obstacles to economic progress in the developing countries, its current existence is, irrespective of its origin, not society bound. In other words, corruption exists in all societies albeit at different degrees. Corruption is a vice, a pathological behaviour associated with public officials because state employees everywhere almost always have some discretionary powers and monopolistic advantages. These powers are likely to be abused unless the holders of public office are closely supervised. Unfortunately, governments are sometimes unable to exercise close control over their employees. In the developed countries, government efforts in controlling public employees are supplemented by those of an informed public opinion. In the developing countries, on the other hand, the public is generally uninformed, and sees government as represented by the bureaucrats to be mystical in its functions and terrifying in its regulations.

Consequently, in approaching a civil servant, the client is not generally an informed citizen requesting a service to which he is entitled, but a subject seeking to appease a powerful person whose ways he cannot fathom. Where the modern and informed citizen may demand, he begs or flatters so that any service rendered him appears to be a privilege, not a right. He therefore understands, so he thinks, that unless he does something to show appreciation for this “unusual kindness” and to create a lasting acquaintance, he may not be served next time around. The intensity of this abnormality is greater in societies like Cameroon where state employees are not forbidden by law to accept gifts from members of the public they are employed to serve. The result is that even people who denounce corruption usually engage in corrupt acts

under the cloak of showing appreciation for work well done. If this be the case why is Cameroon more corrupt than other developing or even African countries? And to what extent does corruption affect governance and development in Cameroon? The purpose of this Chapter is to provide answers to the above questions.

Despite the universality of corruption, there is no single commonly accepted definition of it. This is because societies differ in their views about what constitutes corruption. As such what may be regarded as an act of corruption in one society may be regarded as normal behaviour in another society. Scholars too disagree on its causes and effects. The result is that definitions of corruption abound while consensus is lacking. Bribery and corruption are often used together and although the two concepts are somewhat similar, they are neither synonymous nor interchangeable. Normatively defined, bribery refers to the illegal giving and receiving of something in order to influence action or inaction in favour of the giver. Corruption is, on the other hand, behaviour that deviates from accepted norms so as to serve private interest. It is therefore a broader concept. It includes bribery, embezzlement or misappropriation, fraud, graft, favouritism, nepotism etc. Administratively, that is, from the perspective of the corrupted, corruption refers to the abuse or misuse of public power/office/position/role of trust or resources for private benefit (Girling 1997; Alatas 1990. Thompson 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Mulinge & Lesetedi 2000.)

Origin of Corruption

Corruption seems to be inherent in the nature of man which according to conservative thinkers is selfish, wicked and aggressive rather than peaceful and cooperative. This nature of man is manifested in what Oliver de Sardan (1999) calls the “logic of predatory authority” according to which any person wielding power considers it his right to exact dues from his subordinates or from the people he is supposed to serve, or help himself to the funds he is called upon to manage on behalf of society. If this be the case, why are some societies more corrupt than others? A possible explanation is that the norms and values of some societies are more conducive to the logic of predatory authority than those of other societies. The western value of individualism, for instance, manifest

in the capitalist principle of aggressive search for private profit as opposed to the communal principle of socialism inescapably induces and nurtures the serving of private rather than general interest. Hence, in Cameroon as elsewhere in Africa, Corruption is known to be a colonial legacy (Robb 1992).

Colonialism introduced corruption in Africa in essentially three ways namely, the introduction of monetary economy, cash taxation and the use of the divide and rule method. First, corruption requires a well developed monetary economy characterized by a clear differentiation of interest to thrive. Such economic system did not exist in pre-colonial Africa. Thus, the introduction of monetary economy by the colonial government “laid the structural groundwork for the origins and sustenance of corrupt practices” (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002:54). The introduction of compulsory cash taxation in the forms of hut and later, poll tax constituted a second avenue of corruption only because of the manner in which tax was collected. The colonial rulers relied on local African leaders to collect taxes. And as a motivation the latter were allowed to pocket a part of the money collected, “a practice that amounted to the taking of kickbacks by African Chiefs” (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002:55) and became a principal method for accumulation of private property (Leonard 1991), a way of life that became difficult to give up just as corruption has become. Thus, Tlou and Campbell (1984: 44) rightly point out that the “financial gains accruing from the amount pocketed from taxes blinded the chiefs to the plight suffered by their people as a consequence of taxation.”

The technique of divide and rule adopted by colonial authorities to subdue and control Africans constituted a third link between corruption and colonialism. The technique of divide and rule involved the practice of favouring one tribe over others with the dual objective of securing the loyalty of that group to the administration and encouraging rivalry among the groups to prevent a sense of unity from growing and threatening colonial rule.

The favoured groups were rewarded with access to western education (Kalinga 1985) and government sponsored economic opportunities (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002). This resulted in high regional variations in levels of educational attainment such that at independence those favoured had an edge over those not favoured and constituted the beginning of an African elite class that was to

dominate the political and economic life of the post-colonial African countries. Unfortunately, the socialization of this elite class into a culture that excluded the majority in favour of only a selected few sowed the seeds of corrupt practices such as tribalism and nepotism that have become deeply rooted in Africa. As Nyong'o (2006: 4) aptly puts it in the case of Kenya, which is equally applicable to other African countries, "we decided to inherit from the colonialists the good, the bad and the ugly in governance, corruption remaining at the centre of what subsequently came to be known as neo-colonialism."

The Nature of Corruption

Where it exists corruption presents itself in exactly the same way. Thus, in all societies the scale of corruption, that is, the average value of private and public goods and services involved in corrupt exchange, increases directly with status while the incidence of corruption or the frequency of corrupt acts varies inversely with status (Huntington 1986). Within a society corruption has three major inducements. These include (a) pecuniary considerations in which corrupt acts are intended to result in material or financial gains for the corrupted; (b) Kinship sentiments and favouritism. This is otherwise referred to as tribalism, nepotism and other forms of favouritism; and (c) superior's fevers, that is, when a boss requests a subordinate to bend the rules and the subordinate complies in order to gain the favour of the boss.

In Cameroon all the three inducements exist and the incidence of corruption is high, very high indeed as evidenced by the Corruption Perception Index of (CPI) of Transparency International which showed Cameroon to be the most corrupt country in the world (1998 and 1999). But if corruption is, as shown above, a colonial legacy then why is Cameroon more corrupt than other developing or even African countries? As in other African Countries corruption existed in Cameroon since the colonial days and its incidence has been increasing more or less with the pace of westernization/modernization until the advent of the economic crisis. The incidence of corruption peaked in the 1990s and is attributable to the excruciating effects of the economic crisis that started in the late 1980s. The economic crisis necessitated a drastic

reduction of the salaries of state employees in Cameroon by 60 per cent in 1993 as well as massive layoffs of workers in both state-owned and private companies. As if that was not enough the currency, the franc CFA was devalued by 50 per cent in early 1994. Following the devaluation of the Franc CFA other African countries in the franc zone were forced by pressure from workers to double salaries so as to offset the effects of the currency devaluation. In Cameroon, organized pressure by workers was lacking and so instead of doubling salaries the government proceeded to further reduce the already highly reduced and devalued salaries. This state of affairs, that is, a highly reduced and devalued purchasing power accompanied by poor working conditions (absence or inadequate and dilapidated equipment) threw the Cameroonian state employee into a lethargy such that only either extra motivation (bribe) by individual users of public services or the possibility of embezzling public funds could activate him.

Corruption has, in this way, become a way of life in Cameroon to the extent of developing its own concepts/vocabulary: K percent, the bribe given by bidders for government contracts to officials in the contract control channels; 30 per cent, the bribe given to treasury and other finance officials by those who have government bills to be settled; *gombo*, the bribe given to journalists to induce a preferred view of reporting events etc. Referring to corruption and inertia in the Cameroonian public service, President Paul Biya tells his compatriots that "I have often denounced these ills, but it must be admitted that they are still there" (Cameroon Tribune, 22 September 2002). The implication here is that President Biya thinks that he can exorcise corruption by denouncement alone.

The massive layoffs referred to above resulted, as it were, in high unemployment and a consequent scramble for scarcer and scarcer job opportunities. This in turn exacerbated tribalism and favouritism in public service recruitment as those in position of power would stop at nothing to ensure the success of their kins or those who can bribe their way.

While it is true that economic crisis and the consequent sharp fall in the purchasing power of the Cameroonian state employees aggravated the incidence of corruption, it must be pointed out that the persistence of the hardship and *ipso facto*, the high incidence of

corruption is due to the failure of Cameroonians in general to mobilize in defence of their rights. In other words, the inability of Cameroonians to rally together and claim their rights (better pay package, improved conditions of work and even the fight against corruption itself) from political authorities is the cause of the persistent high incidence of corruption in Cameroon. As such, some scholars have tended to argue that the cause of corruption in Cameroon is political (lack of culture of democracy) rather than economic (salary slash, poverty, poor conditions of work) (GERDDES 1999:66). Corruption exists in all societies including even those which have democratic cultures in which citizens have the habit of mobilising in defence of their rights. The issue here is therefore, the high incidence and not the mere existence of corruption in Cameroon.

Corruption in Cameroon

Although the customs department, the judiciary and the forces of Law and Order (police and gendarme) are often cited as being the most corrupt services in Cameroon, the scourge has permeated the society such that no area of the public service is free from it. Consequently, both of what Oliver de Sardan (1999:250) calls “big-time corruption and petty corruption” exist in Cameroon. Big-time corruption involves presidents, ministers, directors and heads of public corporations, while petty corruption is practised by junior public officials. Thus, the manifestations of corruption in Cameroon are so multifarious and numerous that it would require several volumes of a book to contain them. Consequently, only a few examples can be shown here.

Before mentioning specific examples it should be noted that, in general, corruption takes place in the award of contracts in all government services in the form of kickbacks to top officials and smaller amounts of money to junior officials.

The Customs Services

In the customs service, corruption is practised through, inter alia, lien and abusive seizure of goods to attract tips from customers; the use of false documents through splitting of bills of lading to divide payment of customs duties into small amounts so that the

beneficiary is obliged to 'show appreciation' to the official; and the use of special waivers by which business men bribe for their goods to be placed under 'temporary admission' which exempts them from paying duties (GERDDES 1999: 65).

The Taxation Department

Tax officials in the taxation department receive bribes either to undervalue the taxable business of a client or turn a blind eye in case of evasion.

The Forces of Law and Order and the Civil Service

To enter a public professional school or to get a job in the public service, it must be either through bribing or the intervention of a godfather. If a candidate gets in through a godfather, he is compelled to be completely loyal and obedient to his benefactor who more often than not forces him into sordid practices. If the candidate got in by bribing, he will do everything once on the job to recover his money. This explains the graft that is observed daily on the roads and government offices (GERDDES 1999). Civil servants bribe other civil servants especially those of the ministries of finance and public service for their files to be processed.

The Judiciary

In the judicial department corruption is practised both between the clients and the members of the judiciary and among officials of the judiciary themselves. For instance, a litigant bribes a magistrate to win a case and the magistrate bribes the court registrar to draw up the decision (GERDDES 1999:45). Or again, a bailiff is obliged to give money to the police man who is supposed, as provided for by law, to accompany him in the conduct of his duty.

Education

In public schools especially in the urban areas parents bribe principals for their children to be admitted and teachers to take 'special care' of their children.

In the case of some mature female students the phenomenon of sexually transmitted marks (STM) comes into play, that is, the male teacher goes to bed with the female student to give her a pass grade.

The Electoral Process

Corruption is as rife in the electoral process as in other areas of the public sector. Thus, either for pecuniary considerations, superior's favours or both, election officials (Members of Electoral Commissions, Divisional officers (DOs); Presidents of Courts and Members of the Supreme Court) each in their own areas manipulate the results through various forms of rigging in favour of the ruling party. During election periods senior government officials return to their areas of origin armed with huge sums of money from the public till with which to bribe officials and some individuals to rig elections. Thus, since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1990, no election has been free and fair with the June 2007 twin elections (parliamentary and municipal) being the most rigged (*The Herald*, 24 February 2005).

Corruption and Governance

The term governance which has become the latest catch phrase in the kaleidoscopic development concept remains rather vague. It is defined in managerial terms by the World Bank (1992:1) as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country's economic and social resources for development: it is supposed to be brought about by enhanced accountability within the public sector, transparency in decision making, the rule of law and efficiency in the management of public resources (Sandbrook 2000), and as required by bilateral donors, (Konings 2003), democratization to ensure, among other things, regular, free and fair elections as a means of elite circulation.

If transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of public resources as well as free and fair elections are the requirements or prerequisites for good governance, then good governance cannot exist in Cameroon because the high incidence of corruption is inimical to these requirements. Since elections in Cameroon are not free and fair, they are organized for symbolic reasons (to seek the support of the masses) rather than for political reasons (elite circulation.) There is thus, a constant quest by the regime to preserve the logic and assets of the one party rule, that is, the absence of alternance in power. To do so the regime does everything it can- draws up legal instruments in its favour; corrupts,

by granting undue benefits to the institutions in charge of conducting and validating elections (the magistracy and the ministry of territorial administration) and to the military and the forces of law and order to forestall any popular dissent and uprising (GERDDES 1999). In doing so the regime acquires its legitimacy not from the people but from a minority of individuals it appoints, maintains and manipulates. As a result, it loses its base and becomes weak and consequently unable to impose its will on its accomplices to rectify deviant behaviour such as corruption and outright embezzlement of public funds.

Given the circumstances, the government in Cameroon can neither be accountable nor transparent in the management of public resources. Corruption not only weakens the government it equally makes it inefficient by lowering the standard of services provided by all parts of the public sector since it diverts that very scarce human resource- practical and intelligent man power- into fixing rather than producing. For instance, since officials expect to receive bribes before attending to 'important papers' while others wait, the tendency is to introduce delays so as to attract bribes for circumventing them. The result is the perennial chasing of files in government offices in Cameroon.

Corruption has resulted in the loss of liberty and death of idealism. The scourge has spread so that nothing remains that cannot be manipulated and perverted by the rulers and those with wealth and influence. By suffering policy decisions manipulated by a few, by crushing faith in the ability of popular groups to bring real changes, corruption has disinherited the Cameroonian masses and obliterated the dream of communal society. This has reduced Cameroonians to a state of apathy manifest in the expression of despair "*on fait comment,*" (what can be done). Corruption fomenting injustice by compounding inequality since those who benefit from it are the privileged few. As such, corruption negates the liberal democratic assumption of majority rule and the exercise of civil and political rights thereby breeding social and political tensions and upheavals. Witness the nationwide demonstrations into which a strike called by transporters' syndicates on February 25, 2008 to protest against high fuel prizes degenerated, and paralysed the country for close to one week resulting in the loss of many lives

and the massive destruction of public and private property (*The Post*, 2 March 2008) The inefficiency, embezzlement, injustice, absence of accountability and of transparency in the management of public resources that corruption breeds and nurtures in Cameroon stand firmly in the way of good governance.

Corruption and Development

Corruption is often cited among the domestic or internal constraints to economic progress in developing countries (The World Bank 1994; Ake 1996; Joseph 2003) As such, it cannot be gainsaid that corruption impedes development in Cameroon. In other words, that corruption impedes development in Cameroon is a matter not of whether but of how. The purpose here therefore, is to show the specific negative effects of corruption on development in Cameroon. Corruption hinders development in Cameroon in a variety of ways, the most important of which are shown below.

Reduction in Revenue

The high incidence of corruption in Cameroon leads to a reduction in government revenue. Nwel (1997: 44) shows how on roads of peripheral neighbourhoods in Yaoundé alone the state loses 27 million francs a year in revenue through the activities of the category of transport vehicles commonly known as “Clandos,” coined from the word clandestine. These are drivers who do not have authorization to do public transportation but do so clandestinely by bribing, on a daily basis, the police and gendarmes to the knowledge of everybody.

Even those public transport drivers who have the authorization are still compelled by police and gendarmes to give bribes because as the drivers know, a policeman or gendarme never lacks a reason to seize the car documents, charge the driver and drag him up and down to make him lose time and money. “You cannot complain to anyone,” laments a driver, “because in front of the commissioner you can not be in the right since he is the one who sends his men on the road.” (Nwel 1997:47) As such, to operate, the drivers have to pay a “toll fee” in bribes of 300FCFA or 500 FCFA for motor cycle-mounted policemen and gendarmes. This is paid as many times per day as there are check points, and they are usually many.

Since they understand that they must bribe whether or not they have all the required documents to do business, the drivers do not bother to acquire all the documents as they must reserve some of the money for bribes thereby reducing what goes into government coffers. Government also loses revenue in all revenue collecting services. In some cases, the public official demands as bribes part of the money that the user is supposed to pay into state coffers so that a receipt is issued for an amount less the bribe. In other cases, the user is exempted by the official from paying anything at all into the government coffers. In such cases, a fake receipt or no receipt at all is issued. Furthermore, the loss of confidence in especially, though by no means exclusively, the judicial services occasioned by corruption in Cameroon also translate into a reduction in revenue. As mentioned above, corruption introduces delays. Thus, according to the World Bank (1996) 83 per cent of businessmen complain about the excessive length of time legal procedures in Cameroon take. As a consequence 85 per cent to 95 per cent of disputes between enterprises are, for this reason, settled through negotiation, rather than in the courts. And so the department loses potential clients and revenue. In these various ways corruption reduces government revenue and, ipso facto, the funds available for development projects.

Increased Transaction Costs

Corruption makes government to spend more time and resources on projects than it would in a less corrupt system. As narrated by Mr. Sali Dairou, Minister of Public service and Administrative Reforms:

The state loses a lot because of corruption. Contracts awarded either to nationals or expatriates always come about as a result of envelopes left in the various contract award, payment and control channels. All what is thus paid into the pockets of officials have repercussions on the global cost of the contract. Thus, a project that should have cost one billion is billed at two billion or two and a half billion (Cameroon Tribune, 27 September 1998).

This is what is referred to as the K per cent rule which every bidder for a government contract must take into account in evaluating the cost of the work (Tamba 1999:40.) These increased costs are a hindrance to development because more money is spent for little work. These high costs also retard business which is an engine of development. For instance, the World Bank (1996) indicates that “transaction costs have slowed down the growth of more than 50 per cent of Cameroonian businesses (quoted in Tamba 1999:176).

Misplaced Priorities

Public officials in Cameroon are, due to wide-spread corruption and a consequent lack of accountability, more concerned with maintaining their positions than with serving general interest. The result is that priorities are misplaced. Thus, although it is a well known fact that investment in education promotes development more than that on the army, the Cameroon government gives priority to, and spends heavily on the magistracy and the security forces (institutions that maintain the status quo) to the neglect of building and equipping schools and improving the conditions of teachers.

Impediment to Foreign Investment

Corruption acts as an additional tax and therefore discourages foreign investment. It is thus cited by businessmen as one of the major obstacles to private investment in Cameroon (Tamba 1999:177). This explains the low growth rate of Direct Foreign Investment in Cameroon which rose only by 22 per cent in relative terms during the five-year period between 1990 and 1995 (Tamba1999:177) Investment begets development and so an impediment to investment forestalls development.

In sum, by reducing revenue, increasing transaction costs, misplacing priorities and impeding investment, corruption constitutes the major obstacle to development in Cameroon. This is corroborated by president Paul Biya in his 2007 New Year speech to the nation thus, “our country which is well endowed by nature and climate, which has acknowledged human resources and which enjoys peace and stability is, due to corruption, fraud and smuggling which put personal interest before general interest, unable to achieve its economic take off” (Cameroon Tribune, 3 January 2007).

The Government and Corruption

Before the late 1980s, when Cameroon was still arrogantly resisting going to the IMF and submitting itself to the demands of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the government had a complacent attitude towards corruption. Thus, President Biya could retort “Ou sont les preuves” (where is the proof) to a question on state-television about the existence of corrupt people in his administration (Cameroon Post, 15 January 1991).

A few years later, and compelled by the exigencies of the economic crisis, Cameroon bowed to the IMF and subjected itself to that institution's conditions which included, *inter alia*, reduction of poverty through the fight against corruption. Thus, compelled but without the will to change its attitude towards corruption, the government of Cameroon launched a national crusade against corruption in 1998. For the purpose of the campaign the following message was conceived and publicized: “Corruption kills the nation, Public Services are free of charge and not sold” (Talla 1999:182).

Subsequently, an ad hoc anti-corruption committee was created to which have been attached anti-corruption observatories in the various ministerial departments. The functions of the observatories are: to make inquiries, to alert, and to propose sanctions and reforms. A Financial Investigation Agency has also been set up to fight against money laundering and movement of fraudulent funds. Other structures that are also ostentatiously involved in the fight against corruption are the Supreme State Audit, General Inspectorates of ministries, the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court, Audit Courts and the Public Contract Regulatory Agency. In addition, it should be noted that in Cameroon there exists a legal mechanism of punitive provisions contained in several codes (Penal, Electoral and Public Service) or resulting from adhesion to International Conventions on corruption.

In terms of the number of structures for the fight against corruption Cameroon is, judging from the above, well equipped. What is lacking however is the will to make the structures function effectively. Thus, beyond their existence the above structures have achieved little or nothing. The lack of independence and adequate means are the greatest obstacles to the functioning of these structures. For instance, these structures are under the control of

the very officials (members of the executive and judiciary branches) that they are intended to hold in check against corruption, and so can only function to the extent that these officials permit. Thus, in early 2006 three cronies of the regime (all of them managers and/or board chairmen of the State Corporations) were sacked from their posts and arrested along with eleven of their subordinates in connection with the embezzlement of public funds. Justice and even common sense requires that the accused be speedily tried in a court of law and if found guilty be punished and made to return to the public treasury the huge sums they have embezzled. But government seemed to be reluctant to indict these people as it delayed their trial for several years given that justice delayed is justice denied. This gives credence to the view held by most Cameroonians that government is not committed to the fight against corruption, because corruption serves its interest by maintaining the status quo, and consequently, that the arrests are public relation gimmicks intended to give the impression to the so-called donors that government is fighting corruption.

There are other reasons to justify the view that government is unwilling to fight corruption. For instance, in 1992 the Minister of the Public Service and Supreme State Audit Garga Haman-Adji compiled 42 files of Ministers and other top government officials found by the Supreme state Audit to have embezzled at least one billion FCFA each. He wanted them tried and punished commensurately to forestall further pilfering from the public till. But to his dismay, he was not only ignored but the Supreme State Audit was withdrawn from being part of his Ministry because in his words, "I was so hard on corrupt officials and embezzlers of Public funds" (The Post, 21 July 2000.) And so in protest, he resigned and the 42 people are still free though the three referred to above were among the 42. President Biya unabashedly confirmed the reason for Haman- Adji's resignation when in referring to it ahead of the 1992, presidential election said, "he wanted me to do what I did not want" (<http://www.africaindependent.com>).

Similarly in October 2006 the Financial Investigation Agency compiled files of 30 corrupt top government officials and forwarded them to the Minister of Justice who studied them" informed hierarchy and has since been "waiting (certainly in vain) for the green light by the presidency to submit the files to state prosecutors

to effect arrests and interrogations (The Guardian” Post, 12 November 2007).

Although some former senior officials of the regime, among them the former Secretary General at the Presidency, the former Minister of Finance and the former Minister of Public Health have been arrested purportedly for embezzling public funds, there is reason to suggest that their arrests were for political rather than corruption reasons. They seem to have been arrested because of their membership in the group that called itself Generation 2011 (G11). This group was opposed to President Biya amending the constitution to remain in power after 2011 and was alleged to have been discussing as to which way power will swing when President Biya presumably quits the helm of state in 2011. The fact that they were arrested just when government was pushing the constitutional amendment which they were opposed to through parliament gives credence to the view that the arrests were politically motivated. Moreover, having been arrested on corruption charges these former officials are “now being accused of organising a *coup d’état*.” (The Post, 29 August 2008). Finally, since the arrest of corrupt officials many of whom are in the regime is selective, there is reason to believe that the government is more interested in getting rid of its enemies rather than corruption.

Furthermore, and perhaps more telling is the fact that government is unwilling to implement article 66 of the 1966 Constitution which requires public officials to declare their assets on assuming and on leaving office. This would have been an important means of fighting against the embezzlement of public funds. Government’s refusal to implement the article is all the more embarrassing given that it is the same government, that is, under the same leadership that drafted and manipulated the approval of the said constitution. Consequently, there is reason to believe that the regime does not want to take any measure that may compromise the existence of corruption since it is a major instrument for maintaining the status quo that it cherishes. This explains why although corrupt public officials are incessantly pilloried by the private press, government is protecting them in its administration especially because the number of suspects (51) is seen to be such that if brought before the law, “the whole regime will crumble.” (L’effort Camerounais, 11 April 2007).

Reducing the Incidence of Corruption in Cameroon

Given that the incidence of corruption in Cameroon is ruinously high, it cannot be gainsaid that it needs to be reduced to an acceptable level. To do so, the government must first and foremost have the will to fight corruption because as the old saying goes, 'where there is a will, there is a way.' If government is determined to fight corruption, the following measures could then be applied. First, the working conditions of public employees must of necessity be improved because so long as their wages remain very low, they will resort to unethical means to make ends meet. Secondly, a national code of ethics that emphasizes civility, forthrightness, honesty and duty consciousness should be established and used as a code of conduct for public employees and as a compulsory topic in the training programme for schools and colleges. This entails that recruitment, promotion and appointment of public employees to posts of responsibility should be based on merit.

Thirdly, a National Commission for the fight against corruption should be established. Such a commission should have financial autonomy and the powers to function independently and be responsible only to the electorate through their representatives in parliament. This requires a free press and an independent judiciary to facilitate the process of administering justice in sanctioning unethical behaviour. Finally, all senior public officials should obligatorily be made to declare their assets on assuming and on leaving office. This entails the strict implementation of article 66 of the 1996 constitution. If the above measures are introduced and religiously enforced, the current high incidence of corruption in Cameroon will be reduced to a tolerable level.

Conclusion

Although corruption is a colonial legacy that has become a universal phenomenon from which no society is free, its incidence in Cameroon is ruinously high as evidenced by the classification of the country by Transparency International twice as the most corrupt in the world. The high incidence of corruption in Cameroon is attributed to a number of factors including the economic crisis that led to a reduction of the purchasing power of public employees, the inability of Cameroonians to rally together and fight for their rights, and the lack of accountability and of commitment by the government to fight

against corruption. Corruption hinders development in Cameroon by reducing government revenue, increasing transaction costs, engendering misplaced priorities and impeding foreign investment. By breeding and nurturing inefficiency, injustice, the lack of accountability and of transparency in public management, corruption impedes good governance. Reducing the incidence of corruption to a tolerable level requires an improvement in the working conditions of public employees, the establishment and enforcement of a national code of ethics, the creation of an Independent National Commission for the fight against corruption, and above all, the will to fight corruption on the part of the government.

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Chapter Three

Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Cameroon: Challenges and Opportunities

John W. Forje

Introduction: Situating the Place of the State

The state is a response to demands from society, invented as an instrument for improving society's collective capacity. Thus, major changes in the economic and political realms do influence the design of state structures, structures which tend to be enduring with strong imprint on the organisational and cultural configuration of society. While the catchwords today are globalization and liberalisation, the structural functioning of the world is dominated by the activities of strong and centralised national governments. Caught in the web of centralised governance, development seems to have been brought to a standstill. Other ways of doing things are needed to give new impetus to the development of the nation and continent. The state in Africa emerged as the major producer and provider of basic needs. Yet, the state lacks the capacity and human resources to undertake these valuable tasks of meeting the essential needs of a rapidly increasing population as well as facing the challenges posed by a rapid changing hostile international environment.

We are confronted with the triple issues of *democracy, governance and development* (DGD) with the ultimate goal of providing quality living standards for the population. Issues of democracy, governance and development constitute problems areas with many and varied political interests – struggle for power – as well as undertaking effective public policies as an inherent of the obligations of state commitment or social contract with those who elected the governors. In short, the governor and governed must tango in unity if the genuine completion point – *quality living standard for all* – is to be attained and sustained. The African state structure due to its construction and its evolution is laden with many drawbacks that impinge on its proper functioning. Seen in this light, policy-makers and scholars are equally troubled by how much importance should

be attached to the state and its institutions targeted or focused on the role of values and attitudes in the modernisation process. As transitional polities depart from the contours of a traditional or agricultural to an industrial society, the process of modernisation weighs heavily on state institutions that have emerged with relatively no experience to start tackling issues characteristic of a post-industrial society, especially now that most countries are becoming bedfellows of the service delivery bandwagon.

The position of this chapter is clear. It does not break any new academic ground not known for the past decade or so. But judging from the conventional view of international development theorists like Ferguson's (1999: 39), it argues for *more less government and more community participation* in the process of nation-building and development. We need to understand more carefully and appreciate the assessment of the international imperatives necessary for rolling out development at the local community levels. The position of the paper is that while the State should be an important player, it should not be the sole actor in the chase game of development. It is neither possible nor visible to discard totally the input equation of the state. Therefore, the state as the major trigger for development requires the concerted, progressive and comprehensive inputs from other actors. The state apparatus is inadequately configured for implementing a developmental agenda. What is needed is putting in place the fundamentals and institutions that can facilitate pro-poor or community action-oriented development initiatives that benefit the people. One of the measures is to seriously embarking on the process of devolving power to the people and communities to drive the development process.

No wonder fragmented African polities or societies are confronted with a number of crises that impact on establishing stable political systems, which can better, propel them to the completion point and to consolidate its attainment. The completion point is the devolution of power from the centre to the periphery. These crises are all appearing simultaneously in emerging polities, with governments struggling to use the distribution crisis to resolve the identity, penetration and legitimacy crisis among others. Given that transitional polities are embedded in confusion due to the fragmented nature of its politics, and people do not share common

ideological orientation toward political action, it is imperative to articulate common socialisation platform from where to pilot the affairs of the state. That common dominant political culture can be conceptualised under the umbrella of '*democracy*' or '*democratic governance*' as the road map for quality services delivery and sustainable development.

Just as the colonial lords were hesitant in sharing powers with citizens of their dependencies, the new custodians of power in the current centralised state system are reluctant to devolve power to the periphery, local councils and other institutions. We see the old colonial masters reflecting their tentacles of non-power sharing through the current state formation, where the new custodians of power and authority have failed to understand the practical realities and relations of democratic politics within their own confines. Failing to understand the realities of their environment vis-à-vis the hostile international community, the belief is that politics should revolve around personalities rather than on democratic politics and principles. This constitutes the first giant step to the poverty of the continent – a poverty woven around the non-adherence to the basic tenets of democracy. Stretching the issue further, in these transitional polities, the clash between administrators and politicians reinforces the latter's suspicion of particular interests contra the views of the ruling party. This suspicion in some cases gave birth to the one-party system making the bureaucracy to depart from its traditional role of impartiality and serving whichever political party assumed office. The politicisation of the civil service makes the bureaucracy not to be identified with the aspirations, needs, and predicaments of the people, especially the local and rural populations. The non-adherence to the basic '*principles of democracy*' or the '*democratic values*' is a starting point of exclusion. The state excludes other actors in the development process.

Working towards an open society, involving the people is above all, a test to statecraft. Establishing effective administration in developing countries constitute a fundamental problem in these societies. Here lies the basic argument of the paper. Borrowing from Lucian Pye (1966), "firm rule and efficient administration need not be seen as the composite of democratic development, but rather authority and participation must go hand in hand in the building of

modern states.” There is urgency for stressing the need and advantage of expanding democratic participation to limit the practical liabilities of democracy by taking government much closer to the people and getting them involved. Seen within this context, is the suggestion of expanding popular participation as a priority factor in nation building? Decentralisation should be recognised as a vital matter of administration and governmental rule in building an effective modern state. Having democratic governance requires having a government and ordered authority with the people’s participation.

This underscores crucial input factors of solving part of the crisis of integration, penetration and distribution among others, which are crucial in building effective modern states, and ensuring checks and balances in the function of the system. The devolution of power or ‘*local people-oriented*’ approach widens the horizons of development within the society. While citizens should be encouraged not to be dependent on government as the magic wands for resolving their predicaments, every effort should be made to ensure that their voices and opinions are incorporated in decision-making and implementation of development related activities and processes. In this connection developing the human capacity of the people is vital in pushing forward the smooth transfer of power to the local population and communities. Trickle up development approach requires a sustained financial and human capacity

Democracy and Governance: The Vital but Missing Link.

Democracy can be a key component but it is not a sufficient condition for good governance – as can be seen from its absence in many transitional societies. Good governance should never be shackled with theories however attractive and logically elegant they maybe. Africa’s worst performance since independence has been due, not to failed democratisation, but to centralised and authoritarian rule that has not been unable to meet the needs and aspirations of the people. Uncontrolled centralised and authoritarian government breeds room for bad management, i.e. many African countries have entrenched themselves in the “*wrong management*” of the State where institutions designed to govern relationships between citizens and the State are used instead for personal enrichment of public officials and the provisions of benefits to the corrupt” (Mancham, 2003:21).

Undoubtedly, democracy matters because it promotes human rights, freedom and liberties as well as it protects and preserves human dignity. Democracy is vital because it helps in addressing crucial and challenging issues of peace, development, and economic growth as part of state duties in advancing the well being of its citizens. However, “a missing link exists, as African states are not developing stronger links between representation and participation: grass roots are not involved: the top-bottom approach prevails over the “bottom-up approach, which should trigger partnership, participation, and representation in the development process. So far, poverty challenges democracy in Africa. Seen within this context, democracy in Africa has failed to address the problems of the silent poor and rural majority. The governance system in place centralised as it is, enhances and sustains affluence for the few” (Forje 2002).

Many factors have contributed to the entrenchment of centralised authoritarian governance system in Cameroon. First, there was a “*clash of cultures*” between the politics of “*assimilation*” and “*indirect rule*” with the former triumphant over the latter, the outcome of numbers. It was a contest between the Napoleonic and Republican governance systems. Second, it is attributed to the prevalence of the “*Cold War*” and the fear by western democracies of “*Communist*” penetration into the African continent. Yet, most of these countries tolerated and permitted the structural-functionalism of Communist Parties in their backyard. Strong and centralised governments were advocated as countervailing forces to communist entrenchment within Africa. Third, related to the demise of colonial rule creating a vacuum in the struggle for power and leadership within the new polities. Fourth, building on the sentiments of the euphoria of independence, the centralised nature of authority in traditional societies was evoked by the new custodians of power as a rallying point for reconstituting, reconstructing and as the instituting instrument for nation building. Resources were to be pulled together for the common good, to create a sense of belonging and national identity/unity. The emergence of the one-party system can be attributed to this line of thought. Nationalism was the goal to

compress the legacy of colonialism in the process of manufacturing a new brave society. Unfortunately no new brave society was created.

The ideal of reform and reconstruction after many years of colonial governance was good but never genuinely realised. It fell on the wayside as other forces overtook the noble ideal of moulding a sense of belonging, cohesion and unity. Unfortunately, essential checks and balances to ensure accountability, participation, answerability and benefit sharing soon gave way to nepotism, ethnic hegemonic rule and exclusion. Chaos not cohesion reigned. Ethnic conflicts, political instability, economic crises and secessionist tendencies being more pronounced. To gain favour from the centralised administration, localities and individuals embarked on the “Politics of Motions of Support and Ethno-Regionalism” (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:241-258).

Cameroon moved from what could be seen as a “mission-driven” noble ideal of constructing national unity and sense of belonging to a kind of “rule-driven” governance system with ethnic hegemonic and exclusive forces taking centre stage. Devolving power to the people constituted a challenge and threat to existing ethnic hegemonic centres of power. To achieve and sustain this mission, *patron-client relationship*, the *politics of exclusion and marginalisation* took precedence over the *politics of inclusion and benefit sharing*. The devolution of power to the periphery is considered a serious threat to established order. Mbuagbo and Akoko (2004:255) asserts: “*The ideals of national integration have been jeopardised by ethno-regional jingoism, fanned and sustained by the fact that in public policy, priority is given to group membership first, and the nation second, and the notion of citizenship is therefore bound to suffer from a geo-ethnic delimitation and order.*” Instead of a non-partial public service administration, the country puts in place an “*ethno-party hegemonic and partial*” public service sector that caters for the specific interests that establishes it.

Critical opinions agitating for more open government and inclusive politics are often silenced or considered non-patriotic to the national course, or as enemies in the house. It must be imposed, not participatory governance system of “*top-down*” approach, or the State forcing down the throats of the people policies envisaged as best for them. The State emerges as an instrument of repression

and not one advocating the freedom, equality and liberty of the people. By and large, African politics and state system exhibits a remarkably high potential for conflict. One factor often adduced in explanation thereof is the heavy dependence on the state; the occupancy of State office furnishes the golden road to social and economic advancements, for which few prospects otherwise existed.

An embedded centralised and authoritarian governance system conceals and perpetuates activities contrary to quality service delivery, revealing the complexity of political dynamics and the governing function of satisfying the needs, wants, and desires of the people and communities. The outcome is failure on the part of “government in facing the challenging reality of optimally utilising resources in an inventive and cost-effective manner in the attempt to address the multitude of needs that exist” (Jonker 2001:242). More often than not, the Head of State or Government is directly or indirectly high jacked by ethnic hegemonic forces and sentiments initiated through “various ethnic, cultural and religious associations,” ruling elites, and other strong forces (business tycoons, hawks) within the party. Bear in mind that a Presidential system of the Napoleonic type does not permit any form of power sharing with other constituencies. A republican presidential system would to some degree permit and tolerate the existence of other constituencies of power.

It is vital translating democratic principles into making grass-roots democracy a reality – power of the people – at the local or grassroots levels. It entails constructing institutions that are transparent and accountable ensuring that the poor and excluded can engage in collective actions, decision-making and protecting the rights and liberties of all citizens. Reconstructing and reforming the state means building and promoting democracy – democracy not just in name, but also in substance. An important and significant step in eliminating poverty is increasing the influence and involvement of local communities and the poor in decision-making, articulation, implementation and evaluation of development projects

A Return to Reasoning

In the mid 1980s, the returning to conscious reasoning was initiated from the top echelon of state machinery following the publication of *Communal Liberalism* (Biya, 1987), with the slogan

of “democratisation, liberalism and rigour” designed to uplift the country out of its existing doldrums of inertia, economic decline, total political and administrative impasse in the structural-functioning of government machinery. The President in 1985 drew strong support from the population when he declared that the chasing of flies would soon be a thing of the past. It was hailed as a breakthrough for a transitional polity. The vision of *Communal Liberalism* died immediately even though it became a household slogan used to cement the spoils of the one party system. Centralisation was intensified, corruption institutionalised and ethnic diversity promoted and made a liability instead of an asset for forging ahead the prosperity of the nation. Pockets of the democratisation process were initiated within the ruling Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) party against some descending voices and opinions against political changes in the country. The status quo was to be maintained at all cost.

Events in Cameroon were overtaken by external developments. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered an avalanche of developments throughout the world especially in Africa, where the single-party centralised governance system had taken hold. One of the conditionalities of the imposed World Bank Structural Adjustment (SAP) emphasised the issues of democratisation and good governance. The forces of re-democratisation process could no longer be stopped. The ideals in Communal Liberalism (as a forerunner) was injected with a new lease of life to re-engage in the democratisation process of the country, by (i) returning power to the communities and people – decentralisation: (ii) initiating pluralist democracy – the demise of the one party system was eminent: (iii) liberalisation of the economy: and (iv) the rise of a vibrant civil society as the true custodian of the peoples’ power. The emergence of civil society in the body politic of Cameroon is captured in many scholarly discourses noted in the early 1990s. (See Monga 1996, Nyamnjoh 1999, Bayart 1973, 1993).

Eventually, Cameroon jumped on the democratisation bandwagon, without a deliberate and planned transfer of power and resources from the centre to the periphery. Decentralisation was actually not envisaged even though the 1996 constitution creates room for devolution of power from the central institutions

to peripheral institutions. A decade down the road, the country is far from the envisaged target of power transfer and bringing other stakeholders as active participants in the process of governance and service delivery. The process towards decentralisation has been slow in Cameroon. Scholarly discourses concerning the progress, problems and development ramifications of decentralisation highlight issues like, (a) lack of political will, (b) fear of losing power and the benefits these entail; and (c) the argument that communities lack the requisite human and institutional capacities. Thus the state remains the most appropriate source of the flow of power, direction and guidance for establishing national unity and ensuring sustainable economic growth. A state or government mission-driven developmental approach is envisaged.

A government mission-driven approach is achievable only if policy guidelines are unambiguous and the parameters within which functionaries are expected to operate clearly spelt out. In addition, it requires organisational structures that are conducive to quick decision-making and clearly defined areas of responsibility (Jonker *op cit*). This government is not providing as the spoils of patron-client ethnic hegemonic tendencies hold the State hostage in its output functions. The rescue came from the Breton Woods Financial Conglomerates through its imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) with all the conditionality of democratisation, good governance, devolution of power, and economic liberalism. What are the implications of these? First, the centralised nature of governance is now subjected to external scrutiny. Second, Government operates according to the dictates of the Breton Woods Financial Institutions and other donor bodies. Third, SAP had no human face as it affected mostly the marginalised. Fourth, the declining level of living standards in Cameroon (70 per cent salary reduction, frozen employment and forced retirement), the many hungry faces the world over and the plight of the poor forced some sense of returning to reasoning by the external donors. Fifth, it necessitated the bringing on board other stakeholders as inputs to accelerate the outputs of state functions to the society in a humane and equitable way. To a large extent, centralised governance and conventional approaches to development have left the people as deprived as ever of participation, with prospects of a better

tomorrow bleak for more than half the population. A new weapon is needed to initiate and accelerate these required revolutionary and evolutionary changes.

Devolution of Power and Authority: The New Weapon for Development

For Cameroon to make significant changes and to realise the vision envisaged in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of halving poverty by 2015, it is imperative that existing centralised and authoritarian governance system be dismantled. New structures put in place vested with the appropriate insignia of power. It cannot be gainsaid that taking government to the people, sharing with the civil society and the private sector will establish significant avenues for participation, partnership and responsibility sharing including equity in the distribution process. Unleashing the power of the people is necessary in alleviating poverty and ensuring sustainable development. It a question of tapping into the knowledge and potentials of the people as instrument for constructed development. Two fundamental issues are the issue of knowledge and resources, which are best, exploited by empowering the people from the grassroots.

Fighting poverty must be tackled from all fronts. Here the underlying issues of the Cameroonian Knowledge Economies (CKE) and the Cameroon Ethnic Societies (CES) and the Cameroonian Policies for Sustainable Development (CPSD) through democratic governance must feature significantly in the process of reconstructing and reforming the country. The country's potentials must be linked to as well as tap from existing global knowledge of information and communication technologies. Abundant but untapped knowledge exist in the rural areas and among the marginalized population, which should be exploited for the common good. Here Maharaj and Ramballi (1998:114) asserting the situation of Durban, South Africa, state: "...in the Third World, local dependence and competition between localities have shifted the responsibility for economic development from the central state to the local state." However, this is not enough, as the communities and localities must be actively involved in the governance of their areas. Non-involvement may lead to serious impediments that fail

to tackle issues set out to address by government. An environment of institutional poverty and exclusion is put in place to the detriment of society.

Devolution of power and democratisation are convergence of poverty alleviation. The World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) will only make the necessary impact when the localities are mobilised at all levels and forms to impact on the expected outcome. Critics of devolution of power fear the adoption of an escapist mode by the state in fulfilling its obligations. It should be noted that the marginalisation of the poor from the core administrative or institutional systems and resources of government is one of the key dimensions of persistent and chronic poverty. Thus, centralised authoritarian rule breeds corruption and institutionalises poverty and underdevelopment.

Against this backdrop, the question that arises is how is development possible? And poverty overcome when the consent of those concerned are not involved and their voices listened to? Or again, when government policies are such that limited capacity develops within local communities for implementation and enforcement of development activities as a result of centralised administrative machinery? The existence of a Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation does not translate into reality the practicalities of the Ministry. The decentralisation component remains a theoretical ploy or skeleton requiring flesh to be added and for the people to feel their real impact in changing their life style. Decentralisation should play the vital role of empowering the people and communities in promoting development in their areas, creating jobs and boosting the local economy. It should also lead to investing in the basics by promoting good quality cost-effective services and making the rural areas and communities' areas a pleasant place of harbour. In short genuine devolution of power and democratic governance should promote local economic development (LED) as well as provide special economic and social services.

Building a sustainable society is a complex process that involves a broad definition of local and national economic development: centralised and decentralised authorities all working in partnership with people and private sectors to ensure that all the citizens become beneficiaries in the process. Creating a development strategy is not

only a political commitment and economic engagement but also a process that must rest on the social commitment of the people and administrative systems that facilitate economic growth and participatory democratic governance. It is a process that must engage other spheres of state and local government including the corporate sectors in a developmental approach to governance. Devolution of power as a critical route to popular participation and good governance is a topic that remains on the political agenda of the country for many years yet. The role of civil society is important in strengthening rural communities and moulding public opinion for a governance system of checks and balances, accountability and transparency.

In a society still embedded in traditional authority, the risk of conflicts and tensions between traditional rule and local community authorities cannot be ruled out. Currently, with traditional authorities as auxiliary of the state administration, devolution of power would have to take into consideration “The developmental role of traditional authorities in Africa is also often overlooked when investigating decentralisation issues. The potential schisms between traditional political authority with its social hierarchies, and the ‘new men and women of state-led decentralised local government, may de-rail the whole decentralisation process (Binns et al 2005:24). The ‘decentralised despotism of customary authority and ethno-clientelism, together with the colonial legacy of indirect rule, must not be ignored. The argument posed by Mamdani (1996) “that the failure of political reforms aimed at democratisation to empower ordinary Africans can be firmly associated with the lack of recognition of the potent role of decentralised despotism” is interesting in this context.

Advantages of devolution of Power

The advantages of power devolution to the local communities will include the following:

- It encourages more contact between state, representative and participatory democracy;
- Decentralised institutions reflect the needs and aspirations of the people, and are far more innovative than centralised institutions;

- Devolution of power to the people will promote greater accountability, checks and balances and service delivery with the well-being of the communities properly promoted;
- Institutions are better placed to respond rapidly to changing circumstance and customers needs;
- Whatever existing bottlenecks or weaknesses of existing local government units, as administrative institutions that exist must be addressed by the partners concern to give greater vitality to the people to be partners with the state in the development process.

Success is assured only when the centralised authorities in the process of devolving power to the localities ensure that constant and adequate financial resources and responsibility are established:

- That the transfer is not short-term but long-term focused and oriented within the parameters of the citizens taking full control of their decisions, actions and destiny.
- The people are totally committed in ensuring the sustainability of the process by either contributing financially or otherwise to local initiatives.
- The devolution of power to local communities and the people must be an ongoing process, not one -time shot process.

Devolution of power should induce a sense of nationalism, local democracy, and not boredom in even the most politically interested citizens. The word devolution of power or empowering local government authorities outside The regime can arouse intense passions among die-heart supporters of the system where they benefit. Part of the problem is that local government is often defined simply as the powers and activities of an existing county, district councils and these are complicated, highly circumscribed and apparently of no great significance. This is a very limited view of local government. It under estimates the difference local government empowerment can make in the development process. Devolution of power should go beyond this narrow conception, be holistic, encompassing and highly committed to the virtues of cooperation, closing niches in skills development among others.

Conclusion

Is devolution of power possible in an authoritarian presidential system? Does the Napoleonic system permit many centres of power and authority? Is Cameroon ready to adopt a republican governance system? These and many other questions have to be reviewed to understand why centralisation is part of the hegemonic governance system in Cameroon: and why there is need for change to a governance system that is more accommodating and responding to the needs of the people. The last decade of the twentieth century saw Cameroon's entry in the new century with a considerable shift in the economic and political equation. Cameroon is now bound to ride on the elephant of democratisation, power devolution and economic liberation with a heightened degree of internal integration. The rural areas have to be integrated into mainstream national political and economic development, as the country guns for regional economic and political integration at the continental and global levels.

The argument is that without democratic and participatory governance system, the frontiers of poverty cannot be pushed back. It is only through advancing the process of participatory democracy, power sharing, creation and equitable distribution of wealth that a healthy society can be constructed. The underlying areas of tackling the enabling state and role of the public service in wealth creation under the auspices of governance, equity and public management focuses on issues such as:

- More efficient, people centred government:
- Expanding economic opportunities for all, particularly for the rural poor and marginalised population:
- Pushing back the frontiers of poverty and exclusion, eradicating poverty as well as curbing the escalating rate of corruption.
- Creating an enabling environment and ensuring the functioning of democratic governance at all levels capable of meeting its obligations.
- Creating an enabling state (i.e. open and encompassing).

The conclusion is that without the state providing the necessary legal, economic, political, institutional framework and safeguards against predatory tendencies and forces, democratic governance, and sustainable development can hardly come the way of the people. Devolution of power remains the imperative without which Cameroon will be stuck on the runway forever. Local communities must take their share of responsibilities in ensuring the practice and prevalence of open governance, the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and accountability among others. Who says the future is not bright with intense representative and participatory democracy?

Communal Liberalism was the first step towards giving Cameroon a new focus to proper development. Greater decentralisation, devolution of power and authority, and visionary leadership can contribute towards the emergence of entrepreneurial government that places more emphasis on ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’. The position taken by the Bishops Conference of Cameroon in a recent report about democratic changes in the country is praise-worthy. What is important is for the government to accelerate the decentralisation process especially since there is a Ministry of Territorial Administration Decentralisation. The way forward for Cameroon is to marry Communal Liberalism and the Bishops report, to ensure full implementation of views expressed in these two publications so as to better chart a new course for the country. What a wonderful country Cameroon will be if the views expressed in these two publications receive the blessings and “political will” of positive action of those in power for effective implementation.

The argument can also be advanced that devolution of power does not necessary lead to the creation of genuinely democratic, participatory, bottom-up decision making processes. Centralisation paves the way for authoritarian governance, corruption and all the ills that it entails: and devolution or decentralisation of centres of power paves the road to participatory and representative governance such that development, accountability and transparency are assured. Revamping the process of decentralisation and good governance addresses the issues of poverty and underdevelopment, since a democratically elected government is accountable to its citizens. The country stands to gain much through the devolution of power to the periphery. Failed governments or banana states are avoided. It curtails the rise of ethnic hegemonic state systems camouflage as systems of democratic governance.

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Section Two

Governance and the Higher Education System

Introduction

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

This section focuses on public university administration and has two chapters which analyse students' crisis and the appointment of personnel to posts of responsibility within the context of good governance. The thrust of the argument here is that students' crisis is a manifestation of the lack of good governance and the criteria on which officials are appointed are not conducive to efficiency and by extension good governance. With regard to students' crisis Abangma (in chapter four) uses the University of Buea as a case study and analyses the motivating factors of students' strikes. The factors which are integral aspects of governance include a highly centralised system that is unresponsive to students' concerns and characterised by poor teaching and learning conditions resulting in the disenchantment of students. As a way out of the problem Abangma proposes the introduction of a good governance policy which entails, among other things, decentralisation to confer greater autonomy to public universities so as to ensure the participation of students and other stakeholders in the functioning of the system, and improvement in teaching and learning conditions.

In chapter five Titanji analyses the criteria for appointing officials in state universities and finds that the criteria are not such that can ensure efficiency in university administration. This is so because the criteria comprise anything but administrative expertise. They include scholarly achievements, political and ethnic considerations. As a result the officials are deficient in administrative skills, a situation that mars university governance. The appointments are based in part on the assumption that expertise in teaching and research can easily and successfully be transferred to positions in administration. Titanji argues that this assumption is untenable because university administration is a profession which, like any profession, has a training programme for its potential members. Therefore, to ensure good governance in the university system Titanji recommends the appropriate training of university administrators.

Chapter Four

Governance in the University System and Students' Crises in Cameroon

James Arrey Abangma

Introduction

The Students' crises that wrecked the University of Buea in 2006 and 2007 academic years caught the authorities of the university and those of the Higher Education Ministry off guards and for the first time these authorities were found groping for solutions. The consequences were great as there were major shake-ups in terms of replacement and appointment of top university officials; the destruction of property, the loss of lives, and threats to the existence of the university community, its neighbourhood, and the country as a nation.

The university administration and the government were found wanting in an attempt to provide an immediate diagnosis, appropriate causes, and solutions. Consequently, targets were struck (whether rightly or wrongly), and some citizens of this community either bore the brunt or reaped from the misfortunes of others. The behaviour of the irate and zealous police and punitive officials, all express feelings of animosity and jealousy towards the university as sanctuary for certain privileged activities. The present situation calls for a change in relations and management style involving the introduction of good governance policies to ensure that the university community and the society are accommodating to students, if we hope to meet the expectations of the clientele.

The Management of Students' Rebellion in the Age of Governance

We are undergoing a cultural revolution whereby the old moralising admonitions give way to therapeutic doctrines "amounting to permission for each man to live an experimental life." This phenomenon is part of the widespread ferment as people seek to exist in the modern world with the accelerating potential

for comfort and for devastation. Within this framework of raped cultural changes the family and society are called upon to provide a pleasing yet individualising climate for its members. Parents are wooed to be less arbitrary, while children are helped to have more self-confidence as both participate in the search for a new equilibrium in their relationship to each other and to the demands of the new society. Some of the significant problems associated with this change can be inferred from a causal observation of the current scene. What seems to stand out is the need for changes in methods of conflict resolution through a more careful examination of the situation. Some of the problems of emancipation striving in society are discussed in terms of the loosening of infantile object ties, of orienting the self towards one's future potential, of undergoing identity formulation, of internalising standards of morality, and of acquiring ultimately a capacity for social and sexual role assumption. An observation of the give and take process in family life and the society in general suggests this

Going through a record of activities of students, one would realise that the crises are neither of social revolutions, nor academic, or calculated nihilism. The students have various objectives, but ultimately their commitment is to each other and to the necessary solidarity for their common effort to end the oppression imposed by academic institutions and the society in general (Johnson, Jane, 1972: 19).

Some of them may be anarchists who have turned their attention to tactics of creating the greatest disturbance with the fewest men rather than having a programme or objectives. Certainly the great majority of youths are not rebels in the actual sense of the word, although they may not be exactly happy with their world. Yet in between the more or less contented majority and the very few genuinely devoted to chaos stands a considerable congregation of disaffected youths who, in a sense, do have a programme. Neither they nor their elders have described it a programme, since it is neither political, nor economic, or an academic plan of action. It is not something that can be plotted or campaigned for. It is a new order, but not one that can be achieved by legislation or coup. It is a web of social customs, attitudes, habits, preferences, convictions, a culture that has spread with revolutionary speed from community

to community until the most conservative communities shelter at least a piece of it. The mores and values of this culture are remarkably consistent across the borders. Confrontation, a willingness to be violent if pushed, is a part of the culture, but only a small part. Although the rebels may not have a course in the accustomed sense, they have a way of life, a coherent one that presents exhilarating or threatening challenges to the habits and assumptions on which every society is today built (Bronfman and Helsen, 1972: 15 - 23).

Adults are already acquainted with dissident life, but the acquaintance is blurred or superficial; adding up to an impression of fair, free love, and violence. This impression is both shared by political, traditional and economic actors. These fragments of behaviour are often knit together into a fairly elaborate culture that engulfs and sustains a coherent pattern of values and actions. Student activism in public universities is a convenient example because in these institutions, dissident culture predominates, setting the tone and defining prevailing expectations. We must understand that student activism differs from institution to institution and from nation to nation. We must also be conscious of the fact that public universities give special emphasis to activism. Nevertheless, dissident culture in public universities is closely related to dissident sub-cultures. Collectively, these students are a significant force in our Society.

Students' Culture in Public Universities

Much more than the use of "strange dressing" on campus is the power struggle between local authorities (especially the police and Metropolitan interest, the university and society), the issue is whether the university is a "privileged sanctuary for law breakers." The real issue in the conflict is that the university is indeed a sanctuary for certain kinds of activities and relationships, which are socially valuable; and that unless they are privileged against gross violation by zealous and punitive officials, they will be lost from the society. Moreover, society is diverse and pluralistic, so these activities are conceivable, though uncongenial to the society's ethics, and there may be real conflicts of interest in them. A social institution needs not be valuable in the eyes of every member of the society to merit protection from violation by its enemies.

If there is any way for university students to defend themselves against police campus and hostel raids, investigation committees, irate legislatures, and indignant citizen groups, we ought to learn. The ambition and anxieties that rock a society that has grown accustomed to regard an academic community primarily as a source of economic opportunity for its more docile children and low cost technical advice for its economic enterprises are as predictably noxious to university life as heat, noise, and air pollution are to life in an industrial city. Yet, curiously enough, few comparable measures seem to have been taken to reduce their influence and minimise their effects. Those adopted have been almost entirely public relation measures intended to increase the understanding and elicit the support of antagonistic groups usually by compromise that sacrifices certain aspects of the integrity of university life.

There is no more reason why a university should be a public amenity than a steel mill or any military institution and camp. The facilities are not commonly defended as having to conform to the tastes and demands of the neighbouring community. They are defended as they are attacked for rarely generally serving a useful social function, though at somewhat, greater profit to their own personnel than to the community at large. Although they sometime maintain public relations offices to develop the best relations they can do with the community and still get what they regard as their job done, they do not expect active community support. The management or command assumes the political responsibility as it arises from time to time.

The argument that the university is uniquely dependent on public support and therefore more vulnerable is not logically tenable. The university is more vulnerable, because the public is far less critical of the military and institutional complexes and less inclined to intervene in their affairs. In addition, the university derives much of its support and budget from government sources, although these funds received under grants and contracts are largely unavailable for the university's traditional purposes and serve indeed, to divert it from them. Nevertheless, popular disfavour is potentially as threatening to the military or to the industry as to the university, but one cannot imagine disfavour actually directed against the military or industry in an effective manner.

Despite the pressure of grades and selective service careerism among both faculty and students and admission policies that are competitive and sometimes unrealistic, as the state can understand, there is more community on campus than off campus. The student body is made of people, many of whom have a great deal in common in terms of age, experience, level of culture, and the artificially low standard of living imposed by student status, which excludes otherwise middle class people from the economic opportunity to sustain even a working class standard of living. The result is that in the university young people find it relatively easy to engage in communication. The larger and more heterogeneous and mechanised the university, the less true this will be. Yet, even in large public universities, the condition for community may usually be met with fragmentation into congenial, conflicting groups of activists, hippies, fraternity men, jacks etc. among its members. This opportunity to feel oneself a part of a community is rare and joyful in our society and constitutes an absolute advantage in the quality of life, not merely a competitive advantage. It is precisely this advantage that arouses the bitter antagonism of the citizenry and activates their legislative and police sanctions. Citizens accept as legitimate the university function in promoting social mobility for students who accept the goals and opportunities provided in the large society. Many students enrolled in the university seek no more of this. They even become more uneasy if it offers or demands the adapted ambitions in science and engineering, where the opportunities are now to be found, and also the adapted ambitions in education and social work, where the risks are now if you do make trouble¹. The commuters and part-time students, who want limited and specialised often-technical training, constitute no community and are too little committed to one another to build a community. It is they who appear to the public to be making legitimate use of the opportunity the university provides them, instead of wasting their time, their parents' and the task payers' money in dubious and often anti social behaviours. Between students who use the university primarily as a sheltered territory in which to relate to one another, formulate values and explore their feelings and the meaning of life with whatever aid the curriculum can provide in the process, and those who use it primarily as a stepping stone to compete for external rewards, there

is a real conflict of interest. This involves the goals, values and personal animosities, and also the immediate development of the university's resources and ultimately, the kind of place it is.

It is mainly the proponents of the stepping stone perspective who insist that the university as such must not take specific moral positions. Those who argue against this stress that the university is corporate and comprises individuals whose views will be misrepresented by any single moral stand. Proponents of the stepping stone position see nothing inappropriate in the state itself establishing an official policy that is abhorrent to many, perhaps most of its citizens. But this is not the real issue. The problem is that they consider the university as an arena in which competitions are held and want the university to eschew any partisanship of its own that might discourage either contenders or those in a position to offer prizes. If possible, they would prefer that the kinds of students and faculties that make prize-givers nervous be banished from the campus altogether as injustice to its image and to its effectiveness as a source of opportunity. They view this as no invasion of liberty, but just a matter of keeping the stepping stone clear for the competitors and making the spectators comfortable. The populace do not only prefer, but feel more comfortable with the university being a stepping stone (Bronfman and Helpen, 1972: 13).

The public has a specific hostility to the university community, for it is well aware that to feel oneself as member of a community is a rare privilege as well as a necessary condition in life. These aspects of liberal education have always aroused ambivalence in society, the more so as they become more and more mass. To have friends one can, to some degree, trust and share genuine intellectual interests on a basis of shared experience for moral judgments, personal taste, political goals and prevailing standards in the society, is no doubt very much a privileged character. Public policy seemingly does not intend to provide the young with such privilege, which certainly surpasses anything they might be entitled to. The attitude of the state towards this privilege is considered an aspect of nullity of opportunity. Its interference with the quest for opportunity makes the regards granted for successful achievements seem shoddy and worthless, and the life of the successful achiever empty.

The point of emphasis is that for a large part of the populace, the university is an anti-social community and the prevalence of “strange tastes” and riots simply goes to show how anti-social it is. What makes the university anti-social is the fact that, and the degree in which, it is a community with its own norms, sanctions, sources of self-esteem, and the capacity to resist the judgment and rumours made upon it by those who reject these.

Students' Exemptions and Public Interest

Legislators enjoy immunity from lawsuits that might otherwise arise from their comments on the assembly floor. All these exemptions are justified, or at least rationalised in the public interest rather than as privileges for those protected. But the functions of universities are held to be in the public interest too, obviously for they are granted tax exemptions. Male students, moreover, have been granted tax exemption, a form of discrimination to which others of their age and sex are subjected to. This too is viewed not as a concession to the students' interests or needs but to the supposed manpower needs of the nation and to the undoubted political convenience of coming to terms with middle class ambition. The student deferment, notably, protects the university and concedes nothing to the social value of liberal education. Its function is to permit the selective service system to make vocational choice at the university level and channel students to the military-industrial complex. As a former American Draft Director General, Lewis Hershey rightly observed, “it is freedom of choice under pressure.” (Nevitt Stanford, 1967: 34) Nevertheless, tax exemption and student deferment are enough to establish that the university is officially recognised as a society useful, and where that usefulness requires privileged treatment even students are given exemptions.

But are exemptions from police raids and close surveillance not in the public interest? The difficulty involved in providing a satisfactory answer to this question is that public interest is not monolithic; it is pluralistic. There are conflicts of interest in our society; what is good for the police, the ambitious attorney, and the aging entrepreneur is not necessarily good for the society. It is necessary to emphasise that conflicts exist and to appeal to scholars to ask themselves whether their social interests are not better served

by an open and confident community than by a cautious and an intimidating one. There is no simple answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph. Yet, there is no doubt that police raids destroy any chance of maintaining an environment conducive for education, at least liberal education, and this regents are required to maintain such an environment.

Certainly, no reasonable person would argue that a university campus should be permitted to enjoy an absolute immunity to police incursion without regard to the nature of the alleged student or faculty conduct or the threat it might pose to other members of the community. Nevertheless, a very strong case can be made that a university should protect its members against harassment whether, from the police or an outraged and presumptuous public opinion. Precisely because that opinion has so consistently been punitive and constrictive, universities have been very reluctant to abandon the substitute parent principle and continue to claim authority and responsibility to censure the private lives of students with respect to sex, drugs, and other personal habits. The authority to control implies the responsibility to protect their young against hostile attack; otherwise they might lose the love and loyalty of these youths who would fall apart.

The Falling Apart of Students in Universities

This falling apart has been happening to families, universities, and communities with conspicuous frequency during the last few years. Experienced observers of university scene have attributed students' unrest and the decline of the community in universities in part to the students' widespread perceptions that the bureaucracy in which they have lodged themselves will never deserve the title alma mater, because it has abandoned its responsibility to nurture while retaining its authority to punish and constrain. As Leavitt Stanford (1967: 46) argues:

Another source of student rebellion is the new meaning of the old conception that colleges stand in loco parentis. Originally the conception implied not only discipline but generous personal help. As colleges have grown and "raised their standards"; however, the nurturing functions of the

colleges have been eroded or neglected while the control and punishment functions have been maintained.

This in itself creates a revolutionary climate. Students for many years surrendered their rights as citizens in exchange for the special care and attention that parents or colleges were expected to offer. Now, with the care and nurturance gone, students not inappropriately demand their rights.

In recognition of the justice of such observations, there is a current trend among universities in some advanced nations to relinquish, or pretend to relinquish, the parental claim; mutual distrust being not so far advanced, and to make the converse way of dealing with the problem by restoring genuine nurturing unthinkable. This requires the university to assert that students will no longer be subject to special university discipline for actions off campus or unrelated to education. Until this requirement is met, the public will continue to consider the university to be a sanctuary for lawbreakers and for other forms of community pressure. This position, if carried through in good faith, relieves the student of double jeopardy. Nonetheless, in practice, the university usually breaches its undertaking if the conduct at issue is judged sufficiently offensive to the community (Edgar Friedenberg, 1972: 23).

Classical and Neoclassical Perspectives of Students' Rebellion

Students' rebellion is complex and too recent a subject to permit ready explanation. This is so because to understand radicalism requires that we cut across cultures, politics, socio-economic classes, morality, and ethics. The observers' value judgments in these areas are expected to be very significant factors. As Freud (1969: 32) states: "If the real facts were familiar to you, you would very likely not have thought that there was a case where a father did not let his sons develop but you would have seen that the sons wish to eliminate their fathers, as in ancient times." ²

Those who are clearly identified with both the radicals and their goals seem to understand their psychological insights. Thus, the issues drawing radical support are seen as just, and the activists as

honourable and good. Other social scientists focus on the psychological features of the radical, and it can similarly be contested that they are inclined to psychologise history. This group feels that the first group is naively virtuous and solipsistic in asserting the essence of violent activism. Those who are condemned argue that their opponents use psychological assessments to avoid the necessary political commitment and that the ivory tower is still where it was yesterday. In their paper published in the *Yale Review*, Leavitt and Ben Rubenstein (1967: 30) argue:

The conflict appears at the distance at least to be part of the age-old struggle of the young and the old. ... Student rebellions the country over draw upon energy generated from typical adolescent collisions with society's mores. ... The institution can and must serve as a representative of what is psychologically and culturally important. ... If (they) fail in this obligation, the results of this "folie à trois" – the college replicating general abdication of authority – may be unclear until the next generation makes its appearance, but the potential for social destruction is immense.

In a later paper, their concern at this time was stated in simpler terms:

Can we support a minority group, which unlawfully occupies buildings, holds hostages, and disrupts the society? Are the consequent confrontations the kind of educational experience, which the university wishes to encourage? Can the accelerated capitulation of the academic community to ultimatums that are based on threats of violence and immunity from consequences ever be defended as good moral hygiene for either the academy or its angry subjects? (Leavitt and Ben Rubenstein, 1968: 597-78)

Simply put, the current campus situation can be reduced to several common denominators:

- i. There has been on the part of some young people profound growing disenchantment with society's institutions;

- ii. Probably because it is the place where youths congregate in largest numbers and because it is characteristically benign in its reaction, the university has become a major arena for the expression of this feeling;
- iii. As the bounds of propriety are threatened by increased demands and destruction of prosperity, there is a societal backlash which takes the form of increasingly severe sanctions against the youthful rebels, and this generally serves to intensify the conflict and to polarise the sides;
- iv. There is real reason to fear that the consequent loss of control for all who are involved will destroy many of our civilisation's institutions in a violent revolutionary fashion before evolutionary change can take place.

Individual Freedom and Guilt

In converting these developments into psychoanalytic terms, we can identify discontent with civilisation expressed by small groups in ways, which bring them into conflict with societal taboos over issues clustering around authority (Sigmund Freud, 1929). In his writings on primitive behaviour, Freud (1905: 342) identifies savages as:

“Hapless children of the moment, less influenced by personal memories than we are”

In his work on *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1912: 58) explains the origin of civilisation and argues that all societies share a dread of incest. In a similar way, Freud and James Fryer share the opinion that strict universal laws exist only for crimes towards which a strong temptation exists. Freud pushed the point further when he contended that much precaution was inseparably bound up with the male hood of the family. Ernest Jones (1957: 322) summarised this in the following words:

Hostility to the father, with the corresponding wish to kill or castrate him, is the active counterpart of the forbidden incest happening they constitute the two halves of the Oedipus complex. Freud suggested that the totemic worship so accompanying the practice of exogamy was an example of

the same taboo; the totem representing the father or ancestor, who must be preserved and not injured. The totemic feast where this role was particularly broken in an orgy, he explained, is a temporary “return of the repressed,” a bursting through under certain scientific societal conditions of the critical hostile impulses against the totem, i.e., fathers.

Freud traced the beginning of life to this set of circumstances. The consequences of the overthrow of authority were remorse, repression, and inhibition, all represented as of conscience designed to prevent the repetition of the totem act. He referred to the totem and taboo as a “just-so-story,” but he continued throughout his life to find in the infantile as well as in the neurotic mind impulses of murder, cannibalism, and incest and stated finally, “the beginning of religion, morality, social life, and art meet in the Oedipus complex.”

Earlier on he had commented that the more civilised one is the more energy one develops to avoiding pain rather than to the pursuit of pleasure. He later came to regard this as a characterisation of civilisation (Ernest Jones 1957: 335). According to him, “civilisation involves renunciation.” Implicit in this statement is the conviction that the compensation for such renunciation is the intellectual development of mankind, or that restrictions in the sexual sphere provide the energy for more civilised neurones.

In his discussion on *Civilisation and Discontents* Freud argues for the first time that social restrictions mark the beginning of civilisation:

The substitution of the power of a united number for the power of a simple man is the decisive step towards civilisation. The essence of it lies in the circumstances that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratification, whereas the individual recognised no such restrictions. The first requisite of a culture, therefore, is justice – that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of any individual (Ernest Jones 1957: 340).

Freud saw the conflict between the claims of the individual for freedom to obtain personal gratification, and the demands of society in opposition to them as never-ending and irreconcilable and he concluded:

Civilised society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of men towards each other. Culture has to call up possible reinforcements in order to enact barriers against the aggressive instincts of men. This aggression is the most powerful obstacle of culture, and it is the innate, independent, instinctual disposition of man (Ernest Jones 1957: 341).

Freud asserts that the only way this aggression can be managed in civilised society is through guilt, which has as its origin the fear of the loss of parental love. He concludes with a strong note, “It is my intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the evolution of culture, and to convey that the price of progress in civilisation is paid by forfeiting happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt” (Brewster smith, Norman Haan, and Jeanne Block, 1969: 261 – 288; and Richard Flacks, 1967: 52 - 75)

Other scholars describe group behaviour as often irrational, intolerant, illogical, and deteriorating in moral standards and suggest that this strange functioning was a regression to a more primitive level (Smith M. Brewster, Norma Hann, and Jeanne Block, 1969: 261-288; Richard Flacks, 1967: 52-75). Freud was struck by the thought that something “mysterious” in the group composition limits freedom of thought and judgement of an individual member and felt that this could be explained by analogies to the earliest group: the individual’s family. More importantly, he likened the group to the primeval horde in *Totem and Taboo* and tried to explicate group behaviour in terms of the old psychoanalytic constants: conscience, fear, guilt, and individual bonds.

The Psychoanalysis of Youth behaviour

The task we have set for ourselves in this study is that of trying to make psychoanalytic sense out of youth behaviour by speculating what in the developmental mix of these young people allows for

the release of violence of such proportion that it parallels revolution. In such attempts, we are taken back to the familiar ground: to Oedipus and Liaus, to the shaky relations between the child and his parents, to the nature of binding aggression, to affection and identity, and to the kinds of resolution of the sexual and the familial struggles that are produced in our society today. The psychoanalytic theory states in an unequivocal fashion that the major task of adolescence is the dissolution of infantile emotional ties to the parents and assuming responsibility for one's own behaviour. The adolescent resolution cannot occur without age and drive regression. The process of disengaging from parents produces some upsetting changes such as ambivalence and primitive aggression. These contribute to the liability and contradiction in thought, feeling, and behaviour. The marked exhilaration that accompanies the growing independence from parents is usually mixed with both filial and contemporary aspects of the parental relation.

The adolescent is most irrational, erratic, and stormy at the very point when the individualisation process is most intense. Such actions frequently represent the opposite of parental expectations, and this same pattern obtains in relation to law, tradition, and convention. The manner in which the adult world manages these transient states to a natural conclusion, a premature end, or allows it to continue for too prolonged a period, matters.

The adolescent growth process is a struggle between infantilism and differentiation, between regression and progression, and the final form of the adaptation is constructed out of the nature of the resolution of this conflict. Because of these, the normal adolescent must give up those adult objects that have served as early supports and replace them with more contemporaneous models, and because these processes are rarely simultaneous, he often experiences a strange feeling of personal impoverishment. During this time he can find relief in peer groups, which provide affective experiences of intense excitement. In the substitute organisation for the family, the youth finds those qualities of empathy, devotion, and belongingness that are necessary for him. Since the group permits transient role-playing, experimentation, and severance behaviour without the intense individual guilt, children experience in childhood that peer relations pave the way for the establishment of a new identity.

What is the relevance of the preceding materials, none of it now, to the particular lifestyle of the contemporary students radical? Although adolescents have always taken part in collective peer experience replete with idiosyncratic symbolism and style, the attack upon tribal authority totem and sexual taboos is an integral part of the process today. In the sociological studies carried out after the campus revolt in Berkeley in 1964, Brewster Smith and associates (1969: 52-75) and Richard Flocks (1967: 52- 75) came out with the following summary picture of the student radical and the family:

1. The radical movement involved the most advantaged sectors of students;
2. Activists were good students who were in a good position to achieve significant careers and status;
3. They came from predominantly upper middle professional homes which strongly symbolised democratic, egalitarian relationships with a high degree of permissiveness,' and
4. Intellectual, aesthetic, and political values, rather than achievement, were stressed in the home.

The radical can be considered from the psychological point of view to be struggling with oppressive expression within a fairly organised activity. This symbolises verbal communication of some part of past life experience, energised by a crucial unconscious memory which serves as a drive representative. National dialogue provides no discharge of feeling, because it recalls intense memories of helplessness, while acting out represents the greatest amount of discharge with the least amount of binding accounts.

The new heroes (Castro, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh) symbolise the specific character of youthful struggle because they are men of action who help diminish the sense of helplessness in the face of potential castrators and because they are more satisfying heroes than the youths' politically impotent fathers. Martin Duberman (1969: 1) argues, "The enemy (of the radical) is not as the uninitiated may suppose to be George Wallace, or Max Rafferty, or General Westmorland, but rather is the latest figure of left demonology, the separate liberal." The Minority Rights movements campus-based, offer a rational, symbolic option and a mode of active

management of helplessness against oppressive forces. The implacable hostility, the use of forbidden words, the symbolic desecration, and the absence of any spirit of compromise are aimed at the total destruction of the temple and the tablets of the law.

The psychoanalytic approach may appeal to psychoanalytic pursuits but must offend other social scientists with strong ties to immunity and historical interests. The former may inquire whether Oedipal construction has a high enough explanatory value to cover the vast radical landscape, while the latter may question why university radicals are close to identifying with their parents' political liberalism while opposing many other features of their upbringing?

We can provide a direct answer to the first group. The Oedipal explanation does not offer a satisfactory answer to such a multifaceted subject as students' radicalism, because we cannot offer that which is crucial to the argument, the particularities. For instance why do some youths accommodate easily to society, while others rail verbally at the limitations, and why a few actively revolt? Until this link can be clearly established through copious clinical material then can it offer a satisfactory explanation.

The second group of persons that is interested in psychohistory refuses the intra-psychic explanation for social phenomenon such as the student revolt. This group contends that radical behaviour is not acting but living out and that it is now necessary to abandon the timeless fixity of dysfunctions relating to character structure and substitute instead with a concept of 'identity' as a process connected to these historical events. Viewed this way, psychoanalytic constructs do not explain historical consequences and hence must of necessity observe the giant step from the intra-psychic to external social actions.

Robert Liebert challenges the psychoanalysts to leave their offices and engage in more active roles in society with the following judgement:

The psychoanalytic movement, instead of being a major force for understanding and helping conflicted people of all generations in a complex world, will in succeeding years find its "analyzable" patients getting older and older, and sadly, the Analytic Movement will move towards adolescence and irrelevance, while remaining pure. (1969: 7)

Where can we find a safe position in this scientific controversy? The next attempt to sort out these matters is to provide a complementary approach. Should we consider rebellion as a political act we would have no need for psychological investigations. However, if it is at least in part an adolescent rebellion, then we should try to understand the behavioural manifestations of the phrase. Psychoanalytic efforts involve extensive clinical work and review, yet our fear stems from the fact that these efforts may not offer satisfactory answers to the following questions:

1. Is the struggle of the student radical with society an impression of the continuing influence of the infantile or neurotic character of the Oedipus complex?, and
2. Is the struggle of the service growth or regression, adaptive or maladaptive?

The psycho historical approach of Erik Erickson (1969: 45) that examines a psychological process at a given moment has been brilliantly erased in the studies of Luther and Gandhi. Erickson refers to it as “an area in which no body as yet is methodologically quite at home. There will be those who will rush to apply psychoanalytic insights to history and vice versa.” As a result of the newness and vagueness of these tools, its proponents must sustain its operational hypotheses otherwise the “psycho” part may be lost in history, and history may become stylised and tailored to fit the psychological formulations which accompany it (Smith Brewster and Jeanne Block, 1969: 82).

In considering students dissents, psycho historians have selected an area that is by nature charged with extreme emotions. Similarly, the heavy-handed applications of classic psychoanalytic technologies to a profound behavioural expression are at best a speculating and shaky enterprise. We are dealing with over determining psychic constellations. It is clear that additional years of analytic observations are needed.

We can support the oedipal explanation when viewed from one vantage point. Preliminary clinical material framework with student radicals conveys the ambivalence of a revived oedipal struggle, which enlivens a happy consonance of passion, idealism, defence,

and communicability, which provide the first strong sense of identity in adolescence, the one defined by Erickson as the “this is me!” feeling.

Anne Freud (1952: 11) argues that analysts must continue to concern themselves with the study of man against himself, rather than against society. Such statements reflecting classic positions have drawn criticism from investigators who guard against its narrow perspective. When such modest positions are contrasted with Kenneth Keniston’s (1969: 6) comment, “it is clear that I (like Leavitt and Rubenstein) perceive and interpret today’s (student) radicalism through a lens that includes not only my scientific training and assumptions but my political convictions and personal values”; we begin to recognise the source of some of the controversy. Keniston’s point of view enlarges the scientific operational field in a startling way and scholars question whether what he describes as a scientific position is at all in the commonly accepted use of the concept.

Empirical evidence that supports the psycho historic view indicates that student radicals come from warmly supportive families, which have stressed freedom of expression. For a variety of social and political reasons, the young people have reacted strongly against the tenuous quality of modern life. When their singular efforts to achieve change bring them into inevitable inclusion with the world around them, they have demonstrated the willingness to abandon both their education and careers in order to dramatise their conviction that life is hollow. Their lifestyles give psychoanalytic clues to their basic character structure, but to concentrate on this to the exclusion of the social goals involved, is a fatal intellectual exercise. While they suffer from the same agonies as we, they are apparently determined to effect meaningful change in the human condition. Persons bold enough to look hard at the goals sought by these courageous activists will not be misled by either the threatening rhetoric or the violent tactics. Considered in this light, nothing much can be expected of an older generation which, at best is committed to outmoded tradition and to the course of gradualism and due process, and which at worst, dismisses the effort of the young to change the world as a kind of active idealism that will ultimately

be altered by membership in the Parents' Teachers' Association (PTA), the country club, the utilitarian church or the Mosque. Under such circumstances, all the truth seekers must join the efforts, either actively or ideologically because it is (in Erickson's phrase) "thirteen o'clock in the night" for the human race.

An answer to the second group is found in the understanding of the phenomenon of fire setting. We have been party to frightening happenings in the living theatre. A very special section of youth engages in acting out in an attempt to communicate symbolically the particular flavour of their adolescent struggle. The conflict may be considered, at least in part, an unresolved oedipal one. However, the choice of the stage, that is the campus, as well as the particular point in history, has confused actors, audience, and management. As an audience, we fail to insist that the activity be kept within the confines of the theatre for the players' protection. If what we are seeing is life itself rather than a dream, we must advise the participants to leave the unreal theatre (campus) arena and develop action programmes in the world outside where life is really lived. Moreover, we become more the less confused because the plays deal with issues that are significant and disturbing to us.

Writing at a time when the youth was commonly regarded as both self satisfied and disengaged from societal issues, Herbert Muller (1952: 11) states:

I am assuming that the modern world is in fact as revolutionary as everybody says it is. Its profound contradictions are not due to mere perversity or simple folly. They are due to the extraordinary developments in science and technology, which have led to far more rapid change than any previous society has known, and than our society has been prepared to deal with.

And because the paradoxes of our age are so violent, men have been violently oversimplifying its issues. On the one hand, many political and business leaders are celebrating the triumph of technology, science, and free enterprise as if there were nothing fundamentally wrong with our civilisation, the world depressions, and the world's unfortunate accidents. On

the other hand, many intellectuals are ignoring the obvious triumphs, seeing only a monstrous folly and evil.

It would therefore be helpful to view our world with both pride and alarm, each tampered by historical sense.

Campus Politics and Student activism

Any discussion of the student activists must carefully distinguish the various levels of activism. In the most immediate form, this rebellion is a healthy and probably overdue rush by students for a voice in their own education, particularly through membership in important university committees. Those interested in such measures probably constitute a majority of activists on campus, but they naturally receive far less publicity than the more radical. The radicals also express scorn for the moderates for their lack of meliorism and their apparent indifference to larger issues.

A second group is primarily political in its concerns. Its obsessions are war, tribalism, and poverty; and its aim is to influence the society beyond the campus, to purify the university itself from immoral political influence, and to mobilise the academic community into a progressive political force. There are great extremes within this group, ranging from Eugene McCarthy liberals to would-be Maoist revolutionaries (Nathan Glazer, 1972: 86). Because they are more interesting and because they may represent the wave of the future, we have chosen to highlight the activities of the radical youth. A great dilemma arises within the radical group. Even relatively moderate forms of political activism of the students tend to blend politics and culture; yet the students are obviously unable to effect change in the totalitarianism of the university and the society generally.

The danger can be seen clearly in the demand for relevance, a central feature of discontent. No one may object to this demand for relevance in principle: unquestionably, there is much within the university, which is irrelevant to any kind of humane education. However, the leaders have a distressing tendency to define relevance in rather mechanical and short-sighted way, equating it with contemporary social problems. Whatever is directly related to these problems is deemed relevant; all else is rejected.

On one level this concept of relevance and the militancy that supports it is a kind of professional and intellectual imperialism by the social sciences. A disproportionate number of activists are social science majors, and social science faculty members are damned than most other professors. In some cases these professors actually portray ambitions to lead these movements. Professional imperialism reveals itself in the fact that if the curricula of the universities were reconstructed to become relevant, as that concept is often formulated, perhaps ninety percent of the courses now in the universities would be abolished and a fantastic proliferation of courses in political science, law, sociology, and economics would replace them.

The drive for relevance is intellectual imperialism in the strong tendency of students and faculty members to subsume all knowledge under Political Science, Law, sociology and economics. Values related to religion, nationality, family, political beliefs are seen only in quasi Marxist way, not as ideas to be acquired or rejected in their own terms but merely as the emanations of social class. "Bourgeois hang ups" or "middle class ideology" are epithets that make it possible to dismiss ideas contemptuously rather than to come to terms with them. This tendency is profoundly, though unconsciously, anti-human, because it implies that we are merely creatures of social class and our perceptions have significance apart from that fact.

The intellectual imperialist approach to Unitarianism is the implicit belief that all of culture must serve political ends, most especially progressive and ostensibly democratic ones. Students of the traditional liberal arts or the creative and performing arts now often feel that these studies do not relate directly to the social problems. Classical music, novels, and art are rejected, as expressions of a bourgeois society, while folk and rock music appear to be politically relevant. In attempts to radicalise traditional courses (like Modern Languages), the whole validity of high culture is being called into question. Student programmes for educational reform would in fact make the university a totalitarian community in which all members would be pressured to associate themselves with progressive politics, and all interests and activities not directly relevant to politics would at the very best fall under general disapproval. Art would degenerate into propaganda, and scholarship

would consciously serve partisan ends. This crisis goes beyond the university, as in former American director, Thomas Heaving's stated belief that the metropolitan Museum in New York cannot rest contentedly as a repository of the classics but has to play a progressive role in the great social struggle of our time.

The politicisation of our students confronts us with a fact, which our society prefers to overlook, that apart from a few occasional fortuitous exceptions (that do not look so exceptional the closer they are studied), political success usually goes to the most ruthless and single minded. If the student's desire to effect change is highly laudable for its idealism and care, there is also in it a kind of vanity, as the student believes that he is too moral, too talented, and too aware to confine himself to a social role that is less than central ("mere scholarship") and relatively without power. In the campus rebellion, we have evidence that moderates, those with too many scruples, will inevitably lose control to those whose only restraints seem to be whatever they can get away with. Often such people appear invincibly self-righteous, utterly contemptuous of those who disagree with them, and totally manipulative in their self-relationships with other people. They reject a society that makes people cogs in an economic machine, but they are ready to make their own fellow students cogs in a revolutionary machine of their own design and construction.

This kind of student activism mirrors some of the worst features of our culture, especially its philistinism. Like his business father, the radical has little use for "culture" and a great deal of contempt for those whose bent is meditative and inactivity. He scorns his liberal professors for the same reason his father scorns them, because they are intellectual, indecisive, ineffectual, and unproductive. Certain student activists worship action and respect only success.

However, student activism has long laboured a current, which is not primarily political, despite appearances. The initial puzzle of liberals at the apparent hopeless utopianism and breathless disregard for political realities of new leftists has, at least, yielded to the understanding that certain radicals are in fact not primarily interested in politics at all but in the most fundamental kind of cultural revolution, of which politics is merely a part. This is the third general category of youth rebellion, and in a sense these rebels are at the opposite pole from the second group, because they promise

totalitarianism in which culture controls all, and politics is subordinate. Unlike certain of their colleagues, they are not pragmatist to a Philistine degree and are not particularly interested in measurable success.

We are experiencing a romantic revival, very similar to that of the generation of African nationalists and it is well to remember that romanticism is both a drive towards freedom from convention and a search for absolutes and hence for authority. The gap between so many older intellectuals who now sense between themselves and the young derives primarily from the old generation's formation in the tradition of Enlightenment, especially the belief that ironic, detached and rational probing are the proper tasks of moral men and the necessary starting points of valid politics. The young have come to look upon rationality as sterile and are now inclined to rely on instincts, feelings, and obscuring sensed institutions as the best impetus for action. For these students the political reawakening of the 1990s was less than genuinely political. It was a constant search for liberating and transforming experiences, the constant substance of particular emotions and perceptions. Certain segments of the New Left seem held together less by stated political goals or articulated ideologies than by shared feelings about the world that cannot be expressed adequately in public language but are intuited in other ways by those who are properly sensitive. Hence such things as cloths, music, and speech have significance for the New Left that they do not have for the old. It is here that a new positive totalitarianism can be seen in that the young activists, at least by their exclusions, have created a rightly conformist subculture. The descriptions of experiences bear a sinister similarity to some descriptions of brainwashing experiences.

The divergence of activism from the New Left is the sign of distinction between the movements for Cultural and political revolutions. Some of these leftists are less interested in politics. Yuppie Abbie Hoffman, for instance, proclaims that politics itself is a hang up and that the bourgeoisie must first be assaulted not in its institutions but in its fundamental consciousness. The aim of the movement considered tentatively political, is a total revolution in the lives of the middle class, in which every assumption concerning taste, beliefs, truth, and morality will be subjected to a "trans valuation of values."

Many of these activists have profoundly ambivalent attitudes towards the university and society. They demand to be treated as adults, but they resent bitterly the largeness and impersonality of the university and society. What they fail to understand is that in our mass society, so highly mobile and rapidly changing, it is precisely a mark of adulthood to accept impersonality and largeness and to forge one's own meaning of personal life rather than expecting society to provide it. Many of these activists seem to want a university or society that offers an ultimate familial atmosphere, and at the same time free of all paternalism and normative guidance. This is a contradiction, which extends the entire notion of relevance as the activist employs it. These young activists consider the university as simply irrelevant to the real world, but rather as a mere factory that processes students for the need of the capitalist society. The contradiction in these charges is implicit also in the activists' desire on the one hand, to imbibe all worldly experiences, to be free of hang ups, to admit no stifling boundaries, and on the other hand, to cleanse the university and society of all unsavoury influences. A totally reformed university and society according to the activist apparently would be one in which no element of tyranny, stupidity, backwardness, or immorality would be allowed to exist.

The root of the rebellion stems from extraordinary thirst for life experiences, again a manifestation of a neo romanticism that makes intellectual and cultural activities seem boring and insignificant by comparison. This attitude has been spawned in part by knowledge explosion and by the consequent despair of the youth of ever attaining an intellectual mastery of the world and therefore seeks other roads to truth. They also recognise the fact that accumulation of human knowledge has not led to a deepening of human meaning. It also stems from the fact that in the last few decades, higher education has ceased to be a privilege and for many, it has become a duty. When one is virtually forced to spend seventeen years of his life in formal education, it is inevitable that serious doubts about the process will arise.

In a real sense the ideal of liberal education has been grafted onto our culture; it is not a native plant, and the success of the operation is very doubtful. For some decades when higher education was largely the preserve of a semi-leisured elite, the classic ideal of

liberal art was paid lip service, even if relatively few students were deeply affected by it. This ideal was upheld by the constant insistence of intellectuals who took a resolutely anti-philistine line. However, young people now appear to be in the vanguard of a cultural revolt, which affects mature intellectuals as well, and across the nation many professors have lost self-confidence. There are serious doubts in the validity of their own disciplines, and the very idea of education to which they have given their lives. Thus, the charge that liberal education at present is largely meaningless is similar to the classic belief that man spends his entire life in the search for meaning that is found in flashes and fragments, never whole; and that to achieve even this requires the endurance of many days and years of relative darkness. As such, the interest in drugs among the youths reflects the hope that somewhere a shortcut to meaning can be found; that the struggle and discipline, which since the days of the Greeks man has believed that are essential to his life, are no longer required. The classic notion of liberal education has been the planting of seeds, which will mature slowly. But our society, always interested in speedy and concrete results, has never accepted this ideal, and the youths do not either. Hence their education, the result of which they cannot see, is to them a failure.

Despite its rebelliousness, the youth manifests disquieting signs of the crowd mentality, perhaps no more so than previous generations but more disturbing precisely because this is a generation superior in its seriousness and sophistication. It is still true as it has always been that students' taste in books and music, styles of dress, commonly held ideas and values are standardised and predictable. Despite this iconoclasm they are, in George Orwell's phrase, a head of independent minds. Whatever criticism can be made of the older generations of intellectuals, they manifest much greater diversity of taste and opinion. The constant search for the new and stimulating, the distrust for rationality and the desire for ecstasy, the refusal to see events in perspectives and the lack of interest in the past; in a word, the utter preoccupation with the moment, the "now," also makes this generation potentially susceptible to the worst kinds of manipulation, and this manipulation seems already to have taken place in some public institutions. Significantly, the concept of the "now generation" does not derive from the student

movement nor from any intellectual movement, but rather from the notion of living entirely in the present, for the sake of immediate satisfaction. This is the heart of advertising psychology.

The cult of youth has gained so much intellectual respectability (young people are the noble savages of this particular romantic revival), although it is also an aspect of romantic frame of mind that is most seriously challenged by Enlightenment scepticism. It has been said that the loss of youth is the greatest misfortune. Unfortunately this same belief permeates a good part of the movement, and it implies a horrifying negative view of the human situation, despite its superficial optimism.

The rebels imply the impossibility of significant human achievement in the future in their contempt for so much of the past, whether in politics, education, art, or religion. If past generations have failed so miserably, there is no reason to support that this can succeed. Man is thus as absurd and tragic as the existentialists see him. We may wonder if the almost obsessive need to devour experiences, to seize power and to transform the world does not come from a deeper need for young people to prove themselves that much achievement is in fact impossible. For at this ultimate point, the most alienated of the young seems literally not to believe in the possibility of human growth beyond a certain point. "Don't trust anybody over thirty" is the clearest distillation of this attitudes, and it persists. Many student activists seem convinced that once their student days are over, they have no possibility of happiness, meaning, or moral integrity. Only degradation and regression lie ahead. The extreme cynicism of this view has had a deeply corrosive effect on all aspects of our culture. As Norman Mailer said in receiving the 1969 National Book Award in the US, "We are ... poised upon the lips ... of a spiritual revolution that will wash the psychic roots of young national institutions out to the sea." And again, "... no longer do we know where we go, or whom we fight" (Manuel Bronfman, 1972: 143). Such Hobbesian predictions of "war for all" would come true if the situation is not properly addressed.

Analytical Framework and Methodology

The work seeks to examine the causes of students' rebellion in the University of Buea and to make recommendations and inferences for the implementation of reforms in all the public universities in the country. The stakeholders (students, administrators, lecturers, and parents) of the university were identified as targets of the investigation.

The data collected were done so in recognition of the role of the university community, university administration, Ministry of Higher education and the political system to the successful implementation of governance policies in the universities.

A cross-sectional survey design was adopted for the study. Data was collected from the views of stakeholders about the implementation of reforms in the education system, the university community, the campus and the political system. Respondents were identified on the basis of sex, status, faculty and culture. The data were generated from structured questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. The questionnaires were administered to literate respondents and the same were used as the basis of interview with some of the older and illiterate respondents.

The survey, conducted in May 2005, lasted for five months and a total of 1,500 survey instruments were distributed to the students, administrative staff, lecturers and parents. The respondents were selected also on the basis of sex, status, department and culture. The questionnaires comprised 30 structured items based on the causes of the students' rebellion and the possible university governance reform policies needed for implementation.

The Causes of Students' Rebellion in Public Universities

The following indicators ranked high among the causes of the students' rebellion in the university:

The crisis in the Education system

Judging from the education system and from what happens on campus and the society, much achievement seems impossible. Once university days are over the youth finds no possibility of happiness, meaning, or moral integrity as the present administration seeks the support of, and therefore creates opportunities for, the adults of

retirement age. The system has become so regressive and repressive that much achievement has become impossible. There is the failure of the authorities of the Higher Education Ministry to formulate guidelines and enforce the implementation of governance policies. As a consequence the education system experiences a crisis as:

- The institutional authority of the teaching force works against the implementation of university governance;
- There is the absence of a clearly defined mission for the culturally diffused clientele;
- The French system structured by a set of precise norms that apply from the centre all the way to the outer fringes functions like a sanctuary protected from all influences, though it is unable to cope with the diversified clientele;
- With the new technologies and globalisation, the pressure to improve performance is beginning to be felt;
- The need for change is becoming more felt than ever as neighbouring countries that adopt policies of decentralisation have more efficient and more equitable education systems;
- The critical attitude of the students expresses a severe professional and symbolic crisis that is made more acute by the centralisation of the school system;
- There is the growing need for the functional autonomy of individual universities, changes in the teachers' duties, and for new teaching methods.

The crisis in Public Universities

Public universities have abandoned their responsibility to nurture while at the same time retaining their authority to punish and constrain students. The authority to control implies the responsibility to protect their young against hostile attack; otherwise they might lose the love and loyalty of these youths who would fall apart. This falling apart is already experienced on the campuses. The new heroes on the campus are men of action who help diminish the sense of helplessness in the face of potential castrators because they are more satisfying than the students' politically impotent fathers and lecturers.

- The total lack of welfare concerns in the university community gives the students the impression that the bureaucracy in which they have lodged themselves has little regard for them;
- The narrow fields of choice in the universities prevents the students from following lifelong educational patterns;
- The failure of university administration to fashion bargained agreements among diverse interest groups prevents the allocation of political resources according to interest groups;
- The lack of students' participation in decision making in issues that directly or indirectly concern them makes the students less committed to the existence of the universities in which they find themselves;
- The indifference of the universities to the needs of the students and those of the community gives the students the feeling that there is need for a spiritual revolution which will wash the psychic roots of national institution;
- The growing disenchantment of students with the university and the system gives them the feeling that the university is an instrument of oppression;
- The politicisation of university administration gives the students the impression that the university administrators serve the interest of the state than the students and the clientele.

Political and environmental crisis

- There is the withdrawal of students' welfare concerns by the society, while at the same time students are required to exercise their obligations as children and patriots;
- Their refusal of society to bear with the students' problems in the same way that it bears with the heat, noise, and air pollution of the industrialists, gives the metropolitan police and law makers the impression that the university is a haven for law breakers.
- The undemocratic nature of the political system, gives the students the feeling that the nation's institutions are meant to serve the ruling political elite and their clientele;

- The lack of political accountability and transparency in political transactions in the political system, gives the students the impression that success belongs to the courageous and the single - minded;
- The growing disenchantment of students with the institutions of the state gives them the feeling that the university is an instrument of oppression.

Managing Students' Rebellion in public universities

Based on these indicators the following recommendations are made to promote the implementation of governance policies that would go a long way to minimise the instances of students' rebellion in public universities:

Restructuring the education system

The authorities of the education system should develop additions to formal schooling that can be achieved through restructuring the school system so that young people will interrupt their formal education at various points to engage in worldly activities, and to be able to return to school when they feel the need. This implies that the system needs to create opportunities for students leaving the university to occupy themselves in gainful activities such as youth-service schemes or tax-free business ventures for a number of years.

Implementing corollary changes of educational nature

Educational institutions require corollary changes of especially educational nature. These changes should be such that:

- University structures are remodelled to extend widely the fields of choice and enable people to follow lifelong educational patterns;
- The subject matter must be individualised such that students must be aware of their own wishes;
- The authoritarian reforms of teaching must give way to relationships marked by independence;
- Mutual responsibility and dialogue;
- Pedagogical training must be geared to knowing and respecting the multiple aspects of human;

- Personality, guidance must replace selections;
- Stakeholders of the institutions must participate in their management and policy making;
- The bureaucratic aspects of higher educational activity must be broken down and its administration decentralised.

Democratising public institutions

The democratisation of public universities must go hand in hand with the development of participation. But the democratisation of these universities cannot take place without changes in the institutions themselves. These changes should be such that they would allow the groups involved to establish the democratic relationships with each other, and to allow students to play their full part in implementing decisions affecting all institutions' activities. Progress in this direction also means ending the isolation of the institutions from community and giving the people as a whole the opportunity to take interest in their operation.

Democratising education does not only mean giving more education to more people in educational management. Traditional education is failing to adapt itself to the needs of a growing number of people, it must be recreated. It has to be recreated not by the administrators and officials in education but by the students, all of them;

Let democratising education begin again with a moral democratic act: as many people as possible must help to recreate education.

Promoting Students' Participation in Decision Making

University administration is expected to work within the pluralist framework by fashioning bargained agreements among diverse interest groups, allocating political resources to each group in the smallest increments that will resolve the conflicts implicit in bargaining situations. The aim is to create a "no loss" situation for every conflict situation, which leaves everyone, directly or indirectly involved, not totally dissatisfied. Bargaining processes should involve negotiation, discussion and compromise among the (professional or political) actors directly involved. Policy discussions that result in the gross losses for any particular group should inevitably be ruled out. The policies that survive should be typically presented as benefiting to everyone in a certain group, without adversely affecting everybody outside it.

Participation can only progress if it can overcome two levels of obstruction found in similar forms. The first is the age hierarchy: the younger the student population, the less they are regarded as entitled to participation. The argument usually involved in support of this attitude (when participation is not rejected out of hand), is that certain maturity is a prerequisite to participation. This is certainly not an argument to be neglected. But those who hold this view (even when, exceptionally, they do not claim a monopoly of the maturity of adults) are often inclined to push the minimum age for participation up beyond school age, or even university age. This makes it clear that they are actuated not by objective concern for the degree of the maturity of the young, but primarily by the anxiety of the adults to keep the young under their protection, and to preserve a power structure in the educational system, which reflects and reproduces the power structure of the society. Giving young people a chance relatively early in life to play a role requiring a fairly high degree of maturity (in this case genuinely taking part in running educational institutions), can accelerate the growing up process. In the rare cases where students participate in running universities, participation is fully approved.

The second method of obstruction consists of what may be called the sector hierarchy (i.e., relating to sectors in which participation must operate). The more central the sector and hence the more important the decision, the less participation there is. Participation, particularly student participation, has long been limited to the 'social' structure, i.e., students' unions, halls of residence, university restaurants, health services, cultural and sporting activities, and so on. It is being adopted by a growing number of countries, yet in Cameroon it is still rudimentary: the students are usually in the minority, and the influence they can exert is minimal. A step towards the extension of participation was taken when the governing bodies of some universities in the country began to consult students, essentially through the medium of their unions. But this consultation is in practice concerned with specific problems affecting students, and not with matters of general policy.

Such half-hearted participation would whittle away until it is scarcely worth the name. The main students' demands have been for a change in the structure of educational institutions so as to

give students parity of representation in all sectors, particularly those dealing with policy and administration, and with syllabus and research programmes. Those sectors were normally the preserve of the teaching and administrative staff, even of a central policy making authority, anxious to uphold its prerogatives.

Due to the struggle of students in recent years, and also to the efforts of the more sympathetic elements in the adult society, some progress has been made. But it is the delay and setbacks that annoy students. They are coming more and more to see the introduction of partial participation as a trap, which limits their field of activity to a small compass. This is why the demands of the most radical and the most highly politicised sections of youth are no longer confined to the extension of participation to all sectors of the administration of educational institutions. They now go beyond institutions catering specifically for the young: what is demanded is the introduction of participation or shared control at all levels of the society where power is actually exercised.

In some countries, France in particular, a movement has arisen for joint management in education. It springs from the idea that the transformation of society and the transformation of education go together, and that schools as a microcosm of present day society, contains the germ of social liberation. This movement does not put forward a structural model: it aims at a renovation of teaching methods and educational context through the introduction of collective authority working through a loose association of teachers, students, and parents. To be in a position to exert this authority, school administration, teachers, and parents must have the means to instil social behaviour in the students, to develop community ability in the teachers, and to train the parents through the medium of adult education. Educational institutions would then be "open" not only to the maximum number of students and pupils but above all to the world around them. For example, individual universities should be financially independent and the heads should be elected by a consensus of all groups in the university. Appointments should be in the interest of the university community than in the interest of the government.

Conclusion

There is the need for a deliberate and conscious management of the university community to enhance the participation of the students. Such conscious management could be through different sets of tools including a code of ethical behaviour; outcome-based performance assessment; result-based management; outcome-measurement; balanced scorecard; social auditing; sharing best practices; information retrieval; competences profiling; knowledge delivery; sharing and development; learning after action reviews; learning logs; decision diaries; intellectual capital measurement systems; integration management suites; and others. The management of students must be epitomised by predictable, open and enlightened policy making. The University community must be imbued with professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes and a strong student participation in decision making.

A university community should be made an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. The society must consider students to be the nation. Students must be helped and encouraged to expand the choices they have, to lead the lives they value. For good governance policies to be implemented in public universities would depend on:

- (i) The form of the political regime;
- (ii) The processes by which the authority is exercised in the management of the country's economic and social resources; and
- (iii) The capacity of the government to design, formulate and implement policies and in general to discharge government functions.

Notes

1. Making trouble here is in terms of causing to be noticed in whatever form it might take.
2. Freud refers to the act of Oedipus killing the father to marry the mother as found in Greek mythology.

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Chapter Five

Governance in the University System in Cameroon: The Appointment of Principal Officers

Peter Fon Titanji

Introduction

Governance of the higher education system in the Republic of Cameroon is mostly in the hands of appointed administrative personnel. They occupy different positions with varied job demands or role expectations. Some like deans and directors are expected to sign commitment and payment orders, prepare and manage budgets, do performance appraisals for academic and support staff, among others. The responsibilities of a principal officer, regardless of position within the hierarchy, cannot be performed at acceptable, let alone, superior level, without basic training. A major part of the job of a principal officer is to create and nurture optimal conditions for effective and efficient performance of individuals and sub-units. Regardless of how skilled collaborators may be, regardless of available state of the art technology, to guarantee superior performance requires successful combination of resources into a well-functioning system, the ultimate test of administrative excellence. It is becoming more and more evident that principal officers lack the competence and have not been supported to acquire it.

The need to strengthen capacity of staff has been a recognized challenge. For example, there is precedence in this direction in the University of Buea. During its academic planning week, the Faculty of Education, under the auspices of the Department of Academic Affairs, usually organizes a workshop on various aspects of teaching for newly recruited academic personnel. Structures need to be put in place to strengthen the capacity of principal officers, who for the most part emerge from classrooms and laboratories.

Furthermore, under the auspices of the Association of Africa Universities (AAU), many Senior University Management Workshops (SUMAWs) have been held in various parts of Africa for vice chancellors and top executives from universities across

Africa. The workshops, according to Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, the AAU's Secretary General, are designed to help university leaders who might have excellent academic credentials but minimal or no managerial experience. The goal has been to increase their understanding of issues and problems relating to the changing environment of higher education in Africa and to strengthen their management and administrative capabilities and providing tools to increase effectiveness and efficiency in African universities (University of Cape town, 1997). We are of the opinion that the higher education system should copy the example of the AAU and make management and administrative workshops available to all appointed officials.

To have a quality higher education system requires, among other things, very qualified personnel (academic, support and administrative). Within our higher education system, considerable attention is paid to the professional development of academic staff but little or nothing is done to strengthen the capacity of appointed officials. We insist that the possession of a terminal degree or enrolment in a doctorate programme should be a prerequisite for teaching. We provide staff development assistance to enable teachers conduct research and attend conferences in order to increase their competence and performance. The underlying assumption for our actions is that there are certain characteristics or abilities employees bring to the work situation. Ideally, these characteristics or competencies enable them to perform at acceptable or superior levels. An individual in a given role is expected to draw from his or her competencies to fulfil the responsibilities of a given job.

Even though competence is one of the key variables in the effective performance equation, "it has received the least systematic attention within the field of management and organization studies" Boyatzis (1982:20). For example it will not be surprising that many individuals occupying administrative positions do not know how to write a memorandum. We cannot continue to conceive educational administration as a job that can be done well with minimal or no preparation and support. In-service development opportunities have to be embedded into the work of practicing administrators. Generally, the job of a principal officer, regardless of hierarchical level, is to help their respective units achieve stated

objectives through the utilization of available, albeit scarce resources. This is done by performing the traditional functions of planning, coordinating, motivating, directing and coordinating these resources. Put very simply, principal officers (vice chancellors and their immediate deputies, deans and directors, heads of services and departments, chief of services, among others) are expected to get things done with and through other people.

In this chapter, we argue that principal officers of the nation's higher education are the most neglected in terms of capacity building, relative to their respective job expectations. The chapter is organized into three parts. The first part brings out arguments in favour of training structures for officials within the higher education system in the Republic of Cameroon. In the second part, we present a simple model of effective performance and examine its components. In the final part, an attempt is made at sketching the way forward or what we think can be done.

The Need

There are many inter-related reasons why we think an end should be put to the neglect of the training of practicing administrators within the higher education system. The first reason has to do with the importance of the higher education system, documented evidence of its problems and challenges (The World Bank, 1994; Saint, 1992; The University of Buea, 1998) and urgent calls for reform. This level of schooling is essential to individuals and the society at large. Some of the main reported crisis indicators include unsustainable funding, constraints on educational opportunities, internal and external inefficiencies, and inequality of access and experience based on gender and socio-economic background. The actions or inactions of appointed officials will determine whether our higher education system serves us well or whether our meagre talents and resources will be squandered (Mintzberg, 1971). A recurrent theme in most reform proposals is the need to pay greater attention to institutional governance. With abundant evidence of shortcomings in our higher education system, we cannot afford to continue to do business as usual but must demonstrate commitment to systemic changes, not only in our oral expressions, but more so in what we do.

The second reason stems from the positive relationship between competence and performance. The possession of relevant knowledge builds the confidence of employees and self-confidence is integral to greater commitment and performance (Boyatzis, 1982). The process of assuming administrative responsibilities within the nation's higher education system absolutely pays no attention, before or after appointments, to the administrative competencies of those appointed. Administrative personnel, for the most part, emerge from the ranks of academic staff. The operational logic is that the competencies required for being a successful academic (teacher and researcher) can be successfully transferred to positions in school administration. According to the International Labour Organization, the shift from teaching to a mix of teaching and administration is not usually easy, especially in the absence of socialization structures for the provision of needed competence. It is therefore imperative to design and implement structures to enable university leaders who might have excellent academic credentials but minimal or no managerial or administrative experience to acquire basic administrative and management competence.

Effectiveness and efficiency have recently been seen as twin concepts in the management literature. Before, greater attention was only paid to the concept of effectiveness. Performance effectiveness and performance efficiency are increasingly being acknowledged as basic criteria for measuring the success of an administrator (Schermerhorn, 1984: 219). Performance effectiveness is a measure of goal accomplishment regardless of associated costs. Because of the possibility of accomplishing goals with little or no concern for the rational use of resources, the concept of performance efficiency, especially against the backdrop of economic crisis and scarce resources, has been added to performance effectiveness as a measure of administrative success. It is the measure of the costs incurred with goal accomplishment. It is generally computed in the form of a ratio of outputs realized (goods and/or services) to inputs consumed in the process.

The increasingly changing responsibilities of appointed officials of the higher education system constitute further need for training. These individuals occupy positions in which they are expected to exert quality leadership, to create social and intellectual

environments worthy of the pursuit of excellence in all its manifestations. While some of the vital decisions that shape university life are made in Yaoundé, principal officers, especially at the level of individual institutions, make important decisions and act in ways that can affect the social and academic life of the system and the amount of energy staff bring to their work. In the country today, gathering and maintaining good people in the higher education system is a daunting challenge in spite of widespread unemployment. The fact that many academics are leaving in search of greener pastures may be related to the quality of prevailing leadership. If well trained, the actions of administrative personnel can increase the system's holding power on available employees and attract more talent.

Furthermore, these appointed officials at various levels, are expected to be able to collect, analyze and use data in ways that fuel excellence within the system; serve as instructional leaders who create exciting, interesting and challenging teaching, research and learning environments; we expect them to nurture the professional development of staff, be imbued with a big picture awareness of the societal role of the higher education system, share leadership with others and build bridges with other stakeholders. We also expect them to ensure transparent and appropriate use of resources entrusted to their care especially in view with new policies of greater decentralization and devolution of management. Much is presently being done to decentralize and devolve educational management from the pedagogical, administrative and financial perspectives. For example, Decree No. 2005/383 of October 17, 2005 gives increased financial management to institutional managers such as deans, directors and heads of department. One of the consequences of decentralization policies is to decrease dependence on the state and increase it on local stakeholders. These are very reasonable expectations. However, what is not regular, and that, which constitutes a problem, is the fact that little or nothing is done to prepare practicing administrators to fulfil these expectations. While on the one hand, we share the view that education personnel, especially those occupying administrative positions, should be called to assume greater responsibility and accountability for what goes on within their sub-units, we must on the other hand equip them with what it takes to do it. To this end, training of principal officers

will be very important in building capacity at the local level to ensure more effective and efficient management of scarce resources.

Improving the performance of practising educational administrators in this country has been recognized at lower levels of schooling. For example, in 1990 Education Ministers of Commonwealth countries met in Barbados and reflected on ways of improving the performance of head teachers/principals. This was followed up in 1997 with an in-country workshop on the training of head teacher trainers, jointly sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Ministry of National Education (MINEDUC). Dr. Robert Mbella Mbappe, the then Minister of National Education, in his opening remarks stressed the fact that good school administration is a vital pre-requisite towards the creation of effective and efficient educational environments. To use his exact words, "Good school administration brings about better discipline, better results, better management of scarce resources and a better return on the enormous investment that parents and the state put in education." (p.1). Prominent in the recommendations of the workshop proceedings was the need for permanent structures for the regular continuing education of practicing educational administrators. If it can be done at lower levels of schooling, it can be done at higher levels.

The relationship between quality of leadership and excellence in organizations is well grounded in the literature from the private sector (Peters & Waterman, 1992) and particularly in educational organizations (Barth, 1980; Sergiovanni, 1987; Bennet, 1992; The World Bank, 1994). For example, according to Harvard Professor, Roland Barth (1984) the nature of the relationship among adults who inhabit the school has more to do with its quality and character and with the accomplishments of its students than any other factor, irrespective of the level of schooling. Actions of principal officers have an impact on and contribute to the performance of individuals within their units as well as the units themselves. The quote at the beginning of this paper reinforces the link between the performance of those occupying administrative positions and the ability of social institutions to serve the purposes for which they were created.

It has become fashionable for Cameroon's higher education institutions to attribute their woes to other variables, notably the

prevailing economic malaise that has eroded government subventions. It has also become fashionable for them to conclude that the only solution to problems of the system lies in sizeable injections of additional funds. There is absolutely no doubt that money, judiciously used, is significantly related to good achievement in schools at all levels. However, blaming almost everything on unsustainable funding is myopic and irresponsible. Such a position will blind those holding administrative positions from seeing and exploiting the other complementary variables to the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. With adequate training, principal officers can be helped to know what contributions they can make towards improvements of the higher education system.

Another need for improved institutional governance through the training of principal officers can be obtained from the world of organizational psychology. Whether we like it or not, we are forced to work in order to earn a living for ourselves (Schermerhorn, 1984: 81) and those who depend on us. Work is therefore a normal part of life. Employee job satisfaction has been linked to the perceived congruence between work-related challenges and the ability of employees to fulfil them (Ashton & Webb, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Ability is partly a function of an employee's preparation. When employees perceive that they are well prepared, relative to work expectations, they are more likely to have a high sense of efficacy or an 'I can do it attitude' which is a prerequisite for excellent performance.

Csikszentmihalyi (1990: 98) suggests that, regardless of type of organization, employees who are inadequately prepared will be unable to meet work-related challenges. He further adds that when challenges or work demands exceed an employee's competence, anxiety which is likely to lead to job dissatisfaction is produced. To Ashton and Webb (1986: 56), inadequately prepared education personnel are prone to questioning or doubting their ability to realize expected outcomes. Perceptions about ability will influence choice of activities as well as the amount of effort expended.


Against this backdrop, the need for work, especially the work of employees of a university, to be well done is very important because of the expected outcomes of the higher education system. The foregoing suggests that most appointed officials, especially at the

beginning of their administrative careers, are likely to face issues of self-doubt. It is logical to expect them to doubt their ability to perform as expected without basic training. In the absence of training, they can easily become dissatisfied at work. The transition from being a teacher to assuming full administrative responsibilities should not be abrupt, but one characterized by norms of socialization. Instead of allowing them to either swim or sink alone, part of the envisaged challenge is to provide needed support in the form of basic training.

A Model of Effective and Efficient Job Performance

In this section, the components of a simple model of effective and efficient performance, adapted from the management literature, is presented and examined below.

Figure 5.1: The Relationship between Competence and Performance Effectiveness



As shown in the diagram, the model reveals three variables - i) job demands, ii) individual competencies, iii) the organizational environment as determinants of effective and efficient performance. It suggests that effective and efficient performance, what we desire of every principal officer, will result when there is congruence between work-related challenges or demands, the competence of the individual occupying a given position, and variables within the organizational environment.

This simple model presents three critical prerequisites of effective and efficient performance in an administrative role. It suggests that the competencies a principal officer brings into the specific office he or she has been appointed into, the demands of the job or expected responsibilities, and the environment within which he or she carries out assigned responsibilities are vital determinants of performance effectiveness and efficiency. If any of these elements is not in congruence, then there is a very high probability that ineffective performance or inaction will result.

In our case, the job demands component deals with what principal officers (Dean, Vice Dean, Faculty Officers, and Heads of Department, among others) are expected to do in their respective positions. The Higher Education Reforms of 1993 provide job descriptions for most of the positions.

Universities in Cameroon, like other formal organizations, exist within an environment. The organizational environment refers to the economic, political, social and technological forces, within which the higher education system operates. The economic environment consists of employers, parents, friendly donor organizations (The World Bank, AAU, UNESCO, ADB, among others) whose actions can affect the demand for services and resources availabilities. The political environment includes, among others, interest groups or stakeholders, and the legal-judicial framework (decrees, ministerial circular letters, and laws). The social environment consists of the prevailing culture, demographic characteristics as well as basic characteristics of persons within the society. The technological environment includes available technologies. The above variables can be said to lie within the external environment.

There is also an internal organizational environment comprising of the prevailing culture and climate within various higher education institutions. The culture refers to shared norms, values, beliefs,

traditions, and rituals that shape the behaviour of members while the climate refers to the perceptual feel that workers have for a particular higher education institution. The prevailing climate is an index of the quality of work life of members within an institution. It influences its capacity to change, and the work habits of its members. These variables can combine to create stable, dynamic, or uncertain environments.

An environment can hurt or help an organization or a system. The environment which can be rich or poor constitutes an important input to the planning process (Schermerhorn, 1984). An environment can be described as being rich in terms of the support it provides to the system, on economic, political, social, or technological grounds. For example, it can be argued that legislation that limits user fees to 50.000FCFA per year may be enabling from the point of view of concerns of equity or social justice, but may not be enabling from the perspective of university finance and governance. Or, the non-enforcement of legislation that states that principal officers of state universities are supposed to be elected, not appointed, hurts institutional governance. If job expectations conflict with aspects of the external environment, effective performance will either not be forthcoming or it may be highly inefficient.

There are many definitions of a competency. For our purpose we will modify and adopt that of Klemp (1980), cited by Boyatzis, 1982: 21), who defines a competency as: “an underlying characteristics of a person which results in effective and/or superior performance in a job.” We will add the concept of efficiency to the definition. It is worthy to note that the definition links the concepts of interest to us – competency and effective aspect of one’s self-image or social role, or a body of knowledge which a role and efficient performance. A competency could be knowledge, skills, or attitudes. A skill is the ability to translate knowledge into action that will result in desired performance. Work by Robert L. Katz (1974) is widely recognized as bringing out three essential skills which can be applied to all types of organizations to help employees to be more productive. These are technical, human, and conceptual skills (Glickman, 1985).

- i) Technical skills – the ability to use specialized knowledge or expertise relating to a method, process or procedure. These skills are acquired mainly through formal education before or on the job; skills for planning, assessing, observing, evaluating or the main five functions of planning, organizing, controlling, directing, collaborating etc.
- ii) Human or Interpersonal skills – this is the ability to work well with others; skills for communicating; how their behaviour affects individuals as well as group of subordinates, ranges of interpersonal behaviours that might be used to promote more positive and change oriented relationships.
- iii) Conceptual skills – this is the ability to view an organization as a system as well as analyzing problems and situations from a broader systemic perspective – to identify problems and opportunities, gather and interpret relevant info and make good problem-solving decisions.

The relative importance of each type of skill depends on the administrative level with the hierarchy. Those at the highest level are likely to need more conceptual than technical skills. Those at lower administrative levels need more technical and human relation skills.

The Way Forward

In this part of the paper, an attempt is made to present what can be done to strengthen the capacity of management personnel within the higher education system. We argue that we do not need experts from outside the system to do so. All that needs to be done is to operate on the logic that the system is loaded with experts in different walks of life. For example, some of the academic departments within the larger system (for example, the Departments of Educational Foundations and Administration, Political Science and Public Administration, Law, and Economics) are in the business of providing relevant training for management positions in the public and private sector. These departments can be charged with the responsibility of mounting in-service courses in educational administration to newly appointed principal officers. In addition,

there are also specialists providing various services (stores accountants, accounting officers, financial controllers) who can also be used as resources.

Two conceptions dominate the current debate on the in-service professional development of principals and other educational leaders. On the one hand are those who are of the opinion that the beneficiaries of professional development ought to decide what kinds of assistance they want and need. On the other hand are those who argue that educational administrators should be allowed to identify essential skills and knowledge needed for effective and efficient administration. The two dominant paradigms need to be merged. In other words, the syllabus or content for in-service development workshops will be based on a combination of what those who are appointed to head institutions want to know and do, and also on what the research suggests they need to know and do.

Step One: Acknowledgement

The first step is to acknowledge and accept the fact that being an excellent teacher or researcher does not necessarily translate into being excellent in an administrative capacity. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that there is specialized basic competence that principal officers need in order to increase their competence.

Step Two: Job Analysis

With acceptance that there is a need, the next step is to study each position within the administrative hierarchy in order to be familiar with what it takes for effective and efficient performance.

Step Three: Establish Priority Needs

The results of the job analysis, and the specific job descriptions, should be used in this step to establish priority objectives and content of training workshops. The Delphi or other Technique(s), can be used to establish these priorities for various administrative positions and levels.

Step Four: Sourcing for Resources

Material and human resources will be needed. This will require assessing and knowing what is available within the system itself and what can be obtained from elsewhere.

Step Five: Training Workshop(S)

With priority objectives and content determined, the next step is to provide in-service training workshops at an appropriate time. The issue of time is very important because of the multiple demands on the time of officials within the system.

Step Six: Evaluation

An instrument should be used before and after training to determine the extent to which training objectives have been met. This can be done using a questionnaire that captures the perceptions of trainees before and after training workshop(s). This should be followed up with performance appraisal after training has been offered.

Summary: A Matter of Will

In this paper, an attempt has been made to argue for capacity building among those occupying administrative positions within the higher education system in the Republic of Cameroon. These individuals are for the most part academics turned administrators. Such an endeavour is unlikely to succeed in the absence of enabling systemic policies and policies within individual institutions.

The array of policies governing activities in schools emanate from the ministries of education, denominational education secretariats, and private individuals depending on the type of school. This project cannot succeed in the absence of enabling policies from these sources. We are therefore counting on the partnership and cooperation of these policy makers. The proposal is based on the logic that if we can devise ways to help practising educational administrators to individually and collectively become better practitioners, benefits will accrue to them as individuals and the system as a whole.

Ultimately, the success of this project will depend on our collective aspirations for the educational system and the will not to see those dreams deferred. We do not underestimate the challenges that lie ahead, (notably in the form of resources, enabling policies, and commitment from all stakeholders). We are confident that in working on them together, we will make significant progress.

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Section Three

Governance and the Economy

Introduction

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

Governance and economic performance in Cameroon is the focus of this section. In the two chapters that make up the section the authors have demonstrated by the use of statistical data that there is an indisputable relationship between governance and economic performance. Business operations are not only an indispensable aspect of an economy, they are also the barometer for assessing the health of the economy. The more business operations in an economy, other things being equal, the healthier is the economy and vice versa. It is with this understanding that Sikod and Teke undertake, in chapter six, an assessment of the relationship between governance and doing business in Cameroon. Using cross-country studies they show that Cameroon's economic performance is constrained by poor governance evidenced by the non-respect by the state of tax and custom commitments, the lack of respect by state officials for the rule of law, ineffective provision of public services and corruption in general. All of these poor governance indicators create an atmosphere of suspicion and loss of confidence by interested economic operators. As a result, Cameroon is lagging behind in its economic performance indicators. Consequently, the country's economic performance indicators cannot improve unless its governance indicators improve. In chapter seven, Ntangsi identifies, besides corruption, the non-enforcement of property rights as another indicator of poor governance that obstructs economic performance in Cameroon. Ntangsi argues that there is a correlation between enforceability of property rights and the measure of economic performance and therefore that an improvement in Cameroon's economic performance is conditioned not only on the fight against corruption but also on the enforcement of property rights.

Chapter six

Governance and Doing Business in Cameroon

Fondo Sikod & John Nde Teke

Introduction

Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethics; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law (World Bank, 1994). Although Cameroon reached the HIPC Completion Point in 2006, a conditionality that the creditors put was that Cameroon had to make progress in the area of governance. It is now some 20 years that the economy of Cameroon collapsed, and the country agreed to adopt Structural Adjustment Measures under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to redress the economy. Two factors were responsible for the collapse of the economy: external – world market prices of primary commodities, and b) internal mismanagement. Although Cameroon is well endowed with natural and human resources, the country is not quite able to get out of the economic crisis. As the economy has continued to falter, and the population has continued to grow at the very high rate of 2.9 percent, poverty has continued to mount. According to the Cameroon Institute of Statistics (ECAM II, 2001), over 40 percent of Cameroonians live in poverty. This dismal situation has continued to persist a lot more because of governance issues than strictly economic. It is evident therefore, that without tackling governance, the economy will not grow. This chapter looks at how governance is affecting the way business is done in Cameroon, and what the consequences are. In the chapter, we use the descriptive and the growth model analyses. Because data on governance is based mostly on perceptions, we use mostly secondary data and comparative studies some researchers have carried out on Cameroon.

Literature Review on Governance and Economic Growth

A number of studies have been carried out on this topic. Some recent work addressing the impact of governance on the economic growth include Hali Edison (2003), Easterly and Levine (2003), Knack (2002), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001a, 2002), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002). They established that the quality of governance has a strong, unequivocal impact on economic performance.

McNab and Everhart (2002) have argued that “a functioning private sector requires the rule of law; enforcement of property rights and contracts; an independent, strong judiciary with transparent and effective bankruptcy procedures; transparent tax systems; effective bank supervision; and the strict enforcement of bank prudential regulations.” These are the hallmarks of good governance, regardless of the formal definition. Fostering such an environment not only reduces opportunities for corruption, but, more importantly, the returns from corruption. Each of these, in turn, stimulates investment, lowers transactions costs, and facilitates economic growth.

Aid donors have come to the view that aid flows have a stronger impact on development in countries with good institutional quality, and thus increasingly utilize measurable performance indicators (governance) for monitoring, evaluation and decision-making at a country level. On foreign aid and governance, McNab and Everhart (2002) state that foreign aid that is subject to conditions, such as that offered by the large multi-lateral international donor agencies, may create sufficient incentives for receiving governments to improve institutions, governance, and economic efficiency. “A government that wishes to reform but lacks the political will to do so may be able to move forward with reform by accepting foreign aid.” Collier (1997), Stiglitz (1999), and Easterly (2001, 2002), however, argue that attaching conditions to foreign aid does not improve governance. The conditions attached to foreign aid may also not be static, that is, they may be adjusted over time in response to economic conditions in the recipient country.

Improving governance is a difficult, but necessary task, in order to increase efficiency and promote economic growth (Tanzi, 1998). McNab and Everhart (2002) found that the quality of governance

has a strong, unequivocal impact on economic growth. A one-percent change in the quality of governance, they found, appears to induce a 4-percent change in the rate of economic growth. For a country currently growing at 2 per cent per annum, a ten-percent increase in the governance score would raise the growth rate to approximately 2.9 per cent per annum.

Countries that ignore the rule of law, let red tape interfere with free-market commerce, and let corruption run rampant cannot improve the rate of economic growth without first addressing the problems of governance. As governance improves, the marginal return to improving governance eventually falls. A monotonic relationship, therefore, does not exist between good governance and economic growth. Past some point, resources will enjoy a higher rate of return when invested in human and physical infrastructure, but without improvements in governance, these returns cannot occur.

Gradstein (2003), uses a household model to show that enforcement of property rights (proxy for governance) will lead to growth. His paper shows that for countries with poor governance and high levels of corruption, investments in physical and human capital will not produce the same rate of return as investments in governance and anti-corruption efforts. The transmission channel from corruption to growth is clear. Corruption lowers the quality of governance. As the quality of governance declines, economic growth declines at a rate faster than the decline in the quality of governance. The policy prescription is clear: actions to combat corruption and enhance the quality of governance are likely to enhance economic growth. The efficiency of government institutions cannot easily be quantified. Corruption, the most important variable in governance, is by its very nature, difficult to measure. Although indices to measure corruption are typically based on standardized questionnaires by consultants, and therefore are somewhat subjective, they are indicative of the extent to which corruption may permeate economic interactions. Corruption arises when there is distortion in the economy that creates shortage, thus raising the value of a desirable good or service. For example, quantitative restrictions on imports make the import licenses very valuable; importers may then be willing to bribe the relevant official to obtain them. Protection of domestic industries from international

competition generates rents that local entrepreneurs may be willing to pay for, in the form of bribes (Mauro, 1995: 39). Greater openness in an economy as measured by the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP is significantly associated with lower corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1994: 421).

Mauro also found that government subsidies, price controls, multiple exchange rate systems and foreign exchange allocation schemes cause rent-seeking. When civil servants are not paid enough, to make ends meet, they may be obliged to use their positions to collect bribes, especially when the expected probability of being caught and punished/fired is low (Kraay and Van Rijckeghen, 1995; Haque and Sahay, 1996). In 1993, civil service salaries in Cameroon were slashed by about 60 percent, and corruption immediately became the order of the day. Civil servants began using their offices to collect rents from the public for activities the State pays them. This behaviour, which has become endemic, led to Cameroon being classified as the most corrupt nation in the world by Transparency International in 1998 and 1999. Since then, Cameroon has continued to be among the most corrupt nations in the world. The IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department (1995: 15) warns of the dangers of across-the-board civil service wage cuts, which could lead to a rise in corrupt behaviour. Bardham and Mookherjee (2000), state that corruption in the delivery of public services in developing countries has frequently been argued to result from over-centralization and lack of suitable information systems required for effective oversight of the behaviour of bureaucrats. They suggest the devolution of power to local authorities better informed about local conditions.

In their study of foreign direct investments in Cameroon, Khan and Bamou (2005) found that a number of reasons appear to explain the poor performance of Cameroon in terms of FDI attraction despite the generous incentives offered by the regulatory and institutional framework especially from the 1984 Investment Code and the Free Trade Zone regime: the non-respect by the state of tax and customs commitments created an atmosphere of suspicion and loss of confidence between the state and interested economic operators, the limited autonomy and resources of the body set up to manage the free trade zone, socio-political instability within the

Central African sub-region and even in Cameroon in the early 1990s, corruption, poor governance, and administrative bottlenecks, and finally, the silence observed by the Government regarding the setting up of accompanying structures and the texts of application to the Investment Charter. Governance, whether bad or good, is the result of a combination of factors, some of which may not be measurable. Nevertheless, the progress of nations is greatly affected by governance.

Variables used to Measure Governance

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) have developed a number of composite variables used to measure governance. They have identified indicators that measure six dimensions of governance: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political instability and violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law, and, (vi) control of corruption. The construction of these six aggregate governance indicators, were motivated by a broad definition of governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. This classification of indicators into clusters corresponding to this definition reflects their views of what constitutes a consistent and useful organization of the data that is concordant with prevailing notions of governance.

The first two governance clusters are intended to capture the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced. They refer to the first of these as “Voice and Accountability,” and included in it are a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. Included in this category are also indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

The second governance cluster is labelled “Political Stability and Absence of Violence.” In this index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have combine several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures the idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully select and replace those in power.

The next two clusters summarize various indicators of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. In “Government Effectiveness” they combine responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The second cluster, which they refer to as “Regulatory Quality,” is more focused on the policies themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.


The last two clusters summarize in broad terms the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their interactions. This is captured by “Rule of Law.” In it, they include several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.

Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected. They refer to the final cluster as Control of Corruption. This measures perceptions of

corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance according to their definition.

We look at the governance situation of Cameroon, vis-à-vis other countries with similar characteristics. In this study, we use Botswana and Senegal. Since the indicators are based on perceptions that relate countries to others, we decided to select Botswana, a resource – rich (diamonds) Sub-Saharan African country that at independence had about the same GDP per capita as Cameroon, which is also a resource-rich country (petroleum and timber), and Senegal, another Sub-Saharan African country that is French-speaking like Cameroon and should have indicators similar to those of Cameroon.

Figure 6.1: How Cameroon Fared in Comparison to Botswana and Senegal




Source: Kaufman, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, 2006

Figure 6.1 captures graphically how Cameroon has fared in comparison to Botswana and Senegal. Cameroon has fared worse than Botswana and Senegal in all six indicators, with wider disparities in voice and accountability (VA), rule of law (RL), and control of corruption (CC). Cameroon has been a *de facto* one party state, since 1972, meaning that the citizens have not been free to choose their leaders as they would like. In 1998 and 1999, Transparency International classified Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the world. It is no surprise therefore, that corruption control is very poor in Cameroon. Corruption and the lack of respect for the rule of law are mutually reinforcing. In recent times, governance deficiencies such as problems with the rule of law, corruption, and ineffective provision of public services, account for a large proportion of the difference not only in income inequality but also in voter turnout and civil participation, with the latter undermining the very foundations of civil society.

In a study using some of the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi variables, Edison (2003) found that the aggregate governance measure of institutions is alone capable of explaining nearly three-fourths of the cross-country variation in income per head. For example, he found that the governance index measure for Cameroon was -0.72 . Improving this quality of governance index to the average for all countries of 0.13 as he found, would raise the per capita income of Cameroon from \$600 to \$2,760. Our calculations using his findings showed that improving the quality of governance index for Cameroon to the SSA level of -0.49 would raise the per capita income of Cameroon to US\$960 from US\$600.

Figure 6.2 shows the impact of changes in the quality of governance on GDP per capita, based on the Edison model. An improvement in the institutional quality will increase GDP per capita, and vice-versa. Consequently, the established relationship is positive. For instance, moving one point from an institutional quality measure of -0.4 corresponding to a GDP per capita of about \$1200 to -0.3 would raise Cameroon's GDP per capita to \$1700.

Figure 6.2: The Impact of Changes in the Quality of Governance on GDP per Capita, Based on the Edison Model



Source: Edison, 2003

Freedom House Ratings

Table 6.1 is based on Freedom House rankings of countries pertaining to political rights and civil liberties. Although in 1973 Cameroon and Botswana were both ranked as partly free, while Senegal was ranked as not free, Cameroon moved quickly to a country that was not free as from 1977 till today. Meanwhile, Botswana was ranked as free from 1974, while Senegal was ranked as free as from 2003. “PR” stands for “political rights,” “CL” stands for “civil liberties,” and “Status” is the freedom status. Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF,” respectively, stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.”

Table 6.1: Freedom House Ratings on Freedoms and Civil Liberties

Year	Botswana	Cameroon	Senegal
1973	PF	PF	NF
1974	F	PF	NF
1975	F	PF	PF
1977	F	NF	PF
1980	F	NF	PF
1985	F	NF	PF
1990	F	NF	PF
1995	F	NF	PF
2000	F	NF	PF
2003	F	NF	F
2005	F	NF	F
2006	F	NF	F

Source: Freedom House NF = not free, PF = partly free, F = free

Cameroon's is 117th out of 158 countries in terms of how free their economies are. Cameroon is ranked 22nd out of 40 countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region, and its overall score is equal to the regional average. Cameroon faces problems similar to those faced by other developing African nations. Because corruption is extensive and the rule of law is weak, neither property rights nor justice in the courts can be guaranteed. Employment regulations are costly and restrictive, and firing a worker is difficult. Business licenses are difficult to obtain (Table 6.2). Foreign investment remains heavily restricted.

Table 6.2: Variables Impacting Doing Business in Cameroon

Starting a business	Botswana	Cote d'Ivoire	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Cameroon	Average
Time (days)	108	45	43	57	38	37	54.7
Cost (% of income per capita)	10.9	134	73.8	108.7	8.6	172.8	84.8
Ease of starting a business (rank)	74	130	105	125	51	133	103.0
Hiring and firing workers							
Difficulty of hiring index (0–100)	11	144	33	61	56	28	55.5
Difficulty of firing index (0–100)	40	10	20	70	60	80	46.7
Hiring cost (% of salary)	0	15	8	23	3	15	10.7
Firing cost (weeks of salary)	19	68	4	38	38	40	34.5
Registering property							
Time (days)	69	369	274	114	23	93	157.0
Cost (% of property value)	5.1	14.3	27.1	18	11.0	19.0	15.8
Ease of registering property (rank)	80	147	152	137	77	122	119.2

Starting a business	Botswana	Cote d'Ivoire	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Cameroon	Average
Protecting investors							
Extent of disclosure index (0–10)	8	6	6	7	8	8	7.2
Strength of investor protection index (0–10)	4.3	4.7	5.7	3.7	8.0	5.7	5.4
Ease of protecting investors (rank)	99	80	42	126	8	35	65.0
Paying taxes							
Time (hours per year)	140	270	1120	696	350	1300	646.0
Total tax payable (% of gross profit)	52.9	46.9	27.1	45.0	43.8	47.6	43.9
Ease of paying taxes (rank)	59	123	91	137	84	142	106.0
Enforcing contracts							
Time (days)	154	525	730	485	277	585	459.3
Cost (% of debt) 1	24.8	47.6	37.2	23.8	11.5	36.4	30.2
Ease of enforcing contracts (rank) 38	45	116	119	109	38	152	96.5
Closing a business							
Time (years)	2	2	2	3	2	3	2.3
Cost (% of estate)	15	18	22	7	18	15	15.8
Ease of closing a business (rank)	28	112	61	97	53	80	71.8

Source: World Bank, 2005

Growth Model Analysis

To support the thesis that bad governance impacts negatively on economic growth, we present a rigorous analysis using a growth model. To determine the cause-effect relationship between governance together with other determinants and economic growth (as used in Knack 2002 model), we adopt the log-linear (constant) growth model. We make use of the ICRG data for Cameroon, to obtain the following results:

$$gdp_c = 5.538 - 0.015X_1 + 0.048X_2 + 0.030X_3 - 0.008X_4 + 0.020X_5 + 0.006X_6$$

(0.099) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.0099) (0.011) (0.0098)

Adj R² = 0.61 DW = 1.52 P(F*) = 0.006

Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated parameters, and the dependent variable, gdp_c is the log of GDP per capita. Regressors include the ICRG quality of governance index (X_1); average educational attainment (X_2); the log of inflation (X_3); the year-to-year variability of inflation (coefficient of variation), (X_4); M2/GDP, a standard measure of financial development (X_5); and exports/GDP (X_6). The rationale for choosing this functional form of regression model is that this type of model is particularly useful in situations where the explanatory variables are time trend since in this condition the model describes the constant percentage rate of *growth* ($\hat{a}_i > 0$) or *decay* ($\hat{a}_i < 0$) in the dependent variable (gdp_c).

Our model which explains 61 percent of changes in GDP per capita demonstrates that a constant two percent rate of decay in Cameroon's economic growth is due to Cameroon's poor quality of governance while the year-to-year variability of inflation accounts for about one percent. On a positive note, educational attainment, financial development, and openness to the rest of the world affect economic growth by about five, two, and one constant percentage rate of growth, respectively. The poor governance effect on economic growth corroborates the weak degree of correlation between governance and economic growth in Cameroon observed in the correlation analysis.

We also investigate the responsiveness of economic growth to governance together with other explanatory variables by logging all the variables such that the resulting estimated parameters from an

appropriate regression measure the *elasticity* of the dependent variable with respect to the independent variables; that is, the percentage change in the dependent variable for a given (small) percentage change in the independent variable. We observe that in Cameroon, economic growth is highly inelastic to governance whereas educational attainment is elastic. This observation implies that Cameroon stands to reap more from economic growth if it could be a little serious at improving on its quality of governance.

Transparency International Cameroon

In 2006, the Transparency International office in Cameroon carried out a study where managers and senior workers in various businesses in Cameroon, beginning from small through medium to large businesses by Cameroon standards were interviewed on their perceptions of the constraints to doing business in Cameroon. Table 6.3 shows the rankings of responses indicating the main areas that are particularly corrupt, and thus obstruct the performance of businesses in Cameroon.

Table 6.3: Rankings of Sectors by Degree of Corruption in Cameroon

Customs Department	3915
Taxation Department	3678
Police and Gendarmes	3640
The Judiciary System	3494
Housing and Land services	3099
Transport System	3079
Administrative Services authorising businesses	3055
Water and Forests Services	2987
Health System	2978
Political Parties	2909
Parliament and Legislative Power	2789
Educational System	2749
Registration of Businesses	2634
The Army	2334
Public Services	2054

Source: Transparency International, Cameroon, 2006

Less than one percent of those interviewed think the level of corruption has reduced in Cameroon during the past three years. In contrast, 30 percent think it has increased. Another 30 percent think the level of corruption has stayed the same.

The two main factors as perceived by those interviewed explaining rampant corruption in Cameroon are low salaries and the lack of sanctions or punishment for those who are found to be corrupt (Table 6.4). The government does not seem to really care about the problem, or does not consider it important enough. This behaviour tends to encourage corruption and impunity, to the detriment of economic activities.

The study found that more than 94 per cent of entrepreneurs affirm that the judicial system is corrupt, which supports the fact that the judicial system is not credible. Because the judicial system is corrupt, it is not possible to consider Cameroon as a country where there is effective rule of law. This means enforcing contracts cannot be effective.

In addition to an ineffective judicial system, the police force and the gendarmerie were also found to be very corrupt. With members of these forces of law and order corrupt, enforcing law and protecting the businesses is very uncertain. Those who are corrupt, therefore, tend to behave with impunity.

Most of the business operators interviewed see the government as encouraging corruption, and making it difficult for businesses to operate.

Table 6.4: Ranking of Causes of Corruption in the Public Sector

-
1. No punishment of those who are corrupt
 2. Government does not consider the problem important enough
 3. Desire for personal enrichment
 4. No transparency in government activities
 5. Low salaries
 6. Discretionary Appointment of people in responsible positions
 7. Some government officials have exorbitant powers
 8. The Administration functions badly
 9. The absence of rules and clear norms for the conduit of activities
 10. Pressure from superiors and highly placed people
-

Source: Transparency International, Cameroon, 2006

Conclusion

The above analyses have shown that there is an unequivocal relationship between governance and economic growth. Most entrepreneurs interested in doing business in Cameroon are constrained by bad governance. This entailed the use of models that have been estimated by various authors, and cross country data. Using their estimates, we plugged in Cameroon governance data over time. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have come up with a methodology for determining the governance indicators for countries on an annual basis.

One of the cross-country studies used that is particularly interesting is that of Hali Edison. He showed that if in 2002, the governance index for Cameroon of -0.49 were to improve to the Sub-Saharan African average of -0.72 , the per capita income of Cameroon would improve from US\$600 to US\$900. Using this analysis, we showed that it was possible to determine the cost of bad governance, that is, the difference between the SSA situation and that of Cameroon.

In addition to the Edison study, we used the studies by Stephen Knack, Balamoune-Lutz Mina, and by Transparency International in Cameroon to establish that there is a direct relationship between governance and economic performance, and that Cameroon has lagged behind in development in a major part because of bad governance. The policy implication of this result is that as governance indicators improve, the economic performance will also improve.

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Chapter Seven

Governance and Economic Growth

Max Memfih Ntangsi

Introduction

As the UN Secretary General—Kofi Annan put it, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” Around the world, more people are recognizing that governance matters for development—that institutions, rules and political processes play a big role in whether economies grow, whether children go to school, whether development moves forward or backward. So, promoting development is not just a social, economic and technological challenge: it is also an institutional and political challenge.

Accompanying this new consensus is a growing conviction that many persistent development problems reflect failures of governance. Studies in a range of countries and regions hold weak governance responsible for persistent poverty and lagging development. The governance crisis is evident in widespread corruption, inefficient public institutions and a host of other failures. These studies have also shown what poor governance means for ordinary citizens—schools without teachers, courts without justice, local bureaucrats demanding bribes at every turn.

What does it mean to promote good governance?

There is no single answer. But much of the recent debate has focused on what makes institutions and rules more effective, including transparency, participation, responsiveness, accountability and the rule of law. All are important for human development—especially since ineffective institutions usually cause the most harm to poor and vulnerable people. But just as sustainable development is about much more than growth in national incomes, governance for human development is about much more than effective institutions and rules. For three reasons, it must also be concerned with whether institutions and rules are fair—and whether all people have a say in how they operate:

- Participating in the rules and institutions that shape one's community is a basic human right and part of sustainable development.
- More inclusive governance can be more effective. When local people are consulted about the location of a new health clinic, for example, there is a better chance it will be built in the right place.
- More participatory governance also can be more equitable. Much is known about the economic and social policies that help eradicate poverty and promote more inclusive growth. But few countries pursue such policies vigorously, often because the potential beneficiaries lack political power and their interests are not fully represented in policy decisions.

Governance for sustainable economic growth and development is partly about having efficient institutions and rules that promote development by making markets work and ensuring that public services live up to their name. But it is also about protecting human rights, promoting wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect people's lives and achieving more equitable economic and social outcomes. Thus governance for sustainable development is concerned not just with efficient, equitable outcomes but also with fair processes. Governance for sustainable development must be democratic in substance and in form—by the people and for the people.

Good governance— what for?

From the sustainable development perspective, good governance is democratic governance.

Democratic governance means that:

- People's human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to live with dignity.
- People have a say in decisions that affect their lives.
- People can hold decision-makers accountable.
- Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions.
- Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision- making.

- People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute.
- The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies.
- Economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs and aspirations.
- Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that all people have in their lives.

Literature Review

This chapter draws on the seminal contributions of North (1990), and Olson (1996), which stress the role of institutions for economic development and some of its results are also related to Olson's (1982), on interest groups as an impediment to growth. Both authors acknowledge the importance of the double feedback relationship between institutions and economic performance in their informal analyses, which is the point made in this paper as well. While the motivation for this here is provided by the recent empirical evidence briefly summarized below, the specifics are related to two branches of the literature and, in a sense, build on their insights. One building block is the literature on economic consequences of appropriative activities. Important papers in this literature include Skaperdas (1992) and Grossman and Kim (1995), who have focused on endogenous determination of property rights. In particular, the latter paper studies the emergence of property rights as equilibrium of aggressive and defensive individual investments. The shared component between the present chapter and this work is the endogeneity of property rights enforcement.

Earlier literature has, however, not been explicitly interested in growth implications of property rights enforcement. More recent literature, exemplified by Lane and Tornell (1996), and Tornell (1997, 1999) examines the effects of imperfectly protected property rights on growth. It typically views the economy as consisting of rival interest groups competing over a common pool of resources. In a somewhat related vein, Ehrlich and Lui (1999), also study the relationship between the quality of government ("corruption") and growth. Likewise, Zak (2002) is also concerned with economic

growth in the shadow of appropriation threats. Gradstein (2002), also show that commitment to redistribution rules results in faster growth than discretionary redistribution, and this effect is stronger in an unstable economy. All this work does not consider, however, the endogenous determination of the level of protection itself, which is an essential feature of good governance.

Quite a few empirical studies present empirical evidence that the quality of governance has a robust effect on growth. Early contributions include Barro (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997a, b), Mauro (1995), Svensson (1998). More recent and detailed supportive evidence is provided in Chong and Calderon (2000), and in a working paper Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a). In the last study, the authors find that a one-standard deviation increase in any of their governance indicators causes between a two-and-a-half and fourfold increase in per capita incomes. There are several channels through which this relationship can be manifested. Knack and Keefer (1997b), and Mauro (1995), for example, find that poorly protected property rights affect physical investment. King and Levine (1993), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), among others, present similar evidence with regard to investment in financial assets.

Evidence on the reverse relationship, from income to corruption, can be gauged using Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999b), which provides an excellent dataset on the quality of governance across more than 150 countries, exhibiting six measures of quality of governance. Knack (2002) suggests that the partial correlation between income per capita and the different measures of quality of government across these countries hover between 0.70-0.90, and the correlation between income per capita and the rule-of-law variable is in the upper range of this interval. Treisman (2000), finds empirical support for the moderating effect of income level on corruption in his more rigorous statistical analysis. The data have been expanded and the methodology upgraded in Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), and Chong and Calderon (2000). All three studies recognize that different observable measures of quality of governance can be construed only as proxies for the variable of interest, and all studies are aware of the simultaneity of the relationship between these measures and growth. Their econometric analyses take care of these issues.

Hall and Jones (1999) rooted their analysis in growth accounting and focus on cross country differences in income per capita arising in a steady state. They employ subjective evaluations of aspects of governance, such as bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, maintenance of law and order, supplemented by the degree of openness to international trade. The authors use various geographic and linguistic measures of the effect of the Western culture as instruments. Using cross-sectional evidence for 127 countries, they present robust findings on the positive effects of good governance on growth, which significantly supplements the effect of physical and capital accumulation. The authors argue that the extent to which a country was exposed to Western influence has played a crucial role in its ability to design proper institutions for good governance. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), is similar in many respects. It uses an enlarged dataset and constructs a much wider battery of measures of governance quality based on a variety of sources, incidentally dismissing the trade openness variable. This study's conclusions reinforce by and large those of Hall and Jones' (1999). The work of Chong and Calderon (2000) can be viewed as providing the most direct supportive evidence. The authors explicitly test for the mutual causality between good governance and growth, suggesting "multiple institutional equilibria," whereby good institutions promote growth, which then leads to the adoption of good institutions. They conclude that causality runs in both directions thus providing tentative support for the theoretical claim made above.

Good Governance and Productivity

In most societies throughout history and in much of the underdeveloped world today, incentives have favoured predation over production, or "taking" instead of "making" (Usher, 1987; North, 1990; Olson, 2000). Where social and legal mechanisms for enforcing contracts and property rights are weak or absent, the private returns to redistributive efforts will generally exceed the private returns to production.

An emerging consensus among development and growth economists views good governance as a prerequisite to sustained increases in living standards. The difference between developmental

success and failure in this view has little to do with natural resource availability, climate, foreign aid, or luck. It is, rather, largely a function of whether incentives within a given society steer wealth-maximizing individuals toward *producing* new wealth or toward *diverting* it from others.

In *Les systemes socialistes* (1902), Vilfredo Pareto wrote: “Societies offer men two essentially different ways of acquiring wealth. One is by producing it directly or indirectly through the work and services of the capital they possess. The other is by acquiring the wealth thus produced by others. These two methods have at all times been employed the second method is a general and enduring phenomenon.”

The relative payoffs of production and predation (or “making” versus “taking”) are determined not only by legal mechanisms for enforcing contracts and protecting property rights, but also by social norms that facilitate interpersonal trust. These social institutions, where they are effective, complement the effect of government institutions in reducing uncertainty and transactions costs, enhancing the efficiency of exchange, encouraging specialization, and encouraging investment in ideas, human capital, and physical capital. Where social and legal mechanisms for the efficient resolution of prisoners’ dilemma and principal-agent games are weak or absent – i.e., where most potential pairs of economic transactions cannot trust each other – the private returns to predation increases while the private returns to production reduces.

This basic perspective on the importance of good governance for growth gradually gained adherents over the 1980s and 1990s, following several decades in which development failures were attributed successively to capital shortages, low education, and policy distortions, with little attention devoted to the political and institutional sources of these problems. In his study of long-term economic growth in 40 non industrialized nations from 1850 to 1950, Lloyd Reynolds (1983) conjectured that “the single most important explanatory variable” was “political organization and the administration of government.” This view was elaborated most famously later in the decade by North (1990) who argued that in non-developing societies “opportunities for political and economic entrepreneurs overwhelmingly favour activities that promote redistributive rather than productive activity, that create monopolies

rather than competitive conditions, and that restrict opportunities rather than expand them.” Systematic empirical tests of these ideas were delayed, however, by the lack of available data on political and social institutions and the quality of governance. North (1990) even argued that “we cannot see, feel, touch, *or even measure* institutions.”

Despite difficulties in measurement, numerous studies have analyzed the impact of institutions and the quality of governance on economic performance. All of the evidence from assorted measurements points in the same direction, i.e. that good governance is crucial for growth.

Maintaining law and order, in particular, securing property rights is probably the most acceptable rationale for government intervention. Theoretically, it is argued that enforcement of property rights being a public good, its provision can only be materialized through collective action. Empirically, several studies have reported robust correlations between the enforceability of property rights and measures of economic performance. Yet, economists differ greatly on the extent to which property rights are enforced. Several pieces of empirical evidence suggest, in particular, a strong positive association between the level of a country’s development and the enforcement of property rights. Bardhan (1997) for example, cites the experience of Singapore, where recent economic growth has induced a drastic reduction in corruption, so that Singapore is now one of the world’s least corrupt countries. It is also interesting to compare the recent experience of some transition economies in Eastern Europe in this regard. While countries like Estonia and Hungary have attained moderate scores on the quality of government and robust growth rates in the post-communist era, the relatively more backwards countries such as Moldova and Ukraine have achieved little on both counts. Moreover, in their authoritative account, two experts on the transition experience in Russia write: “In developed market economies, a conventional system of property rights enforcement and contract implementation is provided by the government and the judiciary and paid for by taxes. However, if this can be considered to represent the first-best solution, the immediate implementation of such a solution in Russian case is hopeless. Widespread tax evasion has left the government without enough revenues to pay even those meagre salaries it offers

to its law enforcement officers (including the police force, prosecutors, and judges).” (Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 2000) Taken together, these examples suggest a double feedback relationship between economic development and enforcement of property rights, in particular, indicating that affluent economies are likely to enforce more effectively property rights than poor economies.

The fraction of resources available for such redistribution is endogenously determined through collective decisions on the extent of property rights enforcement. Specifically, property rights can be fully secured by incurring a cost. In line with the public good nature of property rights, we assume indivisibility in the production of their enforcement. This ensures that enforcement of property rights will only take place in rich economies, where the individuals are affluent enough to be willing to meet the enforcement cost. But a better enforcement of property rights causes economic growth, thus perpetuating the willingness to secure property rights. As a result, it is shown that two steady states are likely to be realized: one, with a full protection of property rights and a high income level, and another, with only a minimal protection of property rights and a low income level. One implication of this analysis emphasizes the importance of commitment mechanisms to ensure enforcement of property rights; the absence of such commitment may induce lower investment and higher rent seeking thus lowering growth.

Another implication indicates a role of international lending institutions in providing resources to implement governance reforms so as to allow a poor economy to take off.

How Good Governance Impacts on Economic Growth and Sustainable Development

From the above discussion, it is apparent that good governance affects economic growth and development through a number of ways as lighted below.

Corruption and Economic Growth

There is an increasing volume of literature on the relationship between corruption and economic growth, and the general conclusion is that corruption slows down the long-term growth of an economy through a wide range of channels.

Reducing Investment and Retarding Economic Growth

Mauro (1995) presents some strong empirical evidence to help prove the negative relationship between corruption and long-term growth. Wei (1997) argues that corruption is much more costly than ordinary taxes because it generates uncertainty in addition to the tax burden. In the presence of corruption, businessmen are often made aware that a bribe is required before an enterprise can be started and, in addition, corrupt officials may also lay claims to one part of the proceeds from the investment. Therefore, businessmen interpret corruption as a species of tax. In addition, they also face secrecy and the uncertainty that the bribe-taker may not fulfil his part of the bargain. Both the tax and the uncertainty will diminish incentives to invest.

Misallocating Talents

Since rent-seeking is often more lucrative than productive work, talents will be misallocated. Financial incentives may lure the more talented and better educated to engage in rent seeking rather than productive work, which in turn results in adverse consequences for the country's economic growth. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) present a balance growth model to show that in some equilibriums officials spend a substantial amount of time and effort in seeking and accumulating political capital, which is not socially productive.

Distorting Government Expenditure

Corruption may entice government officials to allocate public resources less on the basis of social welfare than according to opportunities for extorting bribes. Large projects, whose performance is difficult to monitor, may provide lucrative opportunities for rent seeking and bribes. We can expect that it is easier to collect large bribes on large infrastructure projects or high-tech defence systems than on textbooks or teachers' salaries. Mauro (1998) concludes that corruption affects the composition of government expenditure. When corruption is serious, there is much less government expenditure on education than on large infrastructure and defence projects. In addition, Mauro finds that corruption also lowers the quality of infrastructure projects and public services.

Reducing the Efficacy of Aid

In developing countries that receive foreign aid, corruption may reduce the effectiveness of the aid through diversion of funds, and foreign aid may end up supporting unproductive and wasteful government expenditures. As a result, more and more donor countries now focus on issues of good governance. In cases where governance is judged to be especially poor, some donors have cut their assistance. Alexia and Wider (1999), however, argue that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid.

Exposing the Country to Currency Crisis

The currency crises of the late 1990s and precisely of 1997 in East Asia, Russia and Latin America stimulated research on their causes. Many authors have argued that the often corrupt “crony” capitalism is partly responsible for the crises. Wei (2000a) argues that corruption is likely to produce certain composition of capital flows that makes a country more vulnerable to shifts in international investors’ sentiments and expectations.

Other possible consequences of corruption include loss of tax revenues because corruption may encourage people to evade taxes. In addition, by reducing tax revenues and increasing public expenditure, corruption may lead to adverse budgetary consequences. Corruption may also cause monetary problems if it takes the form of improper lending by public financial institutions at below-market interest rates.

Good Governance Challenges in the 21st Century

Good Governance and sustainable development have something else in common. They are both more a journey than a destination – a promise rather than a gift. Societies can be more or less democratic, just as people can have broader or more constrained choices to lead lives they value. But there is no defined end point. No society is ever completely democratic or fully developed. What matters is moving forward rather than being stagnant or slipping backward.

People everywhere want to determine their destiny. The kind of democracy they choose need not follow a particular model - the North American or the Western European, for example. The model must be adapted to local circumstances and history. But everywhere, democracy requires a long process of political development. It needs

basic institutions, formal and informal, of the state and outside it. It will not thrive without the spread of democratic culture of values and principles that guide the behaviour of individual and groups. Threats to democracy come not only from political parties that are personalized and unable to represent people, but also from intolerance, extremism and lack of respect for human rights and human dignity.

The implication is that priorities for advancing democratic principles vary according to the social context, just as priorities for human development vary over time and across communities. Promoting the equal concern for all people in the formation of governance structures meant for something different in an era of state-owned industry and the transistor radio than it does in an era of transnational corporations and the Internet.

It follows that fulfilling the promise of democratic governance in a 21st century world cannot depend simply on making state institutions function better. It must also take into account the fact that global economic integration and political liberalization are reshaping the environment in which state institutions operate — often fundamentally changing what it means for people to have a say in how they are governed.

To be sure, the nation-state is still a powerful force shaping individual lives, and in most cases it is the most important one. But new actors are also becoming important, from the World Trade Organisation to national and international corporations, to new groups in civil society and the media, both local and international. As the actors change, so do the rules: from participatory local budgeting to regional trade rules to international protection of human rights. And as people's lives become more interdependent, democratic principles of participation and equal concern for all must be reflected in the way these new actors structure their institutions and in the way that rules are formulated and implemented.

Democratic governance in this fast-changing environment is about more than people having the right to vote. It must be about strengthening democratic institutions so that they keep pace with the changing distribution of economic and political power. And it must be about promoting democratic politics that make participation and public accountability possible even when the relevant power and processes lie outside the formal institutions of the state. These

constitute major challenges which impact directly on the level of economic take-off and sustainable development in most of Africa. Governance should thus provide the enabling environment for sustainable development to flourish.

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Introduction

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong

This last section of the book focuses on societal issues and has three chapters and a conclusion. The three chapters are contributed by historians as case studies in more or less historical perspective. They concentrate on the media and governance in Cameroon from 1961 to 2005, conflict over the management of land in Aghem 1966-2005 and the political significance of a work of art, the *Afo-A-Kom* 1865-1973. Assessing the role of the media in contributing to good governance in Cameroon Mokake points out, in chapter eight, that the media has not been able to perform the traditional media function of objectively informing and educating the public because successive governments in Cameroon monopolised the media and used it to serve their purposes of suppressing the voice of the governed to maintain the status quo. Consequently, the media in Cameroon has not contributed in any significant way in ensuring good governance. Since freedom of expression is not only indispensable in ensuring accountability and governmental responsibility, but is also prerequisite to good governance, Mokake maintains that the media should be allowed to freely play its role of informing and educating the public.

Using the case of Aghem, Kah shows in chapter nine how corruption and male dominance in the management of land constitute a hindrance to good governance. This is so because those in charge of managing land both the family heads (the Batums) and government officials who are all men are bribed by graziers to favour them against farmers in farmer/grazier conflicts. Thus, corruption hinders the objective resolution of the conflicts. The result is that the conflicts have become perennial occasioning constant strikes and street demonstrations by the farmers, who are mainly women, thereby disrupting economic activities and hindering good governance. As an objective solution to the conflict Kah argues for the revision of the land management policy and structures as well

as the inclusion of women in the land management process. In the concluding chapter Fonchingong and Gemandze summarise the major issues analysed and the recommendations made in the book.

The potential political significance of a work of art, the *Afo-A-Kom* is demonstrated by Nkwi in chapter ten as he shows how the Fon of Kom used the Afo-A-kom to foster unity within his heterogeneous Fondom. Drawing inspiration from this, Nkwi argues that instead of only decreeing and/or forcing or merely assuming unity in heterogeneous societies, political leaders could use works of art to forge national unity.

Chapter Eight

Changing Times, the Media and Governance in Cameroon 1961-2005

Flavius Mayoa Mokake

Introduction

With the attainment of independence in the 1960s most, if not all, Africans thought the political leaders that succeeded the colonialists would guarantee their hopes and aspirations. However in less than two decades, it was realised that there was a growing obsession with the instantaneous betrayal of the aspirations of most Africans in aspects pertaining to governance and development (Post, 1964; Were, 1983; Assefa and Wachira, 1996: 1-33; Jinadu, 2000; Greg, 2002). The manner in which the states were managed did not reflect proportionately the anxieties and aspirations raised by the clamour for independence.

Were's view exposes the hopes of Africans at the dawn of independence. As he puts it, 'this era was to the masses the end of hard times and uncertainties, and the beginning of the golden age'. It was also seen as an era for the effective running of the administrative machineries for the good of all.

Contrary to the raised imaginations, gross irresponsibility and insensitivity characterized most of the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Now as in the past, there is an informed history of political and socio-economic inappropriateness.

This assertion of political and socio-economic perfidies reveal that public policy-making in these states lack the logic and content that characterizes such an enterprise in liberal systems such as popular participation, objectivity and the common good. Instead, these states are characterized by neo-patrimonial relationships, abuse of the rights of citizen, over centralization of authority within an omnipotent centre, rampant corruption, indecent management of public offices, election rigging and the marginalisation of the civil society. These features are supportive of the contention that there is a crisis of governance in the continent. This crisis stems partly from the fact that the civil society is yet to be fully emancipated

from the state and because its body politic does not have an institutionalized complexion (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 1-30). The states are often governed by klepto-septuagenarians (Were, 1983: 2; Kiogora, 1996: 29) reputed to have sterile interest for their fatherland. Properly speaking this describes the governance scenario in Cameroon and most African states.

Cameroon's poor political and socio-economic governance (Susungi, 1991; Nyamnjoh, 2002; Jua, 2003; Forje, 2003) is a by-product of the current deficiencies and absence of a vibrant civil society (Mbuagbo and Fru, 2003: 133; Forje, 2006). The importance of civil society in ensuring good governance cannot be overemphasized yet the media in Cameroon as an arm of the civil society is unable to fully exploit its inherent potentials to achieve this.

Though the concept of civil society occupies a central position in any discourse on governance, it gained currency in the political narratives of African states only in the 1990s. Naturally, its new character and organization within the modern state emerged from the drive among the people to collectively challenge the hegemonic ambitions of the state (Mbuagbo and Fru, 2003: 145-146). The drive was brought to the shores of African states in the 1990s by the uncompromising waves of democratic transition that swept across the continent. In reaction to the alleged failure of the nation-states to liberate the people Cameroonians were prompted to adopt a cynical and distrustful attitude towards politics and the state. Emerging from a monolithic and heavily policed state, the media served as a vent to express disdain and to rally popular support with interest in redressing political, economic and social abnormalities in the society (Nkwi, 2006: 95).

The present global context of advancements in the information and communication technology facilitates the efficient management of limited resources to achieve development goals. The opportunities offered by this context create an invaluable role for the media in enhancing governance and initiating development in a community (Paranjape, 2002). In spite of attempts to numb the potential of the media, new discreet governance structures could be brought/sustained and new social capital generated in Cameroon for mutual benefits (Article 19, 1999; Boh, 1999; Nyamnjoh, 2005). There is no doubt that by informing, and educating the media has a major role to play in the construction of the Cameroonian society.

Rationale for the Institutionalisation of the Media in Cameroon

From time immemorial, humanity has come to recognize the importance of communication in a society. This makes communication to be part of the history, tradition and evolution of a people. In Africa in general and Cameroon in particular, traditional forms and means of communication or expression were common. Here, the gong, town-criers (messengers), sculptures and rumours or radio-trottoir as it is fondly called, are nostalgic examples. These forms served the purpose of free exchange of ideas and opinions within groups aimed at arriving at a consensus. They also served the purpose of the constituent body of society. Ellis and Gerrie (2004) concur that these forms of communication deeply rooted in the social relationships of the people are vital ingredients for their survival. They went further to admit that they help in awakening the slumbering powers within the people (Ellis and Gerrie, 2004: 30-33). Since communication is an embodiment of the evolutionary process of a people it evolves with it.

This evolution reflects a confluence of purpose or *raison d'être* of communicating and the vehicles of communication. As the rationale for communication changes, it triggers a change in the means of communicating and on the impact of communication in a society. Away from that, in Cameroon the means of communication (media) has changed over time as the need for communication changes. The historicity of this evolution in Cameroon is quite amazing. At this juncture there is need to state that for the purpose of this study emphasis will be on the evolution of the reasons behind the institutionalization of main stream communication mediums (audio visual and print media) in Cameroon at different periods of the country's history especially after 1961. Regardless of the dynamic nature of communication processes, its traditional essence of a symmetrical flow of ideas or information remains the goal.

The Evolution of the Media in Cameroon

This section focuses on the institutionalization and functioning of the media in Cameroon during the colonial period as well as during the regimes of Ahidjo and Biya. The intention is to highlight the reasons that accounted for the institutionalization of the media

during these periods and to assess the extent to which they reflected the principles of good governance.

Colonial Rule and the Media

The media was a major tool for governing Cameroon during the colonial period. The media was used as a medium to dish out the views and policies of the colonial overlords. But the underlining factor behind the installation of media organs in Cameroon and other colonial areas was to relay the media organs to the metropolises for public entertainment. Although a pocket of print houses established by missionaries for their own purposes existed in much of Africa- such as those by the Basel and Baptist missionaries in the late 19th century in Cameroon -those that serviced the ‘general public’ were opened only later. By the 1940s, there were a host of print and audio media organs in the French section of colonial Cameroon (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 126-128). The radio station in Douala is an anecdotal memoir. However, the principal languages were English and French. Through the new modes of communication the colonialists could easily manipulate and subjugate African indigenes. This was possible because the products emitted from the media organs were a translation of the values and events of the European society. And only the positive aspects of that society were aired. This went out to a very limited audience and coverage.

Against the backdrop of protecting their group interest, the Europeans effectively used this institution to serve their ‘war needs’ and in lulling the howling winds against colonial rule. Because of this, the whites could use the media to mobilize Africans for conscription into the army during the Second World War and indulged in manipulation in order to contain the rising pressures from urbanites against the yoke of the established status quo of colonialism (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 127-129). The closure of the radio station in Douala by the French immediately after the war is enough evidence to back the argument that the media organs introduced during the colonial era were for the interest of the Europeans. Since with the end of the war in 1945 there was no immediate need for this medium, it was closed (Ekaney, 1976; Ellis and Gerrie, 2004: 30-33; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 126-128), and was only re-opened by the indigenes two years later, solely for commercial purposes. The

preceding evidence is concrete enough to acknowledge that the reason for the opening of the media infrastructures in colonial Cameroon was for the interest of an identifiable group. Thus it was divorced from the vocation to submit to public interest.

The preceding paragraphs on the rationale of the colonial media leave one thing clear, which Nyamnjoh rightly points out:

Given a colonial past in which freedom of expression and access to the media were not guaranteed, it is hardly surprising that Africa's post colonial media-space is a rich and fascinating blend of traditions, influences and technologies. Co-existing in tolerance and interdependence are the most modern forms of communication technologies and the indigenous media (2005: 39).

This observation by the Nyamnjoh serves the purpose of the preceding paragraph. It comes close to our view that what was obtained in the colonial media-space has greatly influenced the role conceived for the media after independence. In sum, our reason for revisiting the colonial period is to ease our understanding of the rationale for institutionalizing the media by the succeeding Ahidjo and Biya regimes. Following that brief recollection the principle that guided the inheritance and continual usage of the institution after independence will now be examined.

The Ahidjo Regime and the Media

The way the Ahidjo regime, which lasted from independence in 1960 until 1982, viewed the media and the task assigned it was not very different from the functions it performed under colonial rule. The only striking differences are that it had a wider audience and it was 'Cameroonised' in orientation. With the new hopes rekindled in the communication horizon raised by the recurrent speeches of Ahidjo on the importance of communication in a democracy, many envisioned the dawn of a reciprocal and constructive relationship between the media and governance in Cameroon (Ahidjo, 1964; 1980). It was seen as a timely opportunity for the press to clothespin the dirty laundry of administrative and corporate malefficiencies, and promotes effective governance for development. But this was

hardly the case. Rather the Ahidjo regime used this institution to manipulate the people, in justifying its course as an extension of government information services (Gallagher, 1991; Nyamnjoh, 2005).

On the 29th May 1962 in Yaoundé, Ahidjo unequivocally declared that the radio will 'keep the population informed of the efforts by government' in the construction of the nation (Ahidjo, 1980: 185; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 130), which he previously insisted was his cardinal mission. Again in June 1967 in Buea, Ahidjo reiterated the importance he attached to communication. While inaugurating the new transmitter centre in Buea, he declared that information would raise awareness amongst Cameroonians about 'what united them, and to further consolidate national unity and the stability of institutions' (Ahidjo cited in Nyamnjoh, 2005: 130-131).

From the above-cited declarations of Ahidjo, the philosophy his regime had for the press is obvious, that is, to socialize the citizens with the policy options of the government without giving them the opportunity to express their own opinions. Indeed, the role assigned to the media was to 'inform and educate within, expose and persuade without.' Nyamnjoh (2005: 131) This very narrow perspective of the role of the press in Cameroon under Ahidjo stifled communication as a process that encourages participation, exchange of perspectives and the creation of an enabling environment (Paranjape: 74). However enticing were the intentions of this government, the process of implementation did not favour the masses and press organs that were critical of the government. The regime saw communication as a vehicle to carry the voice of the government to the remotest regions in the country designed to curb passivity of its citizens, which could be accentuated by insufficient information (Ahidjo cited in Nyamnjoh, 2005: 130). But it failed to provide the enabling environment and opportunity for the sufficient flow of information from the authorities to the citizens and vice-versa.

The Biya Regime

In November 1982, the position of command was handed to Paul Biya by president Ahidjo. In less than three years, Biya introduced a series of reforms that had interesting implications for the media-space in Cameroon. In 1985, he launched the rigour and moralization agenda (Mokake, 2004; C.P.D.M, 1985); divorced from

claims to ‘monopoly over speeches’; relaxed the regulations governing communication put in place by his predecessor such that a good number of print newspaper organs were opened and in 1985 the first national television house was opened at Mballa II, Yaounde (C.P.D.M., 1985; Gallagher, 1991). These changes widen the space occupied by the media and extended its programme coverage. But these were not good enough. Such ambitious moves by Biya left no Cameroonian indifferent as to the turn communication was taking in the country. A light was seen at the end of the tunnel that signalled the true recognition of the role of the press. However, even before Cameroonians could take the next bend a very bold signpost exhumed the tendencies of the past. This exhumed signpost was not interpretative of Biya’s initial and subsequent declarations on the role he accorded the press.

Nyamnjoh contends that ‘like Ahidjo, Biya had a special place for the media in his agenda from the outset’. He goes further to illustrate that during an interview Biya granted Cameroon Tribune on 6th July 1984, Biya insisted that the Cameroonian media had to ‘contribute to the emancipation and the fulfilment of the Cameroonian, to make it possible for him to live his freedom as a true citizen, conscious of his political, civic and social responsibilities’ (2005: 134). Thus Biya saw the importance of communication precisely from the same perspective like Ahidjo and used it effectively for the interest of his government.

With the liberalization of the political and socio-economic space after the 1990s a new dimension was witnessed. There was the establishment of new private media organs and media infrastructures. The number of newspapers has increased significantly since then and there is an exciting trend of private media initiatives and community radio stations. Cameroonians now listen to private radio stations like Equinoxe, Ocean City, Eden Radio; read from a variety of private newspapers (The Post newspaper, Humorist, Nouvelle Expression, Anecdote, and Le Messenger etc); and watch relaxing programmes over a number of TV houses (Spectrum Television (STV), Canal 2, Five TV and cable network televisions.) As divergent as these facilities are so are their editorial policies, interests, targeted audience and potentials. Some are pro-government, others critical of government and corporate institutions, while others are

religious or business oriented. Beyond these parallel lines lies the converging point of required conformity with the rules laid down by government. Most of these radio and television stations are entertainment and animation oriented.

No matter how dynamic the scenario might appear the situation has not really changed. This is because as early as 1985, Biya hailed the 'new dynamic spirit of the private press whose numerous and varied titles have come, encouraged by liberalization, to supplement the efforts of the official media' (C.P.D.M., 1985: 31). These efforts are to deify and glorify the authorities and to 'ensure national goals'? Thus, Ellis and Gerrie argue that 'the loss of monopoly and the free media that has blossomed have not generally lived up to the expectations of transforming societies towards a common good' (2004: 30-33). Consequently, in spite of the changes that have been going on in the Cameroonian media-space and the rationale guiding this dynamism, the main finding is that the successive governments in Cameroon recognized the importance of the media and used it to serve their interests.

The Government-Media Relationship in Cameroon

According to Aaron Mwewa,

'The media occupies a space that is constantly contested, which is subject to organizational and technological restructuring, to economic, cultural and political constraints, to commercial pressures and to changing professional practices. The changing contours of the space can lead to different patterns of domination and agenda-setting and to different degrees of openness and closure in terms of access, patterns of ownership, available genres, types of disclosure and range of opinions represented' (*ADF TODAY*, Monday, 11 October 2004, p.1).

This phrase by Aaron Mwewa rightly portrays the importance of the media and reveals that there is often-strained relationship between the media and government. Because most African governments are aware of the truth that the media like the military and university are efficient weapons that could be used against them,

these governments always try to control the press from within or without through very harsh media laws.

The greatest threat to free communication in Africa 'has been the reluctance' of governments to liberalize press laws (Gallagher, 1991; Boh and Ntemfac, 1991a; 1991b; Eribo and Tanjong, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 2005). Nyamnjoh goes further to observe thus: 'even when there are such liberalization in principle, government tended to introduce, by underhand or roundabout ways, measures and practices that effectively curtailed press freedom' (2005: 161). Bayart regrets that although before independence Cameroon had a press increased censorship and governmental repression make it difficult for the press to freely perform its duties (Bayart, 1973: 26. This current section of the chapter sets to illustrate how successive governments in Cameroon have used the media for their own interest. It will also examine efforts by the government and private individuals with the aid of government authorities to strangle the press critical of its policy options and actions. It will infer that these actions by government, other corporate institutions and 'powerful individuals in the society through evoked media laws not only strain the relationship between the media and governing authorities but also inhibits the potential of communication in promoting people-oriented governance. Looking things from such an angle, we will examine this relationship under three shades: the relationship between government and state-sponsored press; the relationship between government and pro-government private press; and the government and critical private press. This would be studied under the Ahidjo and Biya regimes in Cameroon.

Despite the appealing rhetoric by Ahidjo when he took control of the state to accord the media its rightful place in the society, its government promulgated laws and acted in ways of severe implications to the press in Cameroon. These laws largely disfavoured the press to flourish and perform freely. In running the state, the government either used the media as an extension of the government information service or because of distrust of the critical organs kept them at a distance. For over twenty years, Ahidjo's control of the press was 'as tight as was feasible'. Since the radio was exclusively under that government, he introduced or reinforced press laws so as to contain the 'private press with an iron fist' (Bayart,

1973; Mukong, 1989; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 166). As early as May 1959, Law No. 59-35 of 27th May 1959 was passed by parliament, which extended government's control of the press. In less than a decade, following the enactment of this law, about fourteen newspapers ceased to exist (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 165). There are numerous of Ahidjo's government seeking to suppress media organizations that were critical of him. In April 1962, the editor of *L'Effort Camerounais*, Father Fertin was deported to France for reporting about an incident that happened in a train resulting to the death of twenty-five prisoners (Bayart: 55; Mokake, 2004; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 165). The government did not want this story to be exposed so reacted aggressively to its exposure. Also journalists either disappeared or were killed because of the interpretative comments they gave to an event. The ruthlessness of this system did not spare even those who merely collaborated with 'subversive citizens'. This was the fate of Celestine Lingo, editor of *L'Essort de Juenes* in Nkongsamba. This French-trained journalist was jailed in the 1970s because he was seen as a collaborator to Bishop Ndongmo, who was labelled a potential threat to the regime.

Within the government control press organs, the journalists performed their duties under very tight conditions. Those who failed to respect the 'rules' were punished as to the weight of their offence (Mukong: 22-44). *Le Vine* confirms that most private press organs critical of the government had a very short life span (*La Voix du Peuple du Cameroun*, *L'Etoile*), while pro-establishment organs survived (*Le Vine*, 1964: 148-291). Judging from the above evidence, the media under Ahidjo could not act on behalf of the public. It had to expose only those things deemed necessary and pleasant to the hearing of the public by the regime.

Despite claims by Biya to relax the media space in Cameroon after 1982, much of the practice of his government was no remarkable break from the experience of the past. The laws that regulated the government-media relationship – those of 1959 and 1966 remained in force – which allowed for the seizure of newspapers, arrest and detention of journalists, and the closure of media organs (Bayart: 52; Nyamnjoh, 2005: 168). In brief, the systematic check of the press by the government went on end. Though Biya and his Ministers of Information and Culture continued

to make statements of declarations pertaining to the liberalization of space, it was only in the 1990s that the media laws were redrafted. Pressure from home and abroad greatly facilitated this amendment. Nevertheless, promises of freedom of expression in Cameroon remain hallow.

Under the One-party era the government pulled the media very close to itself. This gave the media the task of explaining and justifying government policies to a people 'ignorant and in need of information'. As such those media organs and practitioners who 'failed' to perform this task had themselves to blame. This was the case even after the media laws were redrafted in 1990 and 1996 by the Biya regime. The way the government-sponsored press organs were made to function reflects the insinuation that it was remote controlled. The bias interpretation CRTV gave to the "Yondo Black Affair" in March 1990, to the disappearance of nine youths in Bepanda-Douala, and to the university students strike in Buea in April-May 2006, partly explains the remorse feelings the students in Buea and Cameroonians in general had for the state-owned organs. The students even denied access to and threatened to destroy the CRTV Buea Toyota Hilux if it drove into the University Campus. Their explanation was that whereas from the outset of the strike on 24 April other private stations like STV, The Post, Eden Newspaper, Equinoxe, and Ocean city Radio had been to the scene to gather first-hand information of what unfolded, CRTV was busy practising "arm-chair journalism," interviewing authorities of the University and the Province, and that it took more than a week before a single image of the strike was passed over the national television. This unprofessional practice on the part of CRTV and other pro-government agents could not be swallowed by most with ease. This created a shift in/of audience to the critical organs reporting what the people wanted to hear, as they saw the pro-government agents' inability to provide better reporting on what was happening and on how to manage the strike.

Law has always been cited by the media organs in Cameroon as a hindering factor that accounts for the ineptness of their reports. In fact these laws are what the Biya regime has effectively used to stifle the press in empowering the people and in raising a political consciousness (Gallagher, 1991; Boh and Ntemfac, 1991a; 1991b;

Article 19, 1999; Nyamnjoh, 1999; Eribo and Tanjong, 2002; Mbuagbo and Neh Fru, 2003). A 'violation' of these laws led to arbitrary arrest, detention and seizure of critical news organs, or the transfer or dismissal of journalists in the state-sponsored organs (Article 19; Boh and Ntemfac, 1991a; 1991b). Even after the revision of the laws in 1990 and 1996 that accompanied governmental claims of more openness and freedom in the media-space in Cameroon (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 161-183), the situation was the same. On the contrary, laws No. 90/052 of 19 December 1990 and No. 6/04 of 4 January 1996 proved to be more repressive to media organs than otherwise.

There were more arrests, detentions and transfers under these legal regimes. On 2 July 1998, Patrick Tchouwa, director of *Le Jeune Détectif*, was arrested after publishing an article that alleged that senior government officials were corrupt. On 20 November 1998, he was convicted and sentenced to prison for eight months. Also, Pius Njawe and Eyoun Ngangue of *Le Messenger* were arrested on 27 February 1996 for alleged defamation of and insult to the president and parliamentarians (Article 19). In CRTV, the tendency of the government has been to transfer journalists considered critical of the status quo, dismissal or the call to termination of critical programmes. And this has been the fate of Anglophone journalists who were either transferred or resigned. This is not to say that their French counterparts were/are free. Vociferous and critical journalists like Julius Wamey, Antoine-Marie Ngono, Larry Eyong Echaw, one time or the other were denied access to information or the microphone. In June 1992, some of the crewmembers of 'Cameroon Calling' were transferred to the provinces (Boh and Ntemfac, 1991a; 1991b; Nyamnjoh, 1996b: 350-357; 2005: 138-150).

The above-cited cases are just a tip of the iceberg. But reveal things have not really changed under the Biya regime. The critical press is still gauged as a potential threat to the government even after the role-played by this institution in the turbulent years of the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Cameroon. By comparison what the Ahidjo and Biya government saw as the role of the media in the Cameroonian society is just to asymmetrically transfer the opinions and justify the actions of the government and not to scrutinize issues ineptly. These governments have emphasized

through series of declarations on developmental communication. This communication concept warrants clarification and would be briefly examined in a later section. One thing comes out evident from these illustrations, a rather love-hate relationship between the government and the media in Cameroon. It is timely to admit that, so much as the government laws accentuate this strain relationship, the press organs on their part have acted in ways that also favour this strain. Either way, this has not helped communication to check corruption, pollution, exploitation, embezzlement, moral indecencies of public figures and abuse of human dignity in Cameroon. It does not give communication a chance to lever and oxygenate good governance in the country.

Developmental Communication: The Concept in Context

Developmental communication is the form of communication most African governments expected the media in their respective countries to accept and yield to. It is the type of communication successive governments in Cameroon expected of the media. In itself, developmental communication is not a bad form of communication as to what is experienced in Cameroon. Paranjape acknowledges that developmental communication encourages participation, exchange of perspectives and the creation of an enabling environment in the community, which gives the people the right to voice their development concerns, problems and aspirations. He comments further that this form of communication empowers the people and creates a political culture among the people that serves as a safe haven for people-oriented governance (Paranjape, 2002: 74).

However, the strength of this form of communication, the governments in Cameroon clinked to it but used it to more to their interest. These governments claimed they are still nascent and fragile and cannot withstand media scrutiny. Since these regimes could not withstand media scrutiny, they stressed the media should be and used it as a vehicle to explain national goals (Tanjong, 2005: 29). Consequently Africans and Cameroonians in particular receive praise singing, official and self-censorship from the media agencies. Cameroonian journalists were taught the lesson that the message they bring out are 'often the glue, which holds society together' and

it was necessary these journalists recount tales that suit the interest of those in power (Hester, 1987: 1-2). In sum, in the Cameroonian context the successive post-independent governments understood developmental communication as anything that was not to be the horizontal flow but the vertical flow of information from the government to the citizens. And it is also supposed to be the flow of the positive aspects of authorities and avoiding the negative ones. This shows that however appealing popular governmental rhetoric the implementation process has always been a problem.

Rethinking the Nexus between Communication and Governance

Communication has enormous potentials if harnessed would assist Cameroon in its drive for better governance. Helen Molnar, Director of MC Media and Associates in March 2003, points out the necessity of effective communication for good governance but regrets while this 'has been acknowledged ..., what constitutes communication for good governance ...,' has not been thoroughly addressed. In this section of the paper our purpose is to advance how the media in Cameroon can come out of the connivance of silence and foster the growth of a people-sensitive, transparent and accountable government and institutions for common good.

First, communication can foster good governance for development in Cameroon through people oriented and development oriented programmes. Through people sensitive programmes and critical editorial policies, the media will systematically identify and raise awareness to the problems, opinions and concerns of the masses. This will help to mobilize, sensitize and enhance reactions from both the people and government. An example of a people sensitive programme with far reaching implications on the historicity of the Cameroonian media space is the Cameroon Calling (formerly Cameroon Report). This programme over radio Yaoundé, greatly contributed to the reintroduction of multi party politics in Cameroon in the 1990s. Programmes of this sort need to be encouraged so that the media could forge social unity and advancement. Also through development oriented reporting, the horizontal flow of information across the society will trigger consciousness among the citizens one part of the development efforts of another part. For

instance if one city has found out a way to cope successfully with problems of inadequate water supply or if one sector of the society has found out ways of curbing corruption, this may be of use to other sectors of the community or communities. By fulfilling its civic responsibility of transferring information between sectors of the society, the media would be promoting good governance for development.

The media can also affect good governance through specialized reporting. Molnar reviewing the media in the Pacific laments that most journalists are mainly generalists. In Cameroon there are very few specialist reporters. Journalists of both the private and public organs report on political, cultural economic and foreign issues with often very little specialized knowledge on the issue they are reporting on. And so most do not have the expertise to 'ask appropriate questions about a range of governance issues'. Most Cameroonian journalists are 'environmental' reporters; with little or no sound specialist knowledge on economics and business, the environment, health, education, social/welfare policy and foreign policy, and these are sectors of the society with particular bearing to governance. Thus there is need for specialist reporters in these sectors for communication to help in enhancing good governance within those sectors in the society. This is the responsibility of both the government and proprietors of the private organs.

Also the media in Cameroon will foster governance for development through the use of alternative communication facilities. By alternative avenues here, we have in mind – the Internet, puppet shows, flannel stories, flip charts, posters and audiocassettes – other than the radio, television and newspapers. These are basically tools that reach out to marginalized communities and initiate dialogue. In the past, French instructors in primary schools in Cameroon used flannel stories and this aided the understanding of the pupil. The experience of this in India is worth mentioning and (re) commendable (Paranjape: 78-85). He explains that these alternative avenues are vital to motivate people to dialogue, interaction and introspection geared at creating a society where the opinion of all are considered in the running of its affairs. While recommending that these be used in Cameroon extensively and intensively, it is valuable to share Ellis and Gerrie's advice that we

'borrow wisely considering our history and on an imbued meaningful foundation'. If this is considered, it will help build alliances between groups and communities, hitherto, excluded from political participation; in gathering opinions and in avoiding conflicts of interest and groups. It will also help in building trust, respect and political consciousness. These would be possible because they will largely meet their targeted groups and all would easily understand the language of transmission. But this creates a problem of access especially with the Internet. It is very encouraging that some Cameroonian media organs have gone online, like The Cameroon Tribune, The Post Newspaper and CRTV. This, in a way, presents events happening in other parts of Cameroon to all evenly, even in the remotest regions and across all strata in society. Hence, if these alternative facilities are exploited extensively and intensively, communication will to a considerable extent oxygenate better governance.

Lastly, there is need for the minimization of the strained relationship between the government and the media in Cameroon for communication to promote good governance. It is evident from the above discussion that there is a strained relationship between these two institutions in Cameroon from any angle one looks at. Both are to blame and have to take a responsibility to minimize this strain. There is proper sense for government to appreciate the national benefit of more open communication with the public via the media and other communication channels, and relax the media laws. The Cameroonian media on its part has to learn how to 'act on behalf of the public' through comprehensive and investigative reporting so as not to run into the dragnets of the government. Also, the Cameroonian government needs to continue the training of journalists especially those in the private press on the laws regulating the media, and those of the state corporations have to be given a chance to act professionally. This training that has been going on for some time now warrants intensification. This will help to save time and money that could be used for the effective performance of duty by the government and the press organs. By minimizing this strained relationship a vacuum would have been created for communication to flow freely for the end of effective governance in Cameroon for general good.

Conclusion

This study set out to probe into the role of the media in enhancing governance for development in Cameroon since 1961. It advances that over the years; the press has been divorced from governance and married to the government and para-public institution as a public relations officer. It reveals that even when given the opportunity to blossom the media failed to live up to expectations to transform the society. This work has proffered and rekindled the need to recognize, harness and exploit the potentials of media, as an organ of the civil society, to democratise Cameroon's governance. It suggests that through built trust and competence – both with and in the media, and within power institutions (public and private), and through collaboration and integration into the public policy dialogue process, strategic dissemination of information will contribute significantly in promoting good governance as well as consensus building. Only in realizing and approaching the capabilities of the civil society will the nexus between media and governance be constructive.

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Chapter Nine

Governance and Land Conflict: The Case of Aghem-Wum 1966-2005

Henry Kam Kah

Introduction

Aghem is the host village of the headquarters of the Menchum division which is one of the seven administrative units of the North-west province of Cameroon. The North-west province is situated in the western Grass-field region of Cameroon which is, due to the savannah nature of its vegetation, not as conducive for agricultural activities as the forest lands. Nevertheless, agriculture is still the main, if not the sole, economic activity of the province. The main agricultural activities are crop cultivation and animal breeding. Animal breeding, especially cattle herding used to be the exclusive activity of the nomadic Fulani known in the Aghem area as 'Aku', while crop cultivation has traditionally been undertaken by the indigenous women.

The North-west Province of Cameroon is notorious for conflicts of different sorts. These include interethnic, farmer/grazer and community scuffles which have escalated over the past four decades (Chilver 1992; Harshbarger *and* Nji 1992; Che 1996; Agborkin, 2001; Beseng, 2004; Diduk, 2004; Kah, 2004, 2005; Omie, 2000.) Although conflicts of different types are common in the province, the Aghem area is noted for one type of these conflicts- the farmer-grazer conflict. The farmer-grazer conflicts are so recurrent in the area as to, more or less, constitute its characteristic. But what accounts for the recurrence of farmer-grazer conflicts in Aghem? Is the conflict irresolvable if so why? If it is resolvable why has it not been resolved once and for all? The purpose of this chapter is to provide answers to the preceding questions. The argument here is that the causes of the farmer-grazer conflicts in Aghem are socio-economic compounded by inefficient management of resources especially land. These conflicts have mobilized civil society especially women groups to agitate for the proper management of land in Aghem.

The discourse on civil society has attracted much attention among scholars in recent years but the concept is described differently by different authors. For instance, it is described by Boyle (1996:609-622:) as the rise of parent groups and organisations; by Eyoh (1998: 338-359) as the ability of local people to resist state power by way of reinventing traditions of their own; by Nkwi (2006a: 354) as a clustering of individuals with an interest in addressing political, economic and social abnormalities in the society and by Forje (<http://apad.revues.org>) as the power of non-state actors to participate in decision-making that impact on them. The role that civil society can play include advancing democracy and disciplining the state (Fatton, 1995: 234, Carothers, 2000: 314); providing new spaces for communication and discussion which render the state helpless because it cannot control it (Monga, 1998: 98); and being able to expand political space (Awassom, 2005: 424). The Aghem women group is seen here as a clustering of individuals with an interest in addressing a social abnormality thereby providing a new space for political participation.

Although most of the work on civil society in Cameroon was done in the 1990s when multiparty politics was reintroduced in the country, civil society organisations were in existence before this period. In the Wum area, for example, women had, due to the farmer/grazier problem, raised their voices in protest as early as the 1960s and mobilised themselves into a group which travelled to Bamenda in the 1980s to air their grievances to the provincial authorities. Such was an alternative force which from time to time rendered the state helpless and gave courage to the disgruntled women. It was a gender manifestation of civil society mobilisation which sought to counter the male leaders popularly known as the *Batums*.

Land in the Economy of Aghem

Aghem is a rural area and so its economy is essentially agriculture-based consisting of farming and animal breeding both of which require extensive use of land. Peasant farming which is undertaken mainly by indigenous women is, due to the lack of modern agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, characterized by shifting cultivation so as to maintain the fertility of the soil. Shifting cultivation requires the availability of much more farm land than

can be cultivated in any one given season since some of the land must be fallowed each farming season. Farming is, as it were, indispensable for the supply of local foodstuffs such as maize, beans, yams, cassava, coco-yams and a variety of vegetables.

Animal breeding especially cattle herding which is undertaken exclusively by the Fulani settlers (*Akus*) also requires the extensive use of land. This is so because the practice is to allow cattle to graze freely rather than in a fence and more importantly because of shifting grazing which entails the movement of cattle to the valleys during the dry season and to the highlands during the raining season. Animal breeding is the sole source of livelihood for the Fulanis and an important income earner for the government. Besides being the source of meat and milk which are consumed in homes and commercial houses, other useful items such as horns, bones and dung, are also obtained from cattle to serve various purposes. While meat and milk are consumed and/or marketed for consumption, the horns serve a social purpose. In the Aghem tradition, the horns are reserved for titled- men who use them for drinking. On their part, the bones serve a medicinal function as traditional healers and other diviners use them for various healing processes. Finally, the dung is used in fertilizing the land for agricultural activities. Cattle production is thus invaluable in the economy of the area, and in fact, of the region as a whole.

Land/Resource Management in Aghem

In Aghem, men are in control of land because although traditionally land is communally owned, the ward head *Batum* is the custodian of the land. Even within government institutions, land matters are also handled exclusively by men. Since the *Batum* controls land it is he who grants right of use to those resident therein (Muam, 2001:21; Kaberry, 1952:52; Kah, 2006: 29; Chilver and Kaberry, 1967: 38-9). In the past, the *Batums* distributed land, free of charge, to other men who then parcelled it out to women for cultivation. The Queen mother (*Natum*) advised the *Batum* in this process of land management. But nowadays, many of the *Batums* ignore the role of the *Natums* and tend to sell rather than distribute the land as was the case in the past. For instance, the *Batums* of Naikom, Waindo, Afuh Nkouh and Chuoembi villages are known to received

money from graziers to allow them graze on land meant for farming without respect for demarcated areas. The Batums commercialize the land to serve their personal interests because they think that they own it and should use it as they so desire (Kebei 2005.) Since the Batums now see land as a commodity and a source of personal income, they not only reserve large expanses of land for themselves so as to sell to the cattle graziers, they also tend to be biased in land matters in favour of those who have the purchasing power, the Fulani graziers, to the disadvantage of the farmers who are largely indigenous women.

In addition, since the *Batums* give out farmland, they also control cultivation and the harvesting of crops. The day of the commencement of cultivation is decided by the *Batum* with the assistance of the *Natum*. The women then assemble at the *Batum's* compound on the eve of the commencement of cultivation. When the land is carefully prepared, it is the *Batum* who announces the planting of crops during the onset of the rainy season. When the crops are ready for harvest the *Batum* uses the *Kwifon* (the law enforcement arm of government in a traditional society) to set aside a date for harvesting to officially begin (Ewo, 2000: 10-11). The first crops of the harvest are taken to the palace for its upkeep. The problem with this is that even those who do not have are also expected to contribute to the upkeep of the palace (Muam, 2001:21).

At the level of the administration, authorities and officials of technical services are also largely men. Committees set up to handle the persistent farmer/grazier conflicts are overwhelmingly dominated by men as well. These administrative authorities, officials and committee members are also accused of corruption in handling land matters especially the farmer/grazier issues (Kebei 2005). They use the farmer/grazier conflict as a means of enriching themselves and as such constituting part of rather than a solution to, the problem. They have thus been subjective in handling the problem. For example, when in 1973 an administrative official (the Chief of Zone Farmer/Grazier for the North-west Province) was mandated to delimit grazing from farmland, he made nonsense of the situation by placing boundaries in areas that extended far into what was considered to be farmland. His actions favoured the graziers because according to the 2004 Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 'he allowed himself to be corrupted.'

Moreover, as far back as 1967, administrative authorities in the area were wary that the continuous exodus of graziers from the area because of the farmer/grazier conflict would impact negatively on the revenue of the state as it would result in a decline in income from tax on cattle (*jangali*) (Meeting of Divisional Officer, 1967). This implied that because of revenue, the administration would favour graziers in a farmer/grazier conflict in order to prevent the graziers from moving out of the area. This explains why over the years, the Wum administration like the Batums, has in land matters, been biased in favour of the graziers either because of personal interest or considerations of revenue from tax on cattle. With the understanding that they are favoured by both administration and the Batums, the Fulani graziers tend to be arrogant to the extent of even ignoring administrative orders thereby ridiculing administrative officers. Thus, the graziers have ignored all Prefectoral Orders as well as Municipal Decisions ordering them to move cattle from farm land to a particular area reserved for grazing (Kebei, 2005: 107) and the administration has not been able to implement the stated sanction of disobedience which is the impoundment of cattle found on farmland.

Conflict in Land Management in Aghem

In Aghem, conflict over how land is managed by different institutions has brought women to the fore. Protest by Aghem women against the poor management of land is by no means a recent development because they had been protesting since 1966. The argument therefore that women are at the very centre of resisting change due to tradition, custom and the need to preserve the cultural heritage is misleading. (FAO, 1995:7). The Aghem women are opposed to the enormous powers of the different ward heads *Batums* over land and the natural resources therein. In the past the *Natum* (Queen Mother) technically regulated the way land was managed by the *Batum* but today even many *Natums* are victims of the land grabbing attitude of the *Batums*. This has been compounded by the involvement of some educated elite in the cattle grazing venture. These indigenous elite graziers who are men have taken up part of the little land available to women for the cultivation of crops. The absence of women in land management institutions means that their interest cannot be adequately ensured in land matters.

While women are in need of extensive land for the cultivation of crops, the graziers also require enough land for the cattle to graze on. This has created a conflict situation not only because of land scarcity, but also because of different perceptions about land ownership. Whereas according to the Aghem tradition upheld by the farmers, land is communally owned, the graziers on the other hand see and perceive of land as something to be privately owned. As such they believe in owning vast areas of land for personal grazing (Kebei, 2005:28). Moreover, since cattle are allowed to graze freely, crops have often been destroyed by cattle. This has happened several times in the past -1966, 1967, 1973, 1981, 2003 (Ewo 2003: 31-32.).

The complicity of the administrators, the Batums and the graziers is a hindrance to the proper management of land in Aghem. It has for instance, been pointed out that the failure of the erstwhile Wum Area Development Authority (WADA) to fulfil its assigned mission of freely allocating waste lands to the needy was the handiwork of these three forces. They broke the deal among themselves with the court members sharing the spoils. It was the graziers 'financial power' that caused the disappearance of farmers' documents in the court as part of the dirty trick occasioned by the bribes given to the WADA personnel' so that free access to farmed plots by cattle graziers would be no problem (Muam, 2001: 31-2). In fact, the consistent inconsistency of these three is the basis of the persistent farmer/grazier conflicts.

The Hurdles to Women Free Use of Land and its Resources

The Aghem women are mainly farmers but they encounter hurdles to free access to land and exploiting the resources therein. A vast majority of them belong to the class of commoner who do not have free access to land and the resources therein. Like many other commoners, they are more or less landless citizens in their different wards by birth (Muam, 2001:25; Attia, 2002:43). Since land is communally owned and managed, women cannot arbitrarily choose a plot of land for exploitation for agricultural purposes. The problem here is not necessarily that land should have been individually owned by households but that the *Batums* are increasingly making things difficult for women because instead of allocating land for collective

farming, as required by tradition, they are commercialising it to graziers and big business concerns. Since the Aghem women are unable to freely access land, they are not also able to produce enough food for the household, let alone, have the excess for the market to earn an income so as to increase the standard of living. Hunger and poverty are indications of poor governance and can be the cause of agitation and uprising.

The origin of the farmer/grazier conflict could be traced to the period between 1937 and 1947 when cattle graziers arrived in Aghem territory. As many more graziers came into the area, arable land was taken up for cattle grazing. Before long cattle grazing expanded requiring increased grazing land thereby reducing the land available for farming. It was this increasing influence of the Fulani community that in 1966 led the women of Aghem, Esu and Weh to denounce the presence of the Akus (Kebei, 2005: 21). This was in reaction to the damage done to their farms by cattle. The following year, the women rioted again and some herdsmen were forced to leave the area although the administration was not happy because this deprived the government of income from tax on cattle.

The problems of women over the years have also been compounded by the way some government officials handle land related issues. The failure by the Chief of Zone Farmer/Grazier for the North West province to ensure that funds were made available to facilitate the demarcation of farm from grazing land (Kebei, 2005: 22). The lack of a clear demarcation between farm land and grazing land means that women cannot successfully cultivate their crops without cattle breaking loose into farm plots and destroying crops. Had there been proper demarcation, some of these problems would have been avoided. Similarly, the Divisional Officer for Wum was said to have prevented the Watch Dog Committee put in place for checking cattle found on farming land from operating because he was bribed by graziers. As such there was no way of preventing cattle from destroying crops since the administrator had received money from the graziers (Kebei, 2005: 22). This is a serious hurdle to women because since the administrators are biased against them in land matters. For instance, the senior Divisional officer for Menchum did not only failure in enforcing administrative orders requiring graziers to move their cattle to specific areas allocated for

grazing, he instead issued Prefectoral Order no. 160 which ordered women to remove their crops from farm land areas at Mbinjam and Naikom. This triggered the women sit down strike of 2003.

Furthermore, Commission Resolutions and various other administrative Orders concerning the farmer/grazier conflict have never been implemented by both the traditional leaders and administrators. On 19th December 2002 for instance, the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) ordered the suspension of grazing permits in Wum Sub Division but this order was violated by the graziers and the administrative order was rendered useless. Even the D.O.s notification of 7 May 2004 giving graziers three days to quit farm land fell on deaf ears because these graziers never moved. A similar situation occurred with the Prefectoral Order No. 036/2004 and Municipal Decision No. 07/2004 with graziers not frightened by the fact that failure to move cattle to grazing land would lead to their impoundment if found on grazing land. (Prefectoral Order No 036/2004; D.Os Notification, 7 May 2004; Municipal Decision No. 07/2004; Kebei, 2005:24). Even when compensation is paid by graziers for crops destroyed by cattle the money never gets to the women. Thus, some officials have been accused of confiscating money paid as compensation for crops destroyed by animals. Added to this is the fact at one time or the other the department of agriculture tried to relinquish its responsibility of managing land to the Veterinary Department (Confidential D.O Wum, 1967). This confused state of affairs further complicates women's problems in land matters since the rich graziers will always have their way.

Besides the administration, some traditional rulers have also been a source of problems for women's access to land. These traditional rulers are known to have received huge sums of money from the graziers in order to favour them in any conflict situation. Some ward heads have sold fertile land to other people and left the women with infertile areas. Some of them have even gone against tradition failing to distribute land. (Patrick Neng Ewi, Personal Communications; 13 August 2003; Ewo, 2000: 26-30; Report of Commission of Enquiry, Feb. 2004; 4, 18 and 19)

Ramifications of Men's Poor Governance of Land and Resources Therein

The way land has been managed in Aghem has created a lot of problems and the consequences have been felt in contemporary times although Nji Fidelis and Richard Wallang, politician and businessman respectively believe that the farmer/grazier problem in Wum is not a human problem (*The Farmer's Voice* no. 121, 2005; 19). One of these is open manifestation by women. In 1966, 1967 not only did Aghem women denounce cattle destruction of their crops but they were joined by their counterparts of Weh and Esu for same reasons. Barely six years later, the women undertook a journey to Bamenda on foot to petition the governor and were persuaded at Befang to return and the result was the putting in place of the Nseke Commission whose recommendations were not implemented to the letter. Again, on 24-31 December 1980 and 1st January 1981 the Aghem people with women playing a prominent role tried to expel the graziers from Aghem land through looting property but this again did not succeed because the Fulani bribed both the administration and the *Batums*. The January 1981 riot led to the destruction of Fulani houses and the shooting dead of nine people by the forces of law and order. Further confrontations erupted in 1991, 1993, 2003. In January 2004, the Aghem women organised a sit down strike at the fon's palace. Throughout this period farming activities were suspended by the women. (Muam, 2001: 32; Kebei, 2005: 23; Report of Commission of Enquiry, February 2004: 5).

One of the greatest consequences of this poor governance was the emergence of the *Kangkem* moot in Aghem in the 1970s. The aims of this peasant revolt were to overthrow feudalism and institute individual ownership of permanent farm plots and to ensure the distribution of natural resources among matri-heads among others (Muam, 2001: 29). Although men and women were involved in this revolt, women had more reasons to protest than men because they suffered more than men. If *Kangkem* had succeeded and individual farm plots were distributed to the various households the problem of women access to land would certainly have been highly reduced

Need for New Management Strategies

Given the fact that the actions some traditional leaders, administrative officials and cattle herders have contributed in making things difficult for women farmers, there is need for new management strategies to promote good governance at the local government level and by extension at the national level. According to Beryl Ikei Attia, the traditional council in Aghem should step in and locate areas of land for Aghem women to carry on agriculture without having to buy land. She argues that this will make those who do not have the means to buy land to actively participate in resource exploitation than idle around as only recipients in matters of agricultural development (Attia, 2002:46). This measure can however, become a reality only if within the traditional council there are forward thinking people without which nothing would fundamentally change. Besides, as long as women are not represented in this council the tendency is that decisions can hardly be taken in their favour. Some councillors will always think of making a lot for themselves than helping others to help the community.

A way out of poor governance is for a clear cut demarcation of farming from grazing areas. This is the responsibility of the competent government services such as Lands and Survey, Agriculture and the Veterinary. Each of them without malice needs to play its role without at the same time complicating the activities of the other. In this way, the demarcated grazing land can be fenced and cattle grazing practised within this fence. The demarcation will make more meaning if resistant folder is planted to minimise transhumance during the dry season into river courses thereby destroying crops. Farmers should also employ proper land management strategies in order not to waste land and to increase output in an area of increasing population.

Besides, within traditional and modern institutions, women should be consciously present to ensure a successful community participation in development. Many women and not only the *Natums* should be incorporated into these structures. They should also chair meetings pertaining to the management of human and natural resources and not simply become insignificant members of committees. Without a conscious effort of governing land and related issues with women in mind, food crop production which is the prerogative of the female

folk would be compromised. This should also include encouraging many more Fulani women in farming because their husbands would consciously control cattle not to destroy crops cultivated by their own wives for consumption and sale.

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Chapter Ten

The Afo-A-Kom and Governance in Kom (C.1865 – 1973)

Walter Gam Nkwi

Introduction: Sculpture in Indigenous African Politics

According to Hugh Honour and John Fleming (1995), most works of African art were created for a purpose, whether religious, social, political or exceptionally, to express the artist's inner vision. Fichner-Bathus (1992:3024) suggests the following purposes of African art (sculpture): to create beauty; to provide decoration; to reveal the truth; to immortalise; to express religious values; to express fantasy; to record and commemorate experience; to reflect the social and cultural context; to protest injustice and raise consciousness and to elevate the common place.

Over the years Art scholars have researched on Art and strategies of governance. In other words they attempted to show how artworks have acted as a source of statecraft in indigenous pre-colonial Africa. In 1972, Douglas Fraser and Herbert M. Cole edited a volume of essays entitled *African Art and Leadership*. In that volume particular attention was paid to royal art; the function of leadership arts and the structure (materials, style, form and iconography were related). The volume further contends that leadership arts have crucial functions in maintaining the position of rulers; the arts contribute to their social position, their political activities and their symbolic power. Furthermore, the volume contends that rulers are set apart from the ruled and this separation is expressed artistically in their ability to possess objects made of more costly scarce and refractory material objects which are monumental in size and very elaborately done, all in contrast to what commoners possess.

Leon Siroto (1972) shows how the Bakwele, in adopting the *beetle* masked ritual from neighbouring people, took the *goon* mask out of its ritual context and used it in the field of competition for power between lineages. The mask became a perfect distancing mechanism for empowering them to carry on their activities of

extortion and assassination with impunity on a back ground of “war games” between the lineages. Siroto, gives an excellent sense of the changes in behaviours and usages in response to new situations, but even more, he indicates how art itself is used in bringing about new balances of power.

Works of art such as the Altar of the Hand, Benin, illustrate the skill with which the Benin manipulated bronze, as well as the importance of symbolism to their art. The many figures, which have been cast in relief around the circumference of this small work, are meant to venerate the king and glorify his divine office. The king is the central figure in both the relief and in the free standing figures on top of the altar. He holds the staffs of his office in his hands and his head is larger than those of his attendants (Fichner-Rathus, 1992; 472-478). The centrality of this configuration points to the fact that Benin art symbolised unity, sacredness and politics of governance in an indigenous African polity.

In the seventeenth century, Osei Tutu and his friend Okomfo Anokye worked together using a “golden stool” to forge the heterogeneous Akan groups into a cohesive strong union. Basil Davidson (1977:242-243) vividly captures the situation in the following words:

Okomfo Anokye declared that he had a mission from Nyame, supreme god of the Akan Nyame, who ordered him to make the Asante into a great people. To spread this message the new Asante, ruler, Osei Tutu who was working closely with Ankye called a vast assembly of people. At this gathering Okomfo Anokye brought down from the sky a wooden stool that was partly covered in gold and made it rest on Osei Tutu's knees. Having done this, Okomfo Ankye announced that the golden stool contained the soul or spirit of the whole Asante people. He told the chiefs and people that their power and health, bravery and welfare, were all symbolised in this stool and the chiefs and people accepted this (Also read Ayittey, 1992:49; Fage, 1969: 169; Webster and Boahen, 1980:85; Ajayi and Crowder, 1976:25).

The above quotation is an eloquent and classic illustration of how Osei Tutu and Anokye used a work of art (the Golden stool) for political expediency. The incongruous Asante Empire recognised the Golden stool created by Osei Tutu as the symbol of their soul and unity, the king of Kumasi state or division (Oman) as their paramount king or Asantehene, and all of them recognised the great oath (Webster and Boahen, 1980:85). When Osei Tutu realised that the Akan had recognised the Golden stool, he then proceeded to make laws which forbade any of the Akan groups to speak about any of the old separate histories of the united groups (Basil Davidson, 1977: 243). Generally, in art historical research on Africa, one of the most widely acknowledged phenomena is the intimate relationship of art forms and leadership in a wide variety of politics

The Bamenda grass field has not benefited much from such studies. However, Christraud Geary in 1988 published “Art and Political Processes in the kingdoms of Bali – Nyonga and Bamum (Cameroon Grass fields)” in *Canadian Journal of African History*. In that article, Geary showed how Bamum and Bali Nyonga kings pursued different strategies for producing and employing art in creating a cohesive state. Geary further shows how both the Bamum and Bali – Nyonga scenarios demonstrate the close link between art production and the use of art works for political and historical processes. In this chapter, I show how a single work of art, *Afo-a-Kom* was used as a strategy of governing the Kom heterogeneous Fandom between C.1865 and 1973. In this I also show the dynamics and mechanisms of statecraft in an indigenous African polity. I will further illuminate the fact that the sculpture, a cultural icon, which is in reality, an item in civil society was used not only by the Fon of Kom for governing but also by some Cameroonian elites who in the early 1970s tried to use it for political jockeying thereby evoking the political role of civil society.

As a concept, civil society has occasioned endless disputes over definitions though, its study in Africa has made great strides (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Kasfir 1998; Siteo 1998; Osaghae 1994). Civil society thus has various definitions: It is the process of advancing democracy and disciplining the state to ensure that citizen’s interests are taken seriously and greater civil and political participation is fostered (Carothers 2000); a critical element of

democratisation because the current failure of the process of democratisation in Africa hinges, in part, on the failure of states to respond to the pressing demands of their people (Fatton Jr. 1995); more or less imaginary: 'outside of the sociological, historical and cultural events of its imagination, the existence or non-existence of civil society is not significant' (Tester 1992); the process by which society seeks to breach and counteract the simultaneous 'totalisation' unleashed by the state (Bayart 1989:); made up of individuals who have an interest in redressing political, social and economic abnormalities in the society (Gam Nkwi, 2006); and 'new spaces for communication and discussion over which the state has no control' (Monga, 1998). The various definitions are limited by the fact that they are mostly Eurocentric, and this Euro centrism has been difficult to deconstruct (Bratton 1989; Harbeson and Naomi 1994). However, the definitions are useful to the present work in that they provide some paradigms which will be borrowed and applied. In the light of these definitions civil society can be broadly understood as the domain of non-kinship-based contractual relations comprising interest groups such as traditional rulers, credit and development associations, student unions, professional associations, religious groups and women and men in the informal sector. These organisations should exist independent of the state but at the same time be prime movers of societal dynamism.

Civil society generally is pegged on a number of themes: to foster the spirit of democracy (Ceesay, 1998); to mediate relations between the state and society; to set the rules and ethos of public conduct and to ensure that the state reflects the social reality and is committed to the pursuance of the public good (Osaghae, 1998). The role of civil society in societal transformation and nation-building in Cameroon has been compromised by political and social structures deriving from several decades of autocratic rule that still underpin the practical and moral workings of the state. Civil society remains mired in societal cleavages that find expression in parochial tendencies ranging from neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, ethnicism to regionalism, thereby limiting its ability to mobilise citizens towards a meaningful development.

Theoretical Framework

The theory that will underpin analysis in this chapter is the functionalist theory as stated by Frank Boas and Nicolas Malinowski. The functionalist paradigm determines the questions which are posed in regard to art and the political domain. Functionalists perceived art as emanating from the system of social relations which it reflects in African art history. It has been commonly assumed that works of art reflect the level of complexity of the political leadership and that some works of art in some ways are central to its success (Sieber and Walker, 1987; Geary, 1988). Until very recently this conceptual framework has remained unarticulated.

Afo-a-kom and the strategy of statecraft in the Kom Fandom

The *Afo-a-Kom* literally means the “Kom thing” and measures 64 inches high. Its face is smeared with copper. It holds a sceptre of power and stands behind a throne. It also has an embroidered crown made of the same material. The exhibitor of the phallus not only stresses sex but also seems to point to lineage and tribal continuity, as well as fertility, which the Kom people hold in high esteem. Its three toes signify the Kom motto of “child, food and prosperity” (Nkwi, 2005: 134). It was carved by Fon Yuh I (1865-1912). It is not known exactly when he did so but speculation holds that it was after he had incorporated assorted peoples into the Fandom. If we assume that Fon Yuh was an expansionist ruler and that by the end of his reign he had conquered about ten neighbouring ‘states’, then we could say that the carving of *Afo-a-Kom* was to legitimise his rule over the conquered ‘states’. This argument is plausible because he made it sacred and any Fon was to see it only once during his reign. The sculpture could further be seen as a constitution although not written a constitution. For the purpose of political legitimization Fon Yuh I carved the feet with three toes, a reversal of mammalian dimorphism. It is beyond our competence to analyse the symbolism of the three toes in detail but suffice it to say that they represented the highest Kom ideals stated above constituting the motto of Kom nation.

Governance implies the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of the country’s affairs at all levels. The legitimacy and the transparent nature of any such government will determine how good it is (Onsarigo, 2005:85). The

authorities in power use all strategies to govern their citizens. In consonance with this operational definition, the carving of the *Afo-a-Kom* necessitated the making of rules on how it shall be used. One of the rules was that it would be brought out only once in a year, that is, during the annual dance. The annual dance usually lasted for a week and information gathered in the field holds that the conquered states were highly represented at the dance. The representatives of the conquered 'states' at the annual dance were required to bring along what Samir Amin (1972) prefers to call 'tributary mode of production.' He uses this as a clear alternative theoretical construct to the euro-centric phrase "payment of tribute." The leaders of the conquered states always attended the annual dance to respect and receive blessings from the *Afo-a-Kom* thereby paying homage to their Kom over-lordship. This again shows how wood sculpture was a major form of artistic expression and was an essential part in the political and historical discourse in the Bamenda Grass Fields (Geary, 1988:18).

Chieftdom expansion in the Bamenda grass fields in the nineteenth century depended on two critical points of control which had to be maintained through force. The first was to retain control over critical resources in the subsistence trade, in particular land and production of palm oil (Rowlands, 1979:16). The second was to gain captives to sell them out for slaves or maintain them as palace errand runners (Chilver and Kaberry, 1967). The kingdoms of Bali-Nyonga, Bamum and Kom expanded because of these two reasons although the 'states' of southern Kom voluntarily submitted themselves to Kom hegemony as a means of gaining protection against raids by the Bafut for slaves. It was therefore imperative for these Fondoms to develop strategies for governing their heterogeneous 'empires.'

In the Kom Fondom the *Afo-a-Kom* was displayed once per annum to reassure and reconfirm Kom hegemony over the satellite states. On the other hand, the Fon of Kom had to provide some royal visual objects for the leaders of the subordinated villages as a means of further reinforcing his hegemony over them. These objects included royal bags, spears, stools and new emblems which were bestowed on the rulers and leaders. These art objects were to act as visual reminders of Kom supremacy. In this way, power radiated from Laikom, the capital of the Kom Fondom to affect the nooks

and crannies of the ten vassal states of the kingdom. By doing this the “Kom-ization” of the empire was ascertained.

The word power, according to the Kom mind-set needs further clarity. According to Shanklin (1976: 67), power in Kom is cosmology, an attribute of humans and objects, a divisible force present in the universe that attaches to particular people or things, sometimes by virtue of age, sometimes by virtue of unknowable factors. She further posits that all old people are potentially powerful but not all old people actually have power, and that the same is true of objects. The power ascribed to *Afo-a-Kom* is generally embedded in myths such as the one attributing the death of Fon Nsom Ngwe in 1974 to it because he had seen it twice against the rule which stipulated that a Fon can see it only once during his reign. It was also believed that the *Afo-a-Kom* had mysterious powers. All these myths went beyond Kom to “affect” the conquered states. But the main point to drive home here is that the sculpture played a psychic significance in the daily routine of the Kom to such an extent that it was even forgotten that it was a piece of wood. The death of Fon Nsom was more a result of age (above 70) than of the fact that he saw *Afo-a-kom* twice during his reign. Generally, going beyond the Kom cosmological philosophy of power, this chapter sees power in the guises of Hans Morgenthau in his classic volume *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*. According to Morgenthau (1973: 28) power is a psychological relationship between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. Those who exercise power influence the decisions of those who have less power because the weaker individual, group or state expects benefits, fears retribution, or respects the men and/or institutions exercising power. In this direction the Kom used *Afo-a-Kom* to govern her heterogeneous Fondom.

The utilisation of *Afo-a-Kom* for political ends was not limited to Kom. In 1973 the Cameroon political elite used it for political sloganeering. The next section of this chapter is an attempt to show how it was used for such an end.

Afo-a-Kom in post-Colonial Cameroon: The Case of its odyssey

Despite the purported importance of *Afo-a-Kom* in the statecraft of the Kom Fondom it was stolen in 1966 and landrovered to Douala where it was sold and spirited away to America. The scientific

dynamics surrounding its theft have been handled in my other article published in *Central Africa: Crises, Reform and Reconstruction* (2005: 133-154). In 1973, it was found at the Dartmouth College exhibition. Because of a deep feeling of loss in the Fondom as a result of its absence its discovery set in motion a crusade to return the sculpture to the Kom. Both Americans of goodwill and Cameroonians at the diplomatic service in Washington played a significant role in bringing back the sculpture (for more on this see Gam Nkwi, 2005: 146).

On 10 December 1973, *Afo-a-Kom* left New York for Cameroon. On the eve of its departure a buffet party was held at the Cameroon Embassy and the Cameroon Ambassador to the United States, Francois Xavier Tschoungui played host and addressed the sculpture in the following words:

As for you, eternal tranquillity Return hence to your ancestral land, return hence to look after the death and living. You symbol of love and unity in diversity be forgetful of Upheaval and blasphemy. Your sojourn here has been nothing but a nightmare which will soon vanish forever. Forget your uncomfortable appearance in this sophisticated technology whose achievement turns to overlook human consideration. Return (Femetti, 1975: 3; *Washington Post*, November, 1973: 2)

The send-off address insinuated that the political importance of the sculpture had gone beyond a single ethnic group. The ambassador viewed the *Afo-a-Kom* as eternal in its functions, thereby acknowledging it as a “god” who was the custodian of the living and the dead. The words “unity and diversity” had some added importance, which cannot be taken uncritically. From the onset, the *Afo-a-Kom* was carved to maintain the unity of a heterogeneous Fondom. Kom was and is still made up of conquered states which were not Kom *per se*. This means that *Afo-a-Kom*’s cardinal purpose was to maintain the unity of the Fondom. The Ambassador’s speech could be viewed as a “government slogan” (Shanklin, 1975:63). Cameroon is made up of approximately 250 ethnic groups. After 1961 President Ahmadu Ahidjo’s main objective was to forge national unity in a diverse cultural milieu. After using several strategies that included intimidation and cajoling, he achieved this

objective on 20th May 1972 through a referendum (Ngoh, 2005: 143-184). What is worth noting here is the way Tschoungui saw the *Afo-a-Kom* as a symbol of “Love and Unity” and thus a strategy to govern Cameroon towards more unity. He saw *Afo-a-Kom* as belonging not to Kom but Cameroon as a whole.

When the *Afo-a-Kom* reached Yaounde it was displayed in the tourism office and the Minister of Information and Culture, Vroumsia Tchinye, maintained that *Afo-a-Kom* will remain in Yaounde because it belonged to Cameroon. The fon of Kom who had been invited to Yaounde told the Minister that if *Afo-a-Kom* was to remain in Yaounde, then the government should show land where he will re-settle his people because *Afo-a-Kom* could not be separated from them. Consequent upon this, the Cameroon government sent the icon to its final destination – Kom.

At Fundong, the political capital of Kom, the Minister of Culture and Information told the Kom that “*Afo-a-Kom* must now serve as a symbol of national unity....this statue though it originated here in Kom, no longer belongs only to the Kom tribe....it is now the property of Cameroonians.” This sudden outburst of interest expressed by the Cameroonian political authorities is a strategy which they could use to achieve their much cherished objectives – Unity.

The Minister’s unity was not limited only to the Kom Fondom. He had wanted the sculpture to remain in Yaounde and it can be deduced that *Afo-a-Kom* had taken on the trappings of a national emblem symbolising national unity. The issue of unity in the context of contemporary Cameroon political history needs further clarity. Unity with focus on the *Afo-a-Kom* has two meanings: first, the *Afo-a-Kom* was used by Fon Yuh 1 to achieve unity in a heterogeneous ethnic milieu. Second, the *Afo-a-Kom* was seen by Cameroonian politicians in 1973 to symbol of national unity, that is, a symbol of what had been achieved in 1972 through the referendum in which 99.9 percent of the population voted for a unitary state. The outcome of the 1972 Referendum was the replacement of the federal system, which was instituted in 1961, with a unitary system thereby changing the country from a federal to a unitary state. After the referendum, the country was fragmented, first into seven and later, ten provinces.

The effect of this fragmentation was the birth of regional identity. As a result, national integration or unity has, since 1961, been jeopardised by ethno- regional jingoism, fanned and sustained by the state. The notion of national unity is ridiculed and people are overtly encouraged to demonstrate stronger loyalties to their ethno-regional or sub-national groups than to the Cameroonian nation. Priority is given to ethnic rather to national identity. This state of affairs engenders the crises of citizenship as full acceptability in one's fatherland suffers from a delimitation of a geo-ethnic order. The *Afo-a-Kom* emerged in 1973 and attempted to symbolise national unity as insinuated in the speeches of Tschoungui and Tchinye. But the attempt to use the *Afo-a-Kom* as a symbol of national unity was short lived as it had to return to its land of origin to play the role for which it was meant, that is, symbolise the unity of the Kom kingdom.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how a work of art, *Afo-a-Kom*, was used for political expediency. The Fon of Kom used it not only as symbol of unity for his heterogeneous Fandom, but also as a source of power that facilitated his rule. On their part, some Cameroonian officials saw the sculpture as a symbol of unity not only for Kom but for Cameroon as a whole. The lesson here is that rather than only decreeing national unity as was the case in 1972, the political elites could use art to consolidate nationhood.

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Chapter Eleven

Conclusion: The Problematic of Governance and Development in Cameroon

Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong & John Bobuin Gemandze

The contributors to this volume offer a wide-ranging, multi-disciplinary and an in-depth exploration of governance policy in Cameroon. It is not practicable to review all the critical issues they have raised here. However, it would be appropriate to conclude this study by concentrating on the nexus between governance and development, for no other reason than the fact that it was the central problematic of the Departmental seminar that led to this publication.

It is interesting to note at the outset that the different authors adopt different perspectives on the concept of governance. This is not surprising, given the variety of their disciplinary backgrounds, as well as the different sectors and/or issues in which they engage. For instance, higher education (Abangma and Titanji); the economy (Fondo Sikod, Teke and Ntangsi); the media (Mokake); indigenous governance (Nkwi) and land conflict (Kah). What is surprising however is that the authors are all unanimous in one point or issue – the correlation between governance and development. That is, that there is an inherent relationship between governance and development. The greater the degree of good governance, other things being equal, the higher the level of development. In Cameroon, the prospects for governance contributing to development (social, economic and political) are rather bleak given the absence of good governance as evidenced by, *inter alia*, over-centralization, high incidence of corruption, lack of accountability and of freedom of expression.

This leads them to an unambiguous and uncompromising stance with their diagnosis. For instance, Fonchingong (chapter 2) and Ntangsi (chapter 7) identify corruption as a major obstacle to good governance and development because it reduces revenue, increases transaction costs, engenders misplaced priorities, impedes foreign investment, breeds and nurtures inefficiency, injustice, the lack of

accountability and of transparency in public management. Fondo Sikod and Teke (chapter 6) also single out low rating on democracy, that is, the lack of good governance as an obstacle to development. As regards governance in higher education, Abangma (chapter 4) refers to the crisis of 'governance' manifested in students' strikes and arising from an over-centralised system which is unresponsive to the needs of students in the learning and teaching processes. As a result students are disenchanted with the system. Titanji (chapter 6) identifies the lack of appropriate skills by academics appointed to managerial positions in public universities as well as the lack of an appropriate capacity building policy/programme as impediments to good governance.

Gemandze (chapter 1), underscores the absence of an appropriate development agenda/strategy. As regards media governance, Mokake (chapter 8) refers to the inability of the media, resulting from the lack of an enabling environment, to assert itself as a credible and useful organ of civil society. Endemic farmer-grazer conflicts in Wum (in the North West Region of Cameroon), have sometimes been presented simply from a gender perspective (i.e. men dominating and oppressing women). Kah (chapter 9) contributes to a much more holistic approach. For Kah, the underlying cause is 'corruption', which gave rise to and is nurturing the 'unholy alliance' entered into by local administrative officials; traditional leaders; and cattle breeders against the farmers. In response, the farmers—mainly women—agitate in the form of strikes and street demonstrations both of which hinder governance and development. Nkwi (chapter 10) points to the inability or unwillingness of political elites to use a work of art, the *Afo-A-Kom*, for the enhancement of (good) governance and nationhood.

Finally, it is also interesting to note that in spite of the controversy surrounding the ideological underpinnings and renewal of interest in the use and/or deployment of the concept of governance today, none of the authors either questions or raises any serious reservations about its use or relevance in the Cameroonian context. This point is important because it underscores the fact that governance like democracy is a universal value (Sen, 1998). This view is vindicated by Nkwi's analysis of the political use of the *Afo-A-Kom* to facilitate indigenous governance process in Kom (chapter 10).

The contributors to this volume have not been content with identifying the obstacles to governance and development in Cameroon. Without gainsaying the fact that ‘the best model of development is the one that any society forges for itself on the anvil of its specific conditions’ (Goulet 1971: X), the contributors have made concrete and practical recommendations not only for the institutionalization of good governance but also for the enhancement of a positive relationship between governance and development in the country. These include among others, (1) the adoption of an appropriate development strategy which should focus on rural development given that the majority of Cameroonians live and depend on the rural environment for their livelihoods, (2) the introduction of opportune measures to reduce the high incidence of corruption which is a major obstacle to good governance and development. The measures that would reduce the high incidence of corruption include an improvement in the working conditions of public employees; the establishment and enforcement of a national code of ethics at all levels of society; the creation of an independent commission for the fight against corruption and most importantly, the political will on the part of government to fight corruption; (3) decentralization to widen the scope of participation by the governed not only in the process of implementation but also in decision-making; (4) guaranteeing freedom of expression which is both a fundamental human right and a prerequisite for good governance and, (5) the enforcement of property rights in order to attract economic operators. It is hoped that these policy recommendations would be considered seriously by all stakeholders in the making of governance policy in Cameroon.

Besides identifying the problems of governance and development and recommending solutions, the book also highlights two important issues. The first, contained in chapter nine and demonstrated by the behaviour of the *Batums* (family Heads), is that in Cameroon, corrupt practices extent beyond the public realm into family circles. The second issue which is illustrated in chapter ten with the *Afo-a-Kom*, is that besides their aesthetic and cultural values, works of art can also serve political expedencies.

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This book deals with the important subject of governance and development. Even more significantly, the book has the merits of critically evaluating the concept of good governance in an African context, identifying the internal factors that impinge on good governance and development, and proposing solutions. It provides empirical evidence on the extent to which inappropriate governing strategies are the main internal obstacle to development in Cameroon. The authors discuss factors contributing to precarious and problematic governance from multidisciplinary perspectives, and demonstrate the extent to which such inadequacies impede positive social change. To promote effective development, the authors argue for the implementation of a good governance strategy that comprises, inter alia: adopting appropriate development strategies; decentralizing administration to make for popular participation and ensure accountability; taking the necessary steps to fight corruption; and ensuring the enforcement of property and cultural rights.

“... a commanding scrutiny of the pervasive mentalities that legitimize and make of corruption an integral aspect of the ruling class in Cameroon and Africa.”

Dr Bill F. NDI, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia

“Using an interdisciplinary perspective, this book explores existing relations between governance and a wide range of institutions and processes – development, higher education, economy, media, and societal issues. The book is based on a wide reading in the field and on intensive research of high quality. The lessons learnt deserve careful reading by both academics and policy-makers, and the book could also usefully serve as a textbook of valuable information to students on a topical issue.”

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